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Abstract
From working memory to maths: A multi-measure physiological
investigation of the impact of anxiety
Chiara Avancini
The present research project adopted physiological measures to investigate the rela-
tionship between anxiety and working memory (WM). The importance of WM for maths
processing and the sensitivity of physiological measures to both anxious responses and
executive processes make these measures appealing for advancing our understanding of
maths anxiety (MA). The overarching research question asked whether anxiety affects the
accuracy of the representations in WM, process that is thought to be central in performing
maths task and that may explain the relationship between maths performance and MA.
In this thesis the construct of anxiety was considered under two aspects. First, as source
of noise causing a decrease in performance to tasks relying on WM. Second, as evolutionary
determined physiological reaction to stressors. The former conceptualization of anxiety
informed the parts of this thesis investigating the effects of anxiety over WM. The latter
provided the starting point to investigate how physiological measures may provide insights
on the relationship between the effects of MA on WM processes and maths performance.
The first two studies in the thesis aimed at addressing the question of whether anxiety
affects WM. WM was conceptualized as a limited capacity system where information is
temporarily maintained and manipulated in order to perform a task. It is necessary for
performing complex cognitive tasks as well as for later encoding of information in long term
memory (Baddeley, 1992). The efficiency of such system can be compromised by events
external or internal to the individual. One factor that may impact WM efficiency is anxiety.
Anxiety is a state of tension in the face of threat and it is characterised by worry and increased
physiological arousal. Task-irrelevant self-directed thoughts might reduce WM resources
otherwise needed for performing cognitive tasks (Eysenck et al., 2007). Moreover, the effect
that anxiety has on maths performance, as in the case of maths anxiety (MA), might be
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explained by the effect of anxiety on WM processing (Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001). The present
thesis investigates the interplay between these three constructs with the aid of physiological
measures.
Attentional control has been found to be a central function of WM processing (Baddeley,
1992; Eysenck, 2007). In the first experiment I look at the involvement of attentional
processes in memory encoding by investigating whether ERP prestimulus-memory effects
(pSMEs) are of attentive nature (Otten et al., 2006). If that was the case, investigating how
anxiety affected attentional processed prior memory encoding would have provided a starting
point to address how MA may exert its influence on the performance of maths tasks. Contrary
to my prediction, the pSME seemed to be better explained by semantic processing, rather
than recruitment of attentional processes.
In the second experiment, I investigated how anxiety affects maintenance in WM. To this
aim I used experimentally induced by threat-of-shock might impact WM as conceptualized
by resource models. Resource models of WM give a central role to attentional resources (Ma
et al, 2014). To do so I implemented a modified NPU-threat test protocol (Shmitz & Grillon,
2012) combined with task in which WM was assessed through precision of recall (Bays et
al., 2009) and anxiety was assessed by means of the startle reflex. In the different conditions,
the probability of receiving a shock was manipulated and the estimates of the distributions
fitted to the data were compared to assess whether anxiety decreased precision of recall.
In a third experiment I looked at the specific case of MA. It is thought that MA impairs
maths performance by depleting WM resources (Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001). While MA
impacts on implicit processes such as WM, very few studies have attempted to investigate
implicit measures of MA with varying success. In the experiment I attempt to replicate the
behavioural findings of Rubinsten et al. (2010 and 2012) in which they use an affective
priming task combined with a verification task. Furthermore, I investigate the startle reflex
and heart rate variability as implicit physiological measures, which have never been studied
in the context of MA.
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1.1 Working memory models
1.1.1 What is working memory?
What did you eat last night? Everyone would agree that we need to tap into our memory
storage in order to find the correct answer. While this question seems trivial, how we encode,
maintain and retrieve information from memory has been object of interest for over a century.
Two distinctive memory processes were engaged when answering the question above: a
system that allowed us to maintain the question in our present awareness and a system from
which the answer is retrieved. The concept of a two-systems memory was proposed back
in the 19th century by the seminal work of Wilhelm Wundt and Ernst Meumann and has
received scientific attention ever since (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971).
Early influential models of memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971; Norman, 1968) identi-
fied a long-term store (LTS) in which long-lasting information is stored and a short-term store
(STS), where information is stored temporarily and whose processes are under the immediate
control of the individual. The whole memory system was described in terms of flow of
information in and out the STS. The environmental input is processed by sensory registers
and then transferred to the STS with the aid of selective attention. The information stored
in STS was thought to quickly dissipate unless control processes that are under the control
of the subject are activated (such as overt or covert rehearsal). While in STS, information
could be copied in LTS to form long-lasting representations. Finally, to retrieve from the
LTS, the subject has to use selection strategies to place some information in the STS. This
information probes the activation of subsets of representations from the LTS. These subsets
are then transferred to the STS where representations are scanned and examined to produce
a response output. Hence, the STS functions as a buffer in which both the newly encoded
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and the retrieved information is temporarily maintained and examined by the subject through
cognitive action. The number of information that can be temporarily stored in the STS was
considered limited to seven to nine items.
The concept of the STS in the early models has laid out the basis for the investigation of
what is now referred as working memory (WM). Some aspects such as the limited capacity,
the action of attention, the online manipulation of information for maintenance and selection
are still key features of the current conceptualization of WM. However, in the past decades
the construct if WM has evolved into a variety complex models that have attempted to best
describe cognitive and behavioural performance. WM is indeed believed to be central to
language comprehension (Baddeley, 2003), learning (Wagner, 1999), reasoning (Süß et al.,
2002) and numerical processing (Raghubar et al., 2010). Playing WM a key role in such
fundamental cognitive processes, the understanding of its functioning has important real-life
implications. In educational contexts, interest has grown in understanding the link between
WM and learning disabilities (Brandenburg et al., 2015; Maehler and Schuchardt, 2016;
Peng et al., 2016) and general academic achievement (Alloway, 2009). The ultimate aim is
developing tools that may help specific populations during schooling and beyond (Redick
et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2016; Titz and Karbach, 2014) through WM training. In the
clinical context, the study of WM has informed the understanding of several conditions
such as anxiety and panic disorders (Moran, 2016; Silva et al., 2017), depression (Rose and
Ebmeier, 2006), attentional deficits (Stroux et al., 2016), schizophrenia (Lett et al., 2014),
and various forms of dementia (Beato et al., 2008; Iachini et al., 2009; Kirova et al., 2015).
Given the extent of WM impairments in clinical conditions, research has been conducted
to assess the temporal and spatial neural correlates of WM. Neurologically, WM has been
found to be linked to prefrontal, temporal, parietal and premotor areas (D’esposito and Postle,
2015; Pessoa et al., 2002) and to be correlated with several oscillatory frequencies (Roux
and Uhlhaas, 2014) and ERP components (Vogel et al., 2005).
1.1.2 Models of WM
Influential models of WM
Early models of memory conceptualized the STS as a unitary limited capacity system that fed
information into the LTS. The STS also acted as a WM system, supported learning, retrieval
of old information and complex cognition (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971). This early view was
later challenged by the work of Alan Baddeley. Baddeley (Baddeley, 1992, 2003; Baddeley
and Hitch, 1974) proposed a tripartite system of WM. The system was composed of the
central executive that functions as an attentional control system, a storage for visuospatial
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information called the visuospatial sketchpad and a storage for verbal information called
the phonological loop. Later, a fourth component was added to the model, the episodic
buffer. The episodic buffer serves as a passive storage for multidimensional episodes and
combines multisensory information (Baddeley, 2010). In the model, the four components
interact allowing the information to be processed in parallel across the subsystems rather
than reflecting a single flow of information (Baddeley, 2010).
The relevance that Baddeley’s model has for the framework upon which this thesis has
been developed lies in the key role of the central executive. The central executive coordinates
information from the other subsystem which are referred to as slaves systems. The definition
of the central executive was initially a broad and vague idea of control processes. Later,
specific attentional processes were defined as agents of executive control. The first process
to be identified was the ability of maintaining the focus of attention. Because the central
executive is thought to be a limited capacity system, increasing attentional demands should
impair performance. In a study in which a task put high demand on the central executive,
several secondary tasks were administered in order to selectively disrupt the visuospatial
and phonological subsystems (Robbins et al., 1996). Performance was indeed impaired
when a secondary task that itself required high attentional processing was to be performed.
The second attentive component identified in the central executive was divided attention.
Studies on patients with deficits at the level of the central executive (Baddeley et al., 1991)
performed significantly worse than controls when required to perform a dual task. However,
their performance did not significantly differ to controls when increased level of difficulty
was applied to a single task, supporting the idea that divided attention was a key component
of the central executive (Baddeley et al., 2001). The third process is switching, namely
the ability of switching attention from one object to another and between different tasks.
However, Baddeley considered attention switching to be a process that did not only contribute
to the functioning of the central executive but that may also depend on the phonological loop
(Baddeley, 2002).
The model of Baddeley does not provide a complete framework of the functioning of
WM. However, it has provided substantial advancements in its understanding. The major
contribution of this model is the conceptualization of a multi-system model of WM and the
role of attentional resources as modality-free control over the processing of information.
In my opinion, a shortcoming of such model is the lack of definition of what constitutes
the limited capacity of such system. Baddeley acknowledges that the slaves systems and
the central executive have limited resources. Furthermore, he emphasizes how the episodic
buffer constitutes limited storage where information is integrated from the slaves systems
through the action of the central executive (Baddeley, 2001). However, the work of Baddeley
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does not further explain what are the mechanisms through which representations gain or gain
not access to memory.
Models that have better addressed the issue of WM capacity are attentional models
(Cowan, 2001; Engle, 2002). According to the view of Engle, WM capacity is defined
as the domain-free limitation in the ability to control attention. Hence, WM capacity is
conceptualized as isomorphic to executive attention. Central to the view of Engle is the idea
that greater WM capacity does not reflect a bigger storage space, but a more efficient ability
to use attention to avoid distraction and maintain information in a retrievable state (Engle,
2002). Dealing with proactive interference is indeed thought to be one of the main functions
of WM (Engle, 2002; Kane and Engle, 2000). Proactive interference is when information
in LTM interferes with the learning of new information. Engle (2002) reports the example
of parking a car at the mall: after parking several times at the same mall we might have
difficulty in recalling where we last parked our car because of the interference of previous
memories. Kane and Engle (2000) linked WM capacity to the ability of dealing with proactive
interference by observing that participants with high WM span were more vulnerable to
proactive interference during a dual task than their low WM span peers. That suggested that
high-WM span subjects relied more on attentional resources to reduce interference. Overall,
Eagle’s model provides a definition of WM capacity and its functioning in terms of the ability
of controlling executive attention and of inhibiting the interference of distractors, while
rejecting the notion of WM capacity as storage space.
A substantially different view of the concept of WM capacity is proposed by Cowan
(Cowan, 2001). Central to his theoretical framework are the ideas that the focus of attention
is capacity-limited, that in adults the limit of such focus averages to four chunks, and that
any information deliberately recalled is restricted to such limit of attention. Chunks are
defined as discrete grouping of information that have strong associations to one another
and weak associations with other groups of information. Chunks can be activated from
LTM on the basis of the current environmental context for which these chunks are relevant.
Activated chunks then enter the limited focus of attention, making them available to conscious
awareness. Other authors have investigated the idea that only a few items can be temporarily
and simultaneous be maintained, however there is no resolved consensus on the exact number
(Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1975, 1956).
Cowan’s model differs from Engle’s. According to Cowan, capacity is determined
by a limited and well defined number of representations that can be retained in memory.
Nevertheless, they agree over the centrality of attention in determining WM capacity. Indeed,
it is important to stress that according to Cowan’s view, capacity is not intended as passive
storage of information, but rather as available space within the focus of attention.
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In summary, the models presented above all agree with the concept of WM being limited
in capacity and with the importance of attention to make information readily available to con-
sciousness. There is however major difference between Baddeley’s model and the attentional
models. According to Baddeley, the storage systems are conceptualized as distinct from
attentional control. According to attentional models, WM capacity is thought to be essentially
of attentive nature. Nevertheless, all three models have been essential for understanding WM.
In particular, the concepts of limited capacity, the idea of discrete representations and the
importance of attentional resources are all fundamental for understanding the debate between
slot models and resource models of WM.
Slot models and resource models of WM
The concept of WM as a system that holds a limited number of items has influenced the
development of slot models of WM. According to this approach, visual stimuli are stored in
WM in a small fixed number of memory slots. Those items that are encoded in memory and
that gain access to one of the slots are remembered in high-resolution with all the features
bound together. On the other hand, items that do not gain access to any of the slots are
completely forgotten (Awh et al., 2007; Luck and Vogel, 1997; Rouder et al., 2008; Vogel
et al., 2001; Zhang and Luck, 2008). The mean through which items gain access to the slots
is selective attention (Donkin et al., 2015).
Data in support of these models mainly come from change-detection tasks. These tasks
consist of arrays of items (e.g. coloured squares). Sample arrays are followed by a brief
retention interval and then by a test array. The test array could either be identical to the
sample array or be different in one feature or one single item. The task of the participant is to
judge whether the test array is different from the sample array (Fig. 1.1). Using this paradigm
in their seminal paper, Luck and Vogel (1997) showed that performance to a change detection
task was perfect for set sizes up to 3 and systematically declined as set size increased. These
results were explained as representing failed encoding for items that did not gain access to
memory slots. Support to this hypothesis also came from electroencephalography (Vogel
and Machizawa, 2004) and fMRI studies (Todd and Marois, 2004; Xu and Chun, 2006)
that showed that neural activity reaches a plateau at high memory loads. However, the
methodology of these studies has been put into question (Ma et al., 2014).
Another important feature of slot models is that items that are encoded in WM are
precisely recalled with all their features bound together. In Luck and Vogel (1997), items were
oriented bars in which either orientation or colour could change. Participants’ performance at
set size four was identical whether only one or both features changed in the test array. These
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results supported the hypothesis that items are encoded in WM as perceptually integrated
objects.
Critiques to slot models identified as problematic the experimental paradigm used to
assess WM capacity (Ma et al., 2014). Indeed, change detection tasks use discrete stimulus
sets. Hence, memory recall for objects can only be evaluated in a binary fashion (recalled or
not recalled).
Figure 1.1 Example of the change-detection task using coloured squares (taken from Luck
and Vogel, 2013). The memory array (left panel) is presented followed by a retention interval.
Then, a test array is presented where one item might have changed in one of its features
(in this example, colour). The participant has to judge whether the test array is identical or
different from the memory array.
Data from studies that investigated precision of recall using delayed-estimation tasks
have raised doubts on the validity of slot models. In delayed-estimation tasks, sample items
vary on continuous variables such, as the orientation of a bar in a 360°space or colours from
a colour wheel. After a retention interval, participants are asked to report the features of
a probed sample item as accurately as possible. Performance is measured by precision of
recall (e.g., Bays et al., 2009; Gorgoraptis et al., 2011), meaning the deviation of the feature
values reported by the subject from the feature values of the probed item. These studies
observed that precision of recall continuously decreases with increasing number of items in a
sample array (Bays et al., 2009; Bays and Husain, 2008). Moreover, when an item is cued, its
precision of recall increases at the cost of the other memory items (Bays et al., 2011a). These
findings could not be explained by slot models according to which items that gain access
to a slot are perfectly remembered in all their features and items that do not gain access are
simply not encoded.
An explanation of the above findings was given by resource-models of visual WM.
According to these models, WM is a limited resource system whose resources are flexibly
allocated to all of the items in an array (Bays et al., 2009, 2011a; Bays and Husain, 2008;
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Bays et al., 2011b; Gorgoraptis et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2014; Pertzov et al., 2013; Wilken
and Ma, 2004). Hence, the more the resources are distributed across items, the poorer
is the quality of the representations. But what exactly determines the decrease in quality
representations? Central to the theorization of resource models is the concept of noise. The
representation of each item in memory carries a certain level of stochastic noise. Increasing
the number of items to be retained increases the overall noise in WM as a function of the
reduction of available resources per item (Ma et al., 2014). Noise can affect WM at encoding
(Bays et al., 2011a; Mazyar et al., 2012), maintenance (Pertzov et al., 2013) and recall stages
of processing (Ma et al., 2014).
Figure 1.2 Example of a trial in a delayed-estimation task taken from Bays et al. (2011a).
The memory array contains items whose features vary on a continuous scale (for instance,
orientation). After a retention period, one of the memory items is probed. The participant
has to adjust the features of the test item to match those of the probed item. In this example,
the participant has to reproduce the same orientation of the blue bar in the test array.
Another central aspect of resource models is that resources are not only distributed
across items, but also flexibly allocated (Ma et al., 2014). For example, Gorgoraptis et al.
(2011) showed that, in a delayed-estimation task in which sample stimuli were presented
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sequentially, precision of recall was better for items that had been cued compared to other
items in the sequence. Furthermore, in Bays et al. (2011a) cued items had enhanced quality
of recall even if they were cued retrospectively. These results are taken as supportive of
the idea that WM is constituted of attentional resources that can be voluntarily allocated to
task-relevant stimuli.
As introduced above, precision of recall is measured by the deviation of the reported value
from the exact value of the sample item. Behavioural modelling has shown that deviations
follow a Gaussian-like distribution centred at the sample item value. Deviations from the
target value are generally referred to as errors. Specifically, for features whose values are
drawn from a 360°space, errors are distributed over a Von Mises distribution, which is a
wrapped Gaussian distribution with mean zero. Zero refers to no deviation from the correct
value (e.g., Bays et al., 2009). However, it became apparent that memory quality was not
the only contributor to recall errors. Indeed, a series of studies showed that the features of
non-target stimuli in the memory array also influence precision of memory recall (Bays et al.,
2009, 2011a,b; Gorgoraptis et al., 2011). In other words, reporting errors are also distributed
around the feature of non-target items.
Trying to make sense of reporting errors has brought to the theorization of a model that it
is somehow a compromise between slot and resource models: the discrete representation
model (Zhang and Luck, 2008). According to this model, memory resolution depends on a
small set of discrete, fixed-resolution representations and these slots are described as a type of
resource. Slots are shared across different items, but if an item is more relevant or the number
is small, more slots are devoted to the same item. However, similarly to the slot model
proposed by Luck and Vogel (1997), slots maintain their discrete fashion and only a limited
number of items can be encoded. Hence, some items will not gain access to WM. The discrete
representation model explains the data with a Gaussian+uniform distribution. The uniform
distribution accounts for errors generated by random guessing when no representation of the
item has been encoded in memory.
Overall, these models attempt to provide a detailed description of how WM processes
visuospatial information and constitute a major advancement in the understanding of WM.
What class of models best explains visuospatial WM functioning, is still a heated debate.
1.1.3 The relevance of WM models for the present thesis
In the present thesis, theoretical models of WM informed experimental choices taken in
order to assess the effect of anxiety on WM. In particular, in the planning stages of this
research, the non-dichotomous nature of paradigms assessing resource models appeared to
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potentially offer a better tool for the assessment of the effect of physiological arousal on
memory. Anxiety does not elicit a dichotomous response. In fact, it can rather be described
as a continuous physiological activation that interacts with the subjective perception of threat
(Sussman et al., 2016). Hence, the paradigms developed to assess resource models of WM
(Bays et al., 2011a,b) were adopted the the present experimental work in order to assess the
extent to which anxious arousal affects the noise of representations on WM.
1.2 WM and maths processing
WM has been found to aid numerous high level cognitive processes and its correlation with
maths processing has been widely reported (Adams and Hitch, 1997; DeStefano and LeFevre,
2004; Peng et al., 2016; Raghubar et al., 2010). Performing arithmetic engages complex
skills and it requires to hold information in memory while manipulating it. Hence, not
surprisingly the link between WM and maths processing has received much attention in
the past decade. Furthermore, being able to perform maths has great impact in our daily
lives. First, it is required in a great number of everyday situations (e.g. counting money).
Second, maths performance plays a big role in overall academic achievement. The extent
of the importance of maths abilities has suggested the practical relevance of investigating
the relationship between WM and maths cognition and developing tools for WM trainings,
although their effectiveness is still debated (Holmes and Gathercole, 2014; Melby-Lervåg
and Hulme, 2013).
1.2.1 Contribution of subsystems of WM to maths processing
In order to solve arithmetic problems, the necessary information must be encoded and main-
tained in memory (DeStefano and LeFevre, 2004). Experimental evidence has suggested that
both the visuospatial and phonological components of WM are involved in these processes
and their different contribution seems to be modulated by presentation format (Trbovich and
LeFevre, 2003), presentation duration (Noël et al., 2001) and presentation modality (Logie
et al., 1994). However, the literature on the specific contribution to the individual WM sub-
systems is not conclusive (DeStefano and LeFevre, 2004). The reason might be that mental
arithmetic might engage different processes according to the type of arithmetic operation,
the type of stimuli presentation and the strategies used for problem solving (DeStefano and
LeFevre, 2004).
The phonological loop seems to be involved during counting in additions, subtractions
and multiplications (Hecht, 2002; Lee and Kang, 2002; Lemaire, 1996; Seyler et al., 2003)
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and it has been linked to the ability of maintaining intermediate results during calculation
(Logie et al., 1994; Seitz and Schumann-Hengsteler, 2002). However, evidence for the
involved of the phonological loop is inconsistent. For example, Lemaire (1996) showed that
articulatory suppression impaired performance at a verification task, while De Rammelaere
et al. (2001) did not. Furthermore, Friso-van den Bos et al. (2013) found that verbal updating
was strongly correlated with maths abilities. On the other hand, Passolunghi et al. (2007)
suggested that phonological ability is not involved in mathematics learning ability. It is
possible that such contrasting results depend on the fact that different strategies used for
arithmetic problem solving tap into the verbal subsystem of working memory to a different
extent (Raghubar et al., 2010). Moreover, some of the studies might have failed to isolate
the involvement of the phonological loop from that of the central executive (DeStefano and
LeFevre, 2004).
The visuospatial subsystem of WM has also received attention in the study of maths
processing. In dual-task procedures, visuospatial interference disrupted performance during
subtraction (Lee and Kang, 2002) but not multiplication (Lee and Kang, 2002; Seitz and
Schumann-Hengsteler, 2000). In a longitudinal study with preschoolers and schooling
children, Bull et al. (2008) found that visuospatial WM was a predictor of maths ability.
Evidence for the possible importance of visuospatial WM abilities for maths processing
also comes from specific populations. For example, children with specific maths learning
disabilities seem to have a primary deficit of visuospatial WM (Szűcs, 2016; Szűcs et al.,
2013). They have been found to fail at spatial WM tasks if compared to controls (Passolunghi
and Mammarella, 2012). Furthermore, children with nonverbal learning disabilities had
poorer performance at calculation compared to controls (Mammarella et al., 2010).
The evidence for the role of the central executive for maths processing comes from
several studies. In a dual task experiment in which central executive load was increased
while performing mental additions, performance was impaired regardless of the modality
(visual or auditory) in which the addends were presented. Thus, providing evidence of a
modality-free involvement of the central executive during mental arithmetic (Logie et al.,
1994). It has been proposed that the central executive supports the maintenance of interim
results during mental calculation. Indeed, studies on mental arithmetic that required to
decompose the solving of the operation is steps (for example with operations with carry)
showed a decrement in performance with increased central executive load (Fürst and Hitch,
2000; Seitz and Schumann-Hengsteler, 2000, 2002). Furthermore, executive functions such
as inhibition and switching play a critical role in maths proficiency and are predictors of
maths ability (Bull and Scerif, 2001; Cragg and Gilmore, 2014).
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1.3 Neural evidence for different systems in WM
A multi-system conceptualization of WM explains dissociations in behavioural tasks. Hence,
neuroimaging studies have investigated whether such dissociation is also reflected in distinct
neural correlates.
Areas that have robustly been found to be correlated with WM functioning are the lateral
premotor cortex, the dorsal cingulate and medial premotor cortex, the dorsolateral and
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the frontal poles, and medial and lateral posterior parietal
cortex. Interestingly, these areas were found to be activated for both verbal and visuospatial
stimuli and it has been suggested that they might be central for control and organization of
information in WM (Bor et al., 2004; Curtis and D’Esposito, 2003; Johnson et al., 2005;
Owen et al., 2005). Furthermore, the activity of the prefrontal cortex has been found to
correlate with fluid intelligence (Duncan and Owen, 2000). Hence, these areas might reflect
the neural correlates of the central executive (fig 1.3).
Neural data seem to provide some evidence of the dissociation between visuospatial and
verbal WM (Nee et al., 2012; Owen et al., 2005). It has been reported that caudal superior
frontal sulcus is sensitive to spatial information, while the midlateral prefrontal cortex showed
sensitivity to non-spatial content (Nee et al., 2012). Furthermore, in their metanalysis focusing
on the n-back task, Owen et al. (2005) suggested that the left prefrontal cortex showed
verbal dominance, while the premotor cortex showed spatial dominance. Regarding the
dolsolateral prefrontal cortex, in Bor et al. (2004) it was found to be activated independently
of stimulus modality, but Fried et al. (2014) demonstrated a dissociation of verbal and spatial
WM. Specifically, stimulating the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex improved verbal WM
performance but did not have any effect on visuospatial WM performance.
What are the neural correlates of WM and its sub-systems is an intriguing question in its
own right. While it is out of the scope of the present thesis to investigate the localization of the
WM sub-systems within the brain, neural evidence of WM dissociation has informed studies
that seek to underpin the mechanisms through which anxiety affects performance to tasks
requiring WM. In particular, it has informed the understanding of how the subsystems WM
may compete for resources with anxiety-induced processes. This is particularly important
for the understanding of those types of anxieties, such as maths anxiety (MA), for which the
relationship between anxiety and task performance is thought to be mediated by WM. These
points are further elaborated in the following sections looking at the WM-anxiety interactions
and its key role in determining MA.
12 General Introduction
Figure 1.3 Neural correlates of executive control as found in Nee et al. (2012) metanalysis.
Figure 1.4 Modality-specific neural correlates of WM as found in Nee et al. (2012) metanaly-
sis.
1.3.1 The relevance of the relationship between WM and maths pro-
cessing for the present thesis
In summary, the importance of subsystems of WM in maths processing has been widely
investigated. Furthermore, performance on maths tasks can be significantly affected by
anxiety, ultimately resulting in a great impact on life choices (Ashcraft, 2002; Ashcraft and
Kirk, 2001). The understanding of the mechanisms through which anxiety affects WM may
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therefore offer an insight into how everyday tasks that rely on WM processes, such as maths
performance, are affected by it. In particular, the understanding of how the different systems
of WM contribute to maths processing has informed the choice of investigating the effect of
anxiety on visuospatial WM in chapter 2.
1.4 Effects of anxiety on WM
Anxiety is an emotional state that occurs when an individual faces threat to self-preservation
(Eysenck and Calvo, 1992). It is a multidimensional construct than encompasses personality,
emotion, cognition and physiology (Eysenck et al., 2007, 2005; Eysenck and Calvo, 1992).
Clinically, a study reported that during a lifetime up to 33.7% of the population are affected
by an anxiety disorder (Bandelow and Michaelis, 2015). However, anxiety is not only a
clinical condition, but also an adaptive response to threat. In the presence of danger, it
facilitates sensory processing and it initiates cognitive and physiological changes that prepare
the individual to activate defence mechanisms aiding self-preservation (Baas et al., 2006;
Grillon, 2008). However, anxiety has been found to impair performance in several cognitive
tasks (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992).
In the following sections, I am going to introduce how anxiety influences cognitive
processing with a focus on WM. Then, I will introduce some physiological measures of
anxiety that have been relevant for the development of the present research project.
1.4.1 Anxiety and cognition
Attention bias
Anticipation of future threats is a central aspect of anxiety. Anxiety is elicited by unpre-
dictable harm and by distal, potential or symbolic threats. For example, in a study in which
the administration of threatening stimuli was signalled or not-signalled, the unpredictability
of the not-signalled condition induced higher anxious responses in participants (Grillon et al.,
2004). At the subjective level, anticipation of threat results in tension, worry and feeling of
insecurity (Grillon, 2008). At the cognitive level, it is characterized by attentional changes
such as enhanced and sustained vigilance (Blanchard et al., 1993), and attention bias (Cisler
and Koster, 2010). Attention bias has received wide interest in literature and it is at the centre
of the most influential models explaining the effects of anxiety on cognition (Cisler and
Koster, 2010). Experimental research has shown that anxiety facilitates attention towards
threatening stimuli and it has been observed in studies using several different paradigms
involving both verbal and spatial judgements (Cisler et al., 2009). As examples, in a modified
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Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), threatening and neutral words are displayed in different colours.
Participants are required to report the colour ignoring the the semantic meaning of the words.
Delayed responses for threatening words have been reported in several clinical populations
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). In the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986), two words (threatening
or neutral) are displayed on a screen. After words offset, a probe appears at the location of
one of the words and the participant has to indicate what word was replaced by the probe.
It has been shown that anxious participants respond faster when the probe replaces the
threatening stimulus, possibly as a result of the attentional preference for threat (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007; Bradley et al., 1999). Another effect that anxiety has on attentional processes is
an increased difficulty in disengaging attention from a threat stimulus (Cisler et al., 2009;
Fox et al., 2002). Furthermore, some studies have also observed attentional avoidance in
high anxious participants (Koster et al., 2006; Mogg et al., 2004).
In summary, the anxiety-induced attentional bias has been widely reported in literature.
In the framework of the present thesis, the influence that anxiety has on attentional resources
is considered the chain ring that allows us to grasp how anxiety affects WM.
Models
The Attentional Control Theory (ACT) from Eysenck and Calvo constitutes the most in-
fluential theory explaining how anxiety impacts performance at cognitive tasks. It places
attention at the centre of the relationship between anxiety and performance. The theory
generates from the assumption that anxiety increases attention to threat-related stimuli at the
cost of task-related stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007). Such assumption links to the idea that
there are two attentional systems (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). One is the goal-directed
system which is guided by expectations and it exerts top-down control over attention. Neural
correlates of this system have been identified in the prefrontal cortex. The second is the
stimulus-driven system which is influenced by the salience of the stimulus and it regulates
attention via bottom-up processes. The neural correlates of this system have been localized
at temporoparietal and ventral frontal areas. While these systems usually interact with each
other in an adaptive manner (Pashler et al., 2001), according to the ACT anxiety disrupts
such balance resulting in a increased action of the stimulus-driven system at cost of the
goal-directed system (Eysenck et al., 2007).
Attentional imbalance is thought to impact performance through its effects on the central
executive as conceptualised by (Baddeley, 1992). Specifically, the ACT explains the atten-
tional effects of anxiety over three executive functions as identified by Miyake et al. (2000):
inhibition, shifting and updating. Inhibition consists in the ability of using attentional control
to resist task-irrelevant stimuli. Shifting is the ability to adapt attentional control on the basis
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of task demands. Updating is the monitoring of working memory representations. According
to the ACT, anxiety impairs the inhibition function (Eysenck et al., 2007). Hence, anxious
individuals will be less efficient in inhibiting task-irrelevant stimulation. Task-irrelevant
stimulation is intended not only as external threats but also internal thought of worry and
ruminations.
As a result of impaired inhibition, anxious individuals will have less available resources
to devote to the task. Evidence for this account comes from studies that observed reduced
WM storage and processing in anxious participants (Darke, 1988; MacLeod and Donnellan,
1993; Owens et al., 2012). Such effect is greater in tasks that require high demands on the
central executive (Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001). However, it is important to mention that anxiety
does not always translate into poorer performance thanks to the engagement of compensatory
processes (Eysenck et al., 2007). Furthermore, participants that have high WM might benefit
from high anxiety as additional motivation to perform well (Owens et al., 2014).
Neuroscientific studies have also brought evidence in support of the relationship between
anxiety and central executive functions. Anxious individuals show reduced recruitment
of prefrontal areas suggesting that anxiety hinders attentional control (Bishop et al., 2004;
Bishop, 2007, 2009; Fales et al., 2008). Furthermore, ERP studies have reported higher
amplitudes of the P1, P2 and P3 components in anxious individuals when exposed to threat
(Bar-Haim et al., 2005; Carretié et al., 2003; Eldar and Bar-Haim, 2010; Li et al., 2006, 2005).
The P1 has been found to be a correlate of visuospatial orienting of attention (Luck et al.,
1990), the P2 of attention disengagement (Bar-Haim et al., 2005), and the P3 of strategic
orientation of attention (Polich, 2007).
The alternative two-components model has been proposed after observing that the im-
pairment of performance is reduced when subjects engage in a difficult task that occupies
executive resources (Vytal et al., 2012). The model suggests that when WM tasks are easy,
there are free resources for anxious apprehension to engage and therefore the effect of anxiety
is greater. The two components model also theorizes a differential effect of anxiety on verbal
and visuospatial WM. According to the model, engaging in a high load verbal WM task
reduces the impact of anxiety by engaging top-down emotional control mechanisms. On the
other hand, the effect of anxiety on high-load visuospatial WM is not attenuated. That is
because anxiety and visuospatial WM compete for resources of defensive mechanisms, such
as perceptual sensitivity and autonomic arousal which are independent of WM load. Vytal
et al. (2013) found that induced anxiety disrupted more low and medium-load verbal WM
compared to high-load and that visuospatial WM was disrupted regardless of task difficulty.
Finally, Shackman et al. (2006) proposed the hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis accord-
ing to which anxiety uniquely disrupts spatial WM performance accuracy. The reason would
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be that task-irrelevant anxious arousal and attentional processes compete with spatial WM
processes for resources in the right prefrontal cortex and other more posterior regions (Lavric
et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2006).
While the three models may predict different experimental outcomes, they are not
mutually exclusive. Indeed, all models are centred around the crucial interplay between
anxiety and attentional control. The effect of anxiety over attentional mechanisms is solidly
corroborated by experimental research.
1.4.2 Can poor performance induce anxiety and reduce WM capacity?
The models explaining how WM mediates the relationship between anxiety and performance
assume a specific causal direction. Namely, the models explain how anxiety has a detrimental
effect on performance. However, may the relationship be explained by the opposite causal
direction? Can performance induce anxiety that reduces WM capacity? Some studies
suggest that individuals with poor performance at tasks involving WM report higher levels
of anxiety (Passolunghi, 2011; Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010). This may suggest that poor
performance may induce anxiety. However, it is important to note that these studies mainly
focus on learning settings while, to the best of my knowledge, the literature is lacking a
more generalizable investigation of the role that poor performance plays in inducing anxiety.
Moreover, deficits in WM are thought to characterize learning disabilities (Fias et al., 2013;
Mammarella et al., 2015, 2010). In such cases, poor performance might induce anxiety.
However, that provides an explanation for clinical populations but cannot answer the question
on whether poor performance reduces WM capacity through means of anxious arousal in
non-clinical subjects. Such gap in the literature may be either justified by failure to provide
evidence for such causal direction of the relationship. On the other hand, researchers might
have simply overlooked to possibility of such directionality. In summary, the question
remains open and unanswered. Understanding whether is certain cases poor performance
reduces WM capacity through anxiety would be very important in directing and targeting
tailored interventions.
1.4.3 Anxiety and physiology
Anxiety induces physiological arousal that will prepare the body for a rapid behavioural
response to danger (Marks and Nesse, 1994). Symptoms of physiological arousal caused
by anxious states are thought to reflect activity of the autonomic nervous system (ANS)
(Thayer et al., 1996). The ANS can be divided into the sympathetic and parasympathetic
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branches that, from the brain stem and through the spinal cord, innervate the cardiovascular
and visceral systems. The coordinated activity of the two branches prepares the body
to respond to threat in emergencies or stressful situations (Jänig and McLachlan, 1992).
Anxiety is characterized by sympathetic activation and parasympathetic deactivation which
cause a series of physiological reactions, including increase in heart rate (HR), increase
in blood pressure, decrease in fingers temperature, increase in respiratory rate and oxygen
consumption, and increase in the variation of the electrical properties of the skin in response to
sweat secretion (skin conductance) (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010; Kreibig, 2010). Although
not exhaustive, in the following section I will introduce some of the physiological measures
used to assess anxiety.
Startle
The fear/anxiety-potentiated startle reflex, or simply startle, is an ubiquitous, cross-species
response to abrupt and intense stimulation. It manifests as a rapid sequential muscle contrac-
tion that has evolved to facilitate the flight reaction and to protect the body from a sudden
attack. While it has the characteristic of being stereotyped, its amplitude measured through
electromyography (EMG) shows high variability that reflects variation in the internal state of
the organism (Grillon, 2008; Grillon and Baas, 2003; Hamm and Vaitl, 1996). The startle
reflex has gained popularity as a measure to infer psychological states for several reasons. It
is an automatic response that is not influenced by intentional control; it is resistant to response
bias that usually affects verbal reports and voluntary motor responses such as reaction times;
it can be elicited at any time to probe ongoing affective processes; it has high sensitivity to ha-
bituation, sensitization, sensorimotor gating, and affective modulation; it is easy to elicit and
quantify (Grillon and Baas, 2003; Hamm and Vaitl, 1996). In psychophysiological research,
the startle is usually elicited with abrupt bursts of white noise and it is measured through the
EMG of the orbicularis oculi muscle (Blumenthal et al., 2005). At the neurological level, the
startle has been found to be regulated by the activity of the amygdala and the bed nucleus of
the stria terminalis. The latter is responsible for responses to uncertain and durable threats as
in the case of general anxiety, context conditioning and chronic stress (Gewirtz et al., 1998;
Grillon and Davis, 1997; Richardson and Elsayed, 1998).
A successful protocol that has been developed to study anxiety by measuring the startle
reflex is the NPU-threat test (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012), which has been readapted in the
research presented in this thesis. The test was originally developed to assess phasic and
sustained stress responses in humans. The protocol, as described by Schmitz and Grillon
(2012), is composed by three conditions. N, a safe condition in which no aversive stimulus is
delivered; P, a condition in which predictable electric shocks are delivered; U, a condition in
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which unpredictable electric shocks are delivered. In the P condition, a visual cue signals the
administration on the shock, while in the U condition the visual cue does not predict shock
administration. The startle reflex is induced by the presentation of bursts of white noise.
According to Grillon and Baas (2003), the physiological arousal induced by the un-
predictable condition reflects anxious states, as the uncertainty of threat creates a sense of
sustained tension. Research on clinical populations has proved the NPU-threat test to be an
effective method to study anxiety disorders. For example, it has been shown how individuals
with panic disorder or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are selectively more sensitive to
the startle elicited in the unpredictable condition than in the predictable condition (Grillon
et al., 2008).
Cortisol and skin conductance
The activation of the sympathetic nervous system during a stressful situation activates
the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis which results in an increase of cortisol
concentration in the blood and in the saliva (Gaab et al., 2005; Sapolsky et al., 2000). Levels
of cortisol within the system physiologically change during the day due to circadian rhythms.
Disregulation of blood and salivary cortisol levels has been found in anxiety disorders (Hek
et al., 2013; Mantella et al., 2008; Vreeburg et al., 2010). Increases in cortisol responses
to stressful situations are considered a marker of acute stress (Armario et al., 1996; Berger
et al., 2016). Furthermore, cortisol responses to stress have been found to mediate WM and
executive functions. However, the literature is inconsistent in identifying the direction of the
relationship between cortisol levels and cognitive performance (Al’Absi et al., 2002; Duncko
et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2008; Shields et al., 2016; Vedhara et al., 2000).
The skin conductance response refers to enhanced electricity conductivity of the skin as
response to external events. The phenomenon occurs when increased nerve activity increases
the number of sweat glands opening. Because the activity of the sudorimotor nerve is
thought to reflect sympathetic arousal, fluctuations of skin conductance may reflect anxious
responding (Bach et al., 2010). The relationship between anxiety and skin conductance is
still not clear. While some studies reported enhanced skin conductance responses in anxiety
disorders (Hinrichs et al., 2017), others have failed to detect such relationship (Glover et al.,
2011; Marin et al., 2017; Rosebrock et al., 2016).
HR variability
The human heart is controlled by electrical discharges that stimulate contractions and that can
be measured with the electrocardiogram (ECG). The cyclic depolarization and repolarization
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of the heart ventricula generates the shape of the PQRST waves. The largest portion of the
signal is the QRS complex (Fig. 1.5, left panel) which is caused by ventricular depolarization
(systole). The time between consecutive R-R peaks (also called inter-beat-intervals, IBIs)
is highly irregular during steady-state conditions (Fig. 1.5, right panel) and it is referred
to as heart rate variability (HRV). HRV is regulated by the action of the sympathetic and
parasympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous system. Hence, analysing HRV can give
information on autonomic balance (Peltola, 2012; Shaffer et al., 2014).
Figure 1.5 Left panel: the QRS complex caused by ventricular depolarization. Right panel:
sinus rhythm of the heart. The duration of R-R intervals vary greatly and is a measure of
HRV.
Short-term HRV 1 is influenced by dynamic autonomic balance and regulatory mecha-
nisms such as the baroreceptor reflex, rhythmic changes in vascular tone, and the respiration-
driven speeding and slowing of the heart via the vagus nerve (Shaffer and Ginsberg, 2017).
Regarding autonomic balance, the parasympathetic system exerts effects over the heart faster
(less than 1 second) than the sympathetic system (more than 5 seconds). The concurrent
contradictory action of the two systems regulates HRV. Regarding regulatory mechanisms,
their action on HRV is approximately in the range of 4 to 5 seconds (Shaffer and Ginsberg,
2017).
Optimal levels of HRV reflect physiological adaptability and self-regulatory capacity
(Shaffer and Ginsberg, 2017). Higher levels of vagally-mediated HRV have been linked to
the engagement of executive functions by the prefrontal cortex (McCraty and Shaffer, 2015).
For example, Hansen et al. (2003) showed that higher resting-state HRV is associated with
1Long-term HRV, such as 24 hours recordings, will not be discussed here as it goes beyond the scope of this
thesis
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better performance at cognitive tasks engaging executive functions. Moreover, HRV during
task performance is decreased compared to resting-states and it is lower if the tasks involve
high cognitive load (Hansen et al., 2003; Hjortskov et al., 2004; Mukherjee et al., 2011;
Taelman et al., 2011). HRV is also thought to reflect regulation of emotional responding
(Appelhans and Luecken, 2006). For instance, individuals with reported scores of adaptive
coping strategies to stress have been found to have higher resting-state HRV (Fabes and
Eisenberg, 1997; O’Connor et al., 2002). Furthermore, patients diagnosed with anxiety
disorders show chronic HRV reduction and PTSD patients show reduced HRV during the
recalling of traumatic episodes (Chalmers et al., 2014; Martens et al., 2008).
Measures of HRV can be divided into two main groups: time-domain and frequency-
domain measures. Because of the large number of available indices, here I will review those
relevant for understanding the methodology adopted in the present reasearch project.
Time-domain measures Time-domain indices quantify HRV over periods that can range
from just over 1 minute up to 24 hours. The mean and the standard deviation of the IBIs of
normal sinus beats (SDNN) are calculated from recordings in which abnormally premature
beats (ectopic beats) have been removed; hence the term "normal" is adopted to refer to
R-R peaks. They are influenced by both branches of the autonomic nervous system and are
a popular measure for short recording times of 5 mins (Malik et al., 1996). In short-term
recordings, the primary influence is exerted by parasympathetically-mediated respiratory
sinus arrhythmia (Shaffer and Ginsberg, 2017).
The root mean square of successive differences between normal heartbeats (RMSSD) is
also a popular measure for short-term recordings (the standard is 5 min of duration). The











where N is the number of IBIs and R are normal R peaks.2
The RMSSD is the primary time-domain measure to estimate vagally mediated changes
(Shaffer et al., 2014). The RMSSD is relatively unaffected by respiration compared to other
measures (Hill et al., 2009) and it is more influenced by the parasympathetic nervous system
than the SDNN (Shaffer and Ginsberg, 2017).
2R−R refers to normalized R-R intervals in which ectopic beats have been removed.
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Time-frequency measures The Fast-Fourier Transformation (FFT) is used to decompose
the HR signal into frequency bands. The low-frequency (LF) band has 0.04–0.15 Hz
boundaries and it requires a minimum of 2 minutes of recording. The parasympathetic and
the sympathetic branches of the nervous system and blood pressure baroceptors contribute to
LF power. However, the parasympathetic nervous system is believed to have more weight in
determining LF power compared to the sympathetic nervous system (Shaffer and Ginsberg,
2017).
The high-frequency (HF) band has 0.15–0.40 Hz boundaries and it requires a minimum
of 1 minute of recording. The HF band reflects parasympathetic activity and it is highly
correlated with the respiratory cycle. HF power is also correlated with the RMSSD (Shaffer
and Ginsberg, 2017).
The LF to HF ratio (LF/HF ratio) is based on the assumption that LF are mostly generated
by sympathetic activity and that HF are mostly generated by parasympathetic activity. Hence,
a high LF/HF ratio is thought to indicate a stress response with high sympathetic activity
and parasympathetic withdrawal. However, some authors have argued that the relationship
between the sympathetic and parasympatetic systems is not linear and that LF is not a pure
measure of sympathetic activity (Billman, 2013). Furthermore, the influence of sympathetic
activity over LF might be influenced by testing conditions (Shaffer et al., 2014).
1.4.4 The relevance of understanding anxious arousal for the present
thesis
In summary, studies have demonstrated that anxiety can be effectively measured on-line
by means of physiological indexes. Moreover, as suggested by Eysenck and Calvo (1992),
physiological arousal may also contribute to ineffective attentional resource allocation,
resulting in impaired WM performance. Hence, in the present work, some of the physiological
measures of anxiety have been adopted in order to investigate the relationship between anxiety,
WM and maths processing. In particular, HRV measures and the startle reflex have been
chosen to answer the research questions in chapters 3 and 4.
1.5 MA and physiological measures
Maths anxiety (MA) refers to a debilitating negative emotional reaction to mathematical
tasks and it may occur in both children and adults (Ashcraft, 2002; Ma, 1999). MA is
typically measured by self-report questionnaires in which individuals rate their agreement or
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disagreement on a series of sentences referring to everyday situations involving maths. It has
been reported that MA has great negative impact on both children’s and adults’ mathematical
education: it contributed to the development of negative attitudes towards tasks involving
maths (Devine et al., 2012). As a consequence, people with high MA are more likely tp drop
out of elective mathematics classes and avoid pursuing careers that require quantitative skills
(Ashcraft, 2002; Ashcraft and Faust, 1994; Devine et al., 2012).
Evidence suggests that MA is a distinct construct from other types of anxiety such as test
anxiety (TA) and generalized anxiety (GA). TA is defined as anxiety elicited specifically by
evaluative situations in educational settings (Hembree, 1988; von der Embse et al., 2018).
On the other hand, GA is not specific to particular situations and it reflects an individual’s
disposition to experience worry (Hill et al., 2016). Moderate correlations have been found
between measures of MA and measures of TA (Devine et al., 2012; Dew and Galassi, 1983;
Hembree, 1990) and measures of GA (Hill et al., 2016). However, measures of MA correlate
more with one another than with measures of TA (Dew and Galassi, 1983; Hembree, 1990)
and the correlation between MA and maths performance persists when controlling for TA
(Devine et al., 2012). In the case of GA, when scores on GA scales were partialled out from
the correlation between measures of MA and maths perfomance, the negative correlation
between MA and maths performance persisted in secondary school pupils (Hill et al., 2016).
These results suggest that MA is indeed an independent construct specific for maths-related
situations and stimuli.
1.5.1 The relationship between MA and performance
The negative correlation between MA and maths performance has been reported by numerous
studies (Ashcraft, 2002; Devine et al., 2012; Hembree, 1990; Jansen et al., 2013; Ma, 1999).
Whether MA is a product of poor maths performance or whether maths performance is
negatively influenced by MA, has been object of debate. Two theories have been developed
to explain such relationship (Carey et al., 2016).
The Deficit Theory theorizes that having poor maths skills, especially in early childhood,
contributes to developing MA (Carey et al., 2016). Supporting this theory are studies that
found that children with specific learning disabilities report higher levels of MA compared to
normally developing children (Passolunghi, 2011; Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010). Further,
adults with poor basic numerical skills report higher MA (Maloney et al., 2011). A criticism
to these studies is that the incidence of maths learning disabilities cannot explain the entirety
of the extent of MA reporting (Devine et al., 2013). Regarding studies with adults, they lack
specificity on the developmental trajectory, providing no information on the direction of the
relationship (Carey et al., 2016). Other studies in support of the Deficit Theory reported
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correlations between students’ academic performance and MA levels the following year (Ma
and Xu, 2004).
The Debilitating Anxiety Model proposes that MA impacts performance by impairing
processing resources necessary to efficiently perform maths (Carey et al., 2016; Douglas and
LeFevre, 2018). One possibility is that MA taxes on WM functions. Ashcraft and Kirk (2001)
found a negative correlation between levels of MA and WM span. Moreover, in problems
with high or low WM load, performance to high WM load problems was more affected by
MA (Ashcraft and Krause, 2007). Evidence of the influence of MA on executive functions is
also provided by the observation that performance improves in situations where cognitive
interference is reduced (Faust et al., 1996). A second possibility is that MA determines
the selection of less efficient problem solving strategies, resulting in poorer performance
(Beilock and DeCaro, 2007). Further support for the Debilitating Anxiety Model comes from
studies in which the manipulation of anxiety modulates maths performance (Marx et al.,
2013; Seitchik et al., 2014).
Both the Deficit Theory and the Debilitating Anxiety Model give a theoretical explanation
of the relationship between MA and performance, assuming a negative correlation between
the two constructs. However, if anxiety has evolved as an adaptive response to threat, can
a certain degree of MA be adaptive? Specifically, can a certain level of anxiety-enhanced
perceptual processing aid maths performance? Some studies suggest that the effect of MA
on performance is mediated by other factors such as negative attitude towards mathematics
(Ashcraft, 2002), WM capacity (Beilock, 2008; Mattarella-Micke et al., 2011) and gender
(Devine et al., 2012; Hembree, 1990). Some of these studies have reported cases in which
MA had limited, if any at all, impact on performance. For example, Mattarella-Micke et al.
(2011) reported no correlation between MA and maths performance in individuals with
low WM capacity. Betz (1978) found no detrimental effects of MA on maths achievement
of males enrolled in a non-maths heavy subject. On the other hand, Devine et al. (2012)
showed that girls’ maths performance was not affected by MA when controlling for test
anxiety. While these studies suggest that MA does not necessarily impact performance,
evidence of a positive correlation between performance and MA is lacking. There may be
several explanations of why this is the case. The adaptiveness of anxiety is determined by
the evolutionary advantage of perceptual enhancement, physical preparation and attentional
modulation in the face of possible danger. In practical terms, anxiety is adaptive when a
fight-flight-or-freeze response is evolutionary advantageous. However, educational or testing
scenarios where MA is likely to develop may not present the characteristics in which anxious
arousal is advantageous. It is however to be noted that the literature investigates LMAs
or HMAs populations, hardly taking into account intermediate levels of MA. Hence, the
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lack of positive correlations between MA and performance might origin from a bias in
sample selection. It would be interesting investigating whether mild anxious arousal might
actually enhance maths performance. It is possible that differences in coping mechanisms
and differences in attitude towards mathematics would mediate the relationship between
mild anxious arousal and maths performance. For example, individuals that experience
moderate feeling of tensions but have a positive attitude towards maths would benefit from
physiological arousal. The possibility of positive effects of moderate MA over performance
has been overlooked and needs further investigation.
1.5.2 Physiological measures of MA
As for other main types of anxiety, physiological measures of MA have received scientific
interest in the past years. However, the literature is still relatively scarce and findings are
far from being exhaustive. The big number of measures and indices that can be investi-
gated, the recent interest of psychophysiology in MA and the difficulty in carrying out
psychophysiological work in educational settings make this topic still of niche interest. 3
Autonomic measures and cortisol
The first study that used simple HR (calculated in beats-per-minutes) to investigate MA was
Dew et al. (1984). The study focused on whether in test-like situations MA interfered with
performance. They assessed the relationship between MA and performance in relation to
physiological arousal and avoidance behaviour. Self-report data were collected by asking
participants to complete the following questionnaires: the Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale
(MARS, Richardson and Suinn, 1972), the Mathematics Anxiety Scale (MAS; Fennema
and Sherman, 1976), and the Anxiety Toward Mathematics Scale (ATMS; Sandman, 1979).
During the testing, the participants solved 20 arithmetic computation problems and 15 words
problems with no time limits. Subsequently, a third set of problems was administered under
test-like conditions: the need for speed and accuracy was emphasized, the task was timed,
and it was communicated that the aim was to assess maths ability. The problems in the
third set were most likely arithmetic problems, although no clear description of the task is
given in the paper. HR was uncorrelated to most self-report measures with the exception of a
negative correlation with the ATMS. Such correlation is isolated and not supported by further
research.
Two other studies have found little sensitivity of HR to MA levels. In a study (Hopko
et al., 2003b) in which anxiety was induced by means of carbon dioxide inhalation (CO2),
3This section has been published as part of the book chapter Avancini and Szűcs (2019)
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HR increased as a result of the experimental manipulation but there was no difference in
physiological response between high maths-anxious individuals (HMAs) and low maths-
anxious individuals (LMAs). The study suggests that the manipulation of anxiety by CO2
administration does not influence HR in HMAs more than non-clinical participants. It is
however also possible that HMAs do not specifically respond to inhalation of CO2, at least
no more than any other population.
Finally, Hopko et al. (2005) found that differences in MA self-ratings to the Abbreviated
Maths Anxiety Scale (AMAS, Hopko et al., 2003a) did not correspond to differences in
HR modulation when participants were asked to perform attentional tasks. While these
attentional tasks mostly included tasks unrelated to performing maths (such as the Stroop
task), they did include the PASAT-C (Lejuez et al., 2003) which requires one to perform
mental additions. Again, HR after the completion of the PASAT-C was not modulated by
pre-experimental levels of MA. Similarly to HR results, little evidence shows that skin
conductance is sensitive to MA levels. In the experiment of Dew et al. (1984) described
above, data on skin conductance was obtained for two indices: skin conductance fluctuations
and skin conductance levels. The first reflected the rate of spontaneous skin fluctuations
per minute which occur as a result of the activity of the sudorimotor nerve. Increased
nerve activity increases the number of sweat glands opening. Because the activity of the
sudorimotor nerve is thought to reflect sympathetic arousal, fluctuations of skin conductance
may reflect anxious responding (Bach et al., 2010). The second index, was obtained by
comparing the value of post-test skin conductance to a pre-test baseline value. Higher levels
of skin conductance post-test would reflect stronger anxious responding during the testing.
Only skin conductance levels correlated with scores to the MARS and the ATMS, suggesting
that participants with high MA have higher skin conductance during testing than during a
baseline period. While these results suggest the sensitivity of skin conductance levels to
maths anxious responding, no other study supported these findings. For example, a group
of participants that had anxiety induced by the inhalation of CO2 showed increased skin
conductance levels compared to than the control group. However, no differences were found
between HMAs and LMAs (Hopko et al., 2003b). Furthermore, pre-experimental MA levels
assessed with the AMAS did not modulate the skin conductance response during attentional
tasks (Hopko et al., 2005).
A third physiological measure that has been traditionally used to assess anxious arousal
and that researchers have tried to study as a potential physiological measure of MA, is the
concentration of salivary cortisol. The comparison between the concentration in samples
collected before and after a stressful event provide a measure of anxious arousal. Salivary
cortisol has been found to be associated with maths performance as a function of MA
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and WM capacity (Mattarella-Micke et al., 2011). Participants judged the correctness of
arithmetic problems in the form “x ≡ (y mod z)”. Problems had two levels of difficulty: high
demand and low demand. The first type included a carry and could not be solved with simple
heuristics, while the latter included no carry and could be solved with simple heuristics.
Then, WM capacity was assessed with the automated Reading Span task (RSPAN; Conway
et al., 2005) which requires one to read a series of sentences followed by a letter and to judge
whether the sentences make sense or not. After two to five sentences, the participants were
asked to recall as many letters at the end of the sentences as possible. Scores were calculated
on the total numbers of letters recalled. Finally, MA was assessed with the shortened MARS
(sMARS; Alexander and Martray, 1989). Cortisol samples were taken prior the testing and
after the arithmetic task. With increasing levels of cortisol, maths performance decreased
when high-WM participants were also HMAs, while performance increased when they were
also LMAs. On the other hand, maths performance did not vary as a function of cortisol
and MA in low-WM participants. This suggests that the effect of physiological arousal on
maths performance depends on the interacting effects of MA and WM capacity and on the
difficulty of the task. Such relationships emerged when the operations presented were high
demand and not when the operations were low demand. The study provides an indication of
the potential of cortisol as a measure of anxiety in maths-related context when WM and task
difficulty are also taken into consideration.
The association between salivary cortisol levels and maths performance as a function of
MA was also reported by Pletzer et al. (2010). They tested the association between cortisol
concentration levels and MA during statistics examinations. In particular, participants were
categorized into cortisol profiles according to the variation of cortisol levels pre and post
examination compared to a baseline. Only participants whose cortisol levels increased pre-
examination and decreased post-examination showed a negative correlation between MA
levels (assessed with the MARS30-brief; Suinn and Winston, 2003) and maths performance.
The authors argued that examination-induced cortisol responses facilitate the association
between MA and maths performance. Both the results of Pletzer et al. (2010) and Mattarella-
Micke et al. (2011) suggest that the interaction between MA as assessed by self-report
measures, salivary cortisol and performance depends on the interaction between these factors
rather than their individual contribution.
Cortisol has also been found to be sensitive to MA levels when the performance of maths
is associated with emotional processing (Sarkar et al., 2014). The authors looked at reduc-
tions of cortisol levels in a study in which the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, area associated
with emotional processing, was stimulated in order to inhibit negative and facilitate positive
emotions by means of transcranial direct stimulation. A dissociation between HMAs and
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LMAs was found: in HMAs, reductions in cortisol levels (calculated by subtracting prestim-
ulation from poststimulation levels and then dividing by prestimulation levels) occurred only
during real stimulation, while for the LMAs greater reductions in cortisol levels occurred
only during sham stimulation.
To date, findings on simple HR and skin conductance point toward a lack of sensitivity of
these measures to MA levels as assessed by self-report measures. On the other hand, literature
examining cortisol responses seem more promising. In particular, cortisol seems to play a
role in the relationship between MA and maths performance. However, the mechanisms
through which cortisol, MA and performance interact are still unclear, as the literature is still
scarce and mostly correlational.
Electroencephalography
Electroencephalography (EEG) records the spontaneous electrical activity produced by
groups of neurons firing in synchrony. Event-related potentials (ERPs), refer to the brain’s
electrical response time-locked to the presentation of a stimulus (Fig. 1.6). ERPs waveforms
consist in components, which are deflections characterized by peaks. Peaks have a certain
polarity (positive or negative), a latency (how many milliseconds after the presentation of
the stimulus the peak occurs) and a location on the scalp where they are detected. Different
components are thought to reflect the allocation of brain resources in order to precess stimuli
and are considered a correlate of different cognitive processes engaged in such processing.
The P2 component is a positive deflection peaking at around 200ms after stimulus onset.
Several studies have found it to differ between levels of MA. For example, is was modulated
by MA in a study investigating the precision of magnitude representation (Núñez-Peña and
Suárez-Pellicioni, 2014). In a number comparison task (Núñez-Peña and Suárez-Pellicioni,
2014), the P2 amplitude was larger in HMAs than in LMAs when comparing trials in which
the numerical difference between the stimuli was small to trials in which the difference
was large. Similarly, it was larger in HMAs than in LMAs when comparing trials with
small numbers to trials with large numbers. According to well-established research in
maths cognition, the processing of arithmetic problems with large solutions is harder than
the processing of problems with small solutions (Groen and Parkman, 1972) because large
numbers are represented more vaguely and therefore are more difficult to discriminate (Restle,
1970). Furthermore, the comparison between numbers that are numerically close to each
other is harder than the comparison of number further apart because the representations of
close numbers overlap (Moyer and Landauer, 1967). Both these effects have been attributed
to the ability of accessing magnitude representations. The P2 had previously been identified
as a measure of effort to distinguish two overlapping number representations as it had been
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shown that its amplitude is greater when the difference between two numbers is smaller
(Szűcs and Soltész, 2008; Temple and Posner, 1998). Hence, the increased P2 amplitude
in the HMAs group may reflect less precise magnitude representation which may result in
recruitment of more cognitive resources in order to perform the task.
Figure 1.6 Example of an ERP waveform. Depicted here is the P2 component analysed in
Núñez-Peña and Suárez-Pellicioni (2014). The P2 peaks at 200ms after stimulus onset and
has positive polarity.
Larger prefrontal P2 amplitude in HMAs compared to LMAs has also been recorded in
a multi-digit verification task (Suárez-Pellicioni et al., 2015). The prefrontal P2 amplitude
has been found to be greater after the presentation of emotionally negative stimuli, and it
has been suggested to be a correlate of the employment of attentional resources toward
negative stimuli (Carretié et al., 2004, 2001). The authors argued that enhanced P2 amplitude
in HMAs may reflect the mobilization of attentional resources toward difficult arithmetic
operations which are attributed negative emotional value.
While increased P2 amplitudes have suggested that HMAs allocate more attentional
resources when performing tasks involving maths, contrasting results were reported by Klados
et al. (2015) in a study using a verification task. While the authors did not specifically refer
to the P2 components, the frontocentral positive amplitude around 180–220 ms poststimulus
was bigger for LMAs than HMAs. Because a similar effect of MA was found in a control
attentional task, the authors suggested that there was more cortical activation in LMAs than in
HMAs and this effect seemed to be linked to general WM skills. As noted, while other studies
have suggested that the MA effect on the P2 may show that HMAs allocate more attentional
resources toward maths stimuli (Núñez-Peña and Suárez-Pellicioni, 2014; Suárez-Pellicioni
et al., 2015), Klados et al. (2015) suggest instead that LMAs are spontaneously allocating
more resources than HMAs when performing maths. It is still necessary to clarify whether
these conflicting results are simply inconsistent or whether they reflect different processes,
such as resources availability versus abnormal resources allocation.
Another component that may be sensitive to MA levels is the P3b, which is a positive
deflection peaking around 300ms after stimulus presentation with temporal/parietal topog-
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raphy (Polich, 2007; Verleger et al., 1994). It is considered to be sensitive to attentional
resources allocation and memory processing (Polich, 2007). For example, in demanding
tasks that require more attentional resources or with high memory load, the P3b has smaller
amplitude and later latency than in undemanding tasks (Bailey et al., 2016; Kok, 2001). In
an arithmetic verification task, HMAs had longer P3b latencies during the processing of
large-split solutions at parietal sites. Furthermore, a positive correlation was found between
latency and the sMARS scores for large-split solutions. Because P3b latency, as well as
longer RTs, is thought to reflect stimulus evaluation time (Polich, 2007) the study suggests
that higher MA is reflected in a higher need of engaging attentional resources in order to
perform arithmetic (Suárez-Pellicioni et al., 2013a). Similarly to the P2, a positive deflection
between 380–420ms was found to be more positive in HMAs than in LMAs (Klados et al.,
2015), which is in contrast with Suárez-Pellicioni et al. (2013a) findings. However, the
frontocentral topography of such positive deflection compared to the parietal topography of
the P3b suggests that the two components may represent different processes.
Other components have been studied as possible correlates of MA. However, such
components have been investigated by single studies and therefore only provide anecdotal
evidence. Suárez-Pellicioni et al. (2013b) looked at the error-related negativity (ERN) and
the correct-response negativity (CRN) to assess whether HMAs showed abnormal error
monitoring during the performance of an arithmetic task. The ERN and CRN were selected
as components of interest as they have been found to reflect error monitoring. The ERN is
a frontocentral negative component peaking around 50–100ms after an erroneous response
has been given (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993; Yeung et al., 2004). It
has been observed that subjects diagnosed with anxiety disorders show bigger ERN (Luu
et al., 2000), suggesting that increased subjective sensitivity to errors produce enhanced
ERNs (Vidal et al., 2000). The CRN is a similar negativity to the ERN but elicited after
correct responses (Cordes et al., 2001). Studies on other anxiety disorders such as obsessive-
compulsive disorder have reported that abnormal error monitoring in anxious participants
was not reflected in behavioural measures, but rather in electrophysiological data (Endrass
et al., 2010; Gehring et al., 2000; Hajcak et al., 2004). Hence, MA effect on the ERN and the
CRN would reflect abnormal error monitoring regardless of any compensation that my result
in no behavioural effect. In a numerical Stroop task and a classical Stroop task in which the
physical characteristics of the stimuli could match or mismatch the semantic information of
the stimuli (e.g. deciding which one between 4 and 2 is the bigger number in the numerical
Stroop task; naming the colour of the word “red” when written in green ink in a classical
Stroop task), HMAs showed enhanced ERNs in the numerical compared to the classical
Stroop task. Furthermore, to assess the difference in processing errors and corrected answers,
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a difference wave was obtained by subtracting the CRN from the ERN. The MA groups
differed in the numerical Stroop task only. Finally, the higher the self-reported levels of MA
with the sMARS, the more negative the ERN and the bigger the difference wave amplitude.
Hence, the ERN and CRN may suggest that HMAs show abnormal error monitoring that is
specific to numerical stimuli.
The P1, the N450 and the conflict sustained potential (Conflict-SP) were investigated
to look at whether MA yields abnormal cognitive control when conflicting information is
presented as a result of poor attention inhibition (Suárez-Pellicioni et al., 2014). Indeed,
these components were selected as they are sensitive to conflict processing. The P1 is a
positive wave peaking around 100ms after stimulus onset. It is thought to be a correlate of
the processing of low-level stimuli features (Zhu et al., 2010). The N450 is a frontocentral
negativity peaking around 450ms after stimulus onset. It is considered to represent the
detection of conflicting stimulus information (Szűcs and Soltész, 2012). For example, it has
been found to be elicited in the incongruent condition in a numerical Stroop task (Szűcs
et al., 2009). The Conflict-SP is a positive wave following the N450 and it has been found
to be modulated by conflict level (Lansbergen et al., 2007). In a numerical Stroop task,
these components of interest were analysed by grouping the trials according to whether the
previous trial was congruent or not. The N450 and the Conflict-SP, but not the P1, differed
between HMAs and LMAs (groups selected using the sMARS), showing that the interference
of a previous incongruent trial impacts HMAs more than LMAs participants.
Several ERP components have been investigated in relation to MA. However, the literature
is still too limited to allow for any satisfactory conclusion on electrophysiological correlates
of MA. Overall, the positivity peaking around 200 milliseconds after stimulus onset seem to
be the components that most consistently showed a difference between HMAs and LMAs
(Klados et al., 2015; Núñez-Peña and Suárez-Pellicioni, 2014, 2015; Suárez-Pellicioni et al.,
2013a). This component is thought to reflect attentional resources allocations and memory
processing, possibly influenced by emotional value of the stimulus (Carretié et al., 2004,
2001). This might suggest that MA bears an impact on attentional and memory resources.
Furthermore, the positivities around 200 and 400 ms found in Klados et al. (2015) have been
associated to the relation between MA and memory as well. It is however still to be clarified
whether such positivites are generated by the same cerebral structures and induced by the
same cognitive functions as those found in other studies.
Finally, it should be noted that comparisons between groups have been done on the
basis of groups that had been previously selected with self-report measures. Therefore, the
presence or absence of electrophysiological differences between HMAs and LMAs might
be related to covert characteristics of self-report questionnaires. The limited literature, the
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variety of components investigated and the dependency of electrophysiological results to
self-report questionnaires calls for replication of the available findings and further research
on the topic.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging
fMRI studies have mainly focused on investigating whether HMAs and LMAs differed in the
activation of brain areas associated with emotional processing and the anxious anticipation of
maths. In anticipating the execution of a maths task, HMAs seem to activate brain areas linked
to cognitive control, emotional processing and pain processing. When HMA participants
(selected with the sMARS) anticipated an arithmetic verification task, better performance
was associated with more activation of bilateral inferior frontal junction and the bilateral
inferior parietal lobe (Lyons and Beilock, 2012a). These areas are thought to be involved in
cognitive control (Brass et al., 2005) and regulation of emotions (Bishop, 2007). Therefore,
it is suggested that for HMAs better performance is associated with increased recruitment
of areas linked to cognitive control and emotion regulation when anticipating a maths task.
Moreover, the activation of the pain network such as the bilateral dorso-posterior insula
and the mid-cingulate cortex before task execution was found to be positively correlated to
sMARS scores in HMAs. The authors argued that anticipatory anxiety of maths simulates
pain in HMA individuals (Lyons and Beilock, 2012b).
Activity of the default-mode network (DMN) has also been found to differ between levels
of MA (Pletzer et al., 2015). Decrease in deactivation of the areas of the DMN has been linked
to emotional processing and it has been found to be proportional to the increase of cognitive
control (Greicius et al., 2003). In the context of MA, differences due to MA levels (assessed
using the MARS30-brief; Suinn and Winston, 2003) emerged in the precuneus during a
number comparison task and in the anterior cingulate gyrus during a number bisection task.
In the number comparison task, trials could either be unit-decade compatible where the
smaller numbers also had the smaller unit digit (e.g. 23 vs. 68) or unit-decade incompatible
where the smaller number had the bigger unit digits (e.g. 28 vs. 63). LMAs activated the left
inferior frontal gyrus and insula, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the supplementary
motor area more during incompatible items than compatible items, while HMAs did not. The
study suggests that MA is associated with less deactivation of the DMN when inhibitory
control is required, such as with incompatible items in arithmetic tasks, highlighting poorer
cognitive control in HMAs.
The activity of areas supervising emotion regulation have been found to be modulated by
MA in children as well. Young et al. (2012) tested whether children with high MA showed
hyperactive amygdala activity during maths problem-solving and stronger connectivity
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between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex. These regions and structures were chosen
because they have been found to be activated during the view of negative stimuli (Sabatinelli
et al., 2011) and therefore enabled investigation into whether numeric stimuli were perceived
as negative by HMAs in developmental age. Children aged 7 to 9 were administered the
Scale for Early Mathematics Anxiety (Wu et al., 2012). Participants took part to two fMRI
testing sessions in which they had to perform an arithmetic verification task. Activation
in the right amygdala and anterior hippocampus was stronger for HMAs than LMAs. On
the contrary, HMAs showed less activation in the intraparietal sulcus, right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (right dlPFC), and the bilateral caudate and putamen nuclei of the basal
ganglia. Moreover, greater deactivation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was seen in
HMAs. Finally, the authors used connectivity analysis aimed at identifying whether HMAs
and LMAs differed in how the amygdala interacts with other brain regions. Compared to
LMAs, HMAs showed greater connectivity of the right amygdala to regions associated with
social and general anxiety such as the left amygdala, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
the anterior thalamic nucleus. On the other hand, they showed less connectivity between the
right amygdala and the posterior parietal cortex.The study suggests that differences in brain
activation associated with different levels of MA are apparent as early as in 7-to-9-year-old
children. Specifically, limbic areas were more activated in HMAs. Parietal, prefrontal and
basal ganglia were less activated in HMAs. Ventromedial prefrontal areas were instead more
deactivated in HMAs. Finally, MA also modulated the connectivity of the right amygdala to
adjacent areas of the brain.
Similarly to EEG literature, studies investigating brain correlates of MA through fMRI
are still scarce. Overall, the focus has been drawn toward brain areas linked to emotional pro-
cessing and cognitive control. However, findings should be interpreted with care considering
some methodological aspects of the studies reviewed. One issue concerns the study by Lyons
and Beilock (2012a), in which better performance was associated with more activation of
areas involved in cognitive control when anticipating a maths task. In the study, performance
was defined as in terms of “maths deficit”, namely the difference in performance between
an arithmetic verification task and a word task: the smaller the difference in performance
between the two tasks, the smaller the “maths deficit” as a result of better cognitive control.
First, such an approach is problematic because the outcome is dependent on not only an
impairment in maths but also linguistic task ability. Further, the score can also be interpreted
as a “verbal advantage” score and in that case, for example, it could be argued that the
identified brain areas reflect happiness about executing verbal rather than mathematical tasks.
A second point of concern is that in Lyons and Beilock (2012a,b), the analysis is based on
double dipping, a practice in which the data are first analysed to select a subset of significant
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data and then those data are reanalysed to obtain results. This practice constitutes a circular
process in which the assumption of independency of the data is violated and therefore the
results distorted (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009). In Lyons and Beilock (2012a), the authors
identify brain areas which showed activity correlated with maths deficit scores in HMAs
only. After this they tested these brain areas for significant MA effects. Provided that the
areas were pre-selected by a significant association defined by the HMAs group, this clearly
constitutes invalid double dipping. A similar procedure was used in Lyons and Beilock
(2012b). It is important to note that the selected regions are consistently called regions of
interest which usually implies that regions are defined before the analysis is run. However, in
this case it is clear that regions of interest were defined during analysis and they cannot be
considered independently defined.
Overall, the most reliable fMRI findings concern an increased and possibly dysfunctional
emotional processing as shown by hyperactive limbic areas (Young et al., 2012) and impaired
cognitive control as shown by a reduced deactivation of the DMN in MA participants (Pletzer
et al., 2015). Importantly, these studies will need replication before any strong conclusion
can be drawn on the implication of these areas in MA cognitive functioning. A final issue
on fMRI studies is the interpretation of the imaging data in terms of differences in specific
cognitive processes between HMAs and LMAs, which constitutes a case of inverse inference.
Inverse inference is a backward reasoning in which the engagement of a cognitive function
is inferred by the activation of a specific brain area. However, this type of inference can
only be drawn with relative confidence if the region is activated selectively for one specific
cognitive function (Poldrack, 2006). Given that several cognitive processes are engaged
during arithmetic tasks (Avancini et al., 2015), specific claims about differences in cognitive
functioning between MA groups should be specifically tested in the future.
1.5.3 The relevance of physiological measures of MA
Physiological measures have been used to investigate anxiety in the specific case of MA.
Differences in physiological arousal between participants with different anxiety levels have
been reported. However, the literature is still scarce and only a limited number of physio-
logical indexes have been investigated. Not surprisingly, not all measures reported in this
introduction have been used for the present research. However, the knowledge available in
the specific field of MA with the broader breath of information available on anxious physio-
logical arousal informed on what specific indexes may have been appropriate to address the
specific research questions posed in the present thesis.
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1.6 Summary
WM is a system involved in many complex cognitive processes, including maths problem
solving. Great interest has been shown for understanding the functioning of a system so
central to human cognition. Several models have linked WM to attentional and executive
process, which a significant body of literature has identified as the gateway through which
anxiety affects performance at cognitive tasks. Furthermore, the intertwined nature of WM,
physiological responding and task performance makes physiological measures an appealing
tool for measuring MA.
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1.7 Overview of the work completed and methodological
considerations
The experimental work carried out is centred on the relationship between WM processes and
anxiety. The overarching research question is how anxiety affects WM and how physiological
measures can inform on such relationship. The case of MA is taken as specific model given
the importance of WM in maths processing.
Both frequentist and bayesian statistical analysis have been run and the interpretation of
the data has been done taking into account both information. To keep consistency across
chapters, bayesian factors have been calculated against the null hypothesis (BF01). The
interpretation of the BFs followed the one suggested by Jeffreys (1998). BFs and their
interpretation are reported in table 1.1. Furthermore, published pipelines have been used
for EEG preprocessing and conservative approaches have been preferred. Finally, I aimed
at appropriate statistical power, although methodological difficulties have made it at times
challenging to achieve with the available resources. Where appropriate, such methodological
issues are discussed in the relevant experimental chapters. Each experimental chapter is
composed of its own introduction, methods, results, discussion and conclusions sections.
Chapter 2 focuses on the role of attentional processes in memory encoding. The work is
centered on the prestimulus subsequent memory effect originally observed by Otten et al.
(2006). In the original paper, this effect has been interpreted as semantic. I hypothesize that
such effect may instead reflect attentional processes. If that was the case, the prestimulus
subsequent memory effect may allow us to investigate how anxiety may affect WM in its
anticipatory component, namely even before stimulus presentation. To address this question
I have combined a replication of the experiment run by Otten et al. (2006) with a novel
paradigm that had the aim of isolating attentional processes while maintaining as many
features as possible comparable to the replicated experiment. ERPs methodology was used
to investigate the question.
Chapter 3 looked at the effect of anxiety on VSWM, taking a resource model perspective.
In this study, a delayed-detection paradigm was run while anxiety was experimentally
manipulated. Anxiety modulation was obtained with a modified version of the NPU-threat of
shock protocol (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). The measure of anxiety chosen was the startle
reflex recorded with ocular EMG. Maximum likelihood estimation was run on behavioural
data to obtain the estimates of the models on which statistical inference was carried out.
Chapter 4 constitutes the last experimental chapter. The experiment focuses on how
physiological measures can be used to detect MA. To this aim we tried to replicate Rubinsten
et al. (2012)’s experiment while recording physiological measures. The paradigm combined
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an affective priming task with an arithmetic verification task. The measures chosen were the
startle and HRV indices.
Each chapter has a detailed discussion of the single experiment and chapter 6 will discuss
overall implications of the present work. While carrying out my PhD research, I possibly
came to face issues related to the replication crisis (Colling and Szűcs, 2018; Pashler and
Harris, 2012). Such issues are elaborated in the general discussion in light of the present
experimental work.
BF01 Interpretation
> 100 Decisive evidence for H0
30-100 Very strong evidence for H0
10-30 Strong evidence for H0
3-10 Substantial evidence for H0
1-3 Anecdotal evidence for H0
1 No evidence
0.3-1 Anecdotal evidence for H1
0.1-0.3 Substantial evidence for H1
0.03-0.1 Strong evidence for H1
0.01-0.03 Very strong evidence for H1
< 0.01 Decisive evidence for H1
Table 1.1 Interpretation of the BF01 based on Jeffreys (1998).
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Szűcs, D. and Soltész, F. (2012). Functional definition of the N450 event-related brain
potential marker of conflict processing: a numerical stroop study. BMC Neuroscience,
13(1):35.
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The prestimulus subsequent memory
effect and attentional processes
2.1 Introduction
Anxiety is thought to represent anticipatory expectation of threat. As a consequence of
such anticipatory quality, anxiety it is not a psychophysiological response that is merely
time-locked to the presentation of a certain threatening stimulus. Rather, it is a sustained
psychophysiological activation whose intensity fluctuates over time in response to threat
characteristics (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). Studies looking at the effect of anxiety on WM
have generally focussed on maintenance and retrieval and some evidence also suggests an
effect of anxiety on memory encoding (Mueller, 1979; Richards and French, 1991). However,
a further step back could be taken. Specifically, given that anxiety is sustained over time,
it may be hypothesized that its detrimental effects on WM could be detected even before
stimulus presentation. If the pre-stimulus subsequent memory effect (psSME) reflected
attention allocation, it would provide a starting point to investigate whether anxiety affects
the efficiency of WM memory even before a stimulus is presented.
The rationale behind the choice of investigating the psSME in the context of anxiety
was driven by the common anticipatory aspect of both attention and anxious responding.
Furthermore, attentive processes during encoding modulate memory performance. Hence, the
study wants to assess whether the established detrimental effect of anxiety on performance
(Eysenck and Calvo, 1992) may be detected early on. Before diving into the specific effects
of anxiety, the present chapter aims at establishing whether pre-stimulus attentional processes
can predict memory performance in normal adults. To do so, the analysis has focussed on
the psSME as originally reported by Otten et al. (2006).
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This study was preregistered on Nature Human Behaviour but did not meet the interest of
the Editor.
2.1.1 Memory encoding and attentional processes
Memory performance is influenced by attentive processes during encoding. There are several
mechanisms through which attention is thought to influence how successfully we encode
stimuli and the interaction between attention and memory is still a hot topic in the literature.
In the case of WM, it is still debated whether WM and attentional processes are essentially
the same mechanism (Awh and Jonides, 2001; Bae and Luck, 2018; Fusser et al., 2011).
The fact that different types of attention, as well as dissociable WM systems, have been
reported increases the complexity of the interaction between attention and WM. Furthermore,
attention may play different roles at different stages of WM processing (Awh et al., 2006;
Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). Nevertheless, it is widely believed that selective attention
provides top-down regulation that determines our ability of encoding task-relevant and ignore
task-irrelevant stimuli. By selectively attending to stimuli and by inhibiting the access of
task-irrelevant information, selective attention exerts an anticipatory redirection of cognitive
resources towards target stimuli (Awh et al., 2006; Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012; Myers et al.,
2015; Tas et al., 2016). For instance, in attentional blink paradigms, when participants are
asked to report two stimuli presented in rapid succession, the processing of the second target
is impaired. However, if participants are instructed to ignore the first target, the second
stimulus is processed (Raymond et al., 1992). In the case of visuospatial information, when
the location of a target item is cued, the features of the target are better remembered than
when the target is not cued (Schmidt et al., 2002). However, top-down regulation is not the
only way in which selective attention regulates memory encoding. Evidence suggests that
the perceptual system can also influence attention bottom-up, determining what stimuli will
be encoded in memory. Visual search paradigms have indeed shown that attentional capture
facilitates encoding in memory (Awh et al., 2006; Belopolsky et al., 2008).
Attention is also thought to play a key role in encoding into LTM (Blumenfeld and
Ranganath, 2007; Kim et al., 2010). While WM and LTM are considered separate systems,
successful maintenance of representations in WM is thought to support LTM formation
(Khader et al., 2010). Brain areas such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the occipital
cortex and the hippocampus have been found to be activated during WM processes and to
predict later recollection (Blumenfeld and Ranganath, 2006; Davachi et al., 2001; Ranganath
et al., 2005; Schon et al., 2004). Furthermore, slow event-related potentials during a WM task
predicted later recollection, suggesting that WM maintenance contributes to LTM formation
and that this may occur through strengthening of stimulus-specific cortical memory traces
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(Khader et al., 2007). Hence, given that formation of LTM representations is supported by
WM maintenance and that attentional processes determine the items that will be encoded in
WM, attentional resources play a key role in LTM encoding.
In addition to stimulus-dependent attentional processes such as selective attention, sus-
tained attention (vigilance) is also required to perform tasks. Sustained attention has been
described as the ability of keeping a focus of attention and to remain alert to stimuli over pro-
longed periods of time (Warm et al., 2008). It has been found not to be constant over time and
to spontaneously fluctuate from moment to moment transitioning from optimal to suboptimal
states (Esterman et al., 2012, 2014; Mackworth, 1948). During the latter, participants show
decreased accuracy, increased variability in reaction times and increased speed-accuracy
trade-offs (Rosenberg et al., 2013). Fluctuations in attention have been linked to fatigue
and resources overload (Helton and Warm, 2008; Warm et al., 2008) or to mindlessness as
a result of task automatization and routinization (Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). The spontaneous fluctuations as well as the ability of mantaining sustained
attention have been linked with success in memory encoding and maintenance, as suggested
by studies on populations with attention deficits or on sleep deprivation (Dennis et al., 2007;
Lenartowicz et al., 2014; Yoo et al., 2007).
2.1.2 The prestimulus subsequent memory effect
A phenomenon that has received particular interest in the area investigating memory encoding
is the pre-stimulus subsequent memory effect (psSME). Pre-stimulus electro-encephalography
(EEG) activity has been shown to predict whether a stimulus will be later remembered or
forgotten. The effect was first observed by Otten et al. (2006). In her study, participants
were asked to perform a semantic animacy judgement over written words and were later
presented with a surprise recognition task. The prestimulus amplitude of stimuli that were
later remembered was more negative than prestimulus amplitudes of stimuli that were later
forgotten. The psSME has been found both in event-related brain potentials (ERPs) and
time-frequency (TF) activity and it has been attributed to encoding processes (Galli et al.,
2013; Kleberg et al., 2014; Otten et al., 2006, 2010).
Event-related psSME has often been reported as a left-frontally distributed negative
deflection, more negative for later remembered compared to later forgotten stimuli. Such
effect has been detected with written words (Galli et al., 2013; Otten et al., 2006, 2010;
Padovani et al., 2013), auditory words (Galli et al., 2012, 2013; Otten et al., 2010), and
pictures (Galli et al., 2014, 2011). Moreover, encoding strategies (Galli et al., 2012) and
executive functions (Galli et al., 2013; Padovani et al., 2013; Richter and Yeung, 2016)
have been suggested to modulate ERP psSME. Notably, while these studies have identified
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psSMEs with similar deflections and topographical distributions, the time windows where
the effects emerged varied greatly possibly as a result of methodological choices. It has been
suggested that the frontally distributed ERP psSME reflects the activation of a task set optimal
for semantically oriented processing (Otten et al., 2006; Pashler et al., 2001), similarly to
the left-frontal negativity associated with phonological processing in WM control (Ruchkin
et al., 2003). On the other hand, the ERP psSME detected in studies where motivation to
remember was experimentally manipulated has shown different characteristics: remembered
stimuli were more positive than later forgotten stimuli at parietal(Galli et al., 2014; Gruber
and Otten, 2010; Padovani et al., 2011) and frontal (Galli et al., 2011) sites. It has been
argued that while the negative psSME may reflect the preparation of semantic processes, the
positive psSME may reflect more elaborate associative processes linked to motivation (Galli
et al., 2014; Gruber and Otten, 2010).
The psSME is believed not to be generated by general recruitment of attentional resources
because it appears only when participants are requested to perform a semantic judgement
(Otten et al., 2006). However, recently it has been shown that attentional mechanisms do
modulate the psSME (Galli et al., 2013; Padovani et al., 2013). In particular, reducing the
available attentional resources prior to stimulus presentation has been suggested to impair
encoding and annul the psSME (Galli et al., 2013). While it is not clear what specific
functional process contribute to the psSME, it is plausible that the flexible allocation of
attentional resources plays a significant role in influencing the preparatory activity prior
memory encoding.
Various TF effects in EEG have been attributed to psSMEs. The effect emerges as a
positive deflection with higher power for later remembered compared to later forgotten stimuli.
Similarly to the ERP psSME, the TF psSME is located over frontal electrodes, although
medial temporal psSME have been detected as well (Guderian et al., 2009). Oscillatory
psSME has been attributed to a range of different phenomena. It has been suggested that it
reflects preparatory processes for the encoding of episodic memory (Addante et al., 2011;
Kleberg et al., 2014) and the binding of information interlinked with the stimulus that will
be later remembered (Scholz et al., 2017). Frontal theta psSME has also been found to be
enhanced when the motivation to attend the stimuli is high (Gruber et al., 2013). Evidence
on whether the functional role of the prestimulus theta is linked to voluntary encoding is
still mixed. Indeed, it has been detected both when encoding was voluntary (Gruber et al.,
2013; Guderian et al., 2009; Kleberg et al., 2014) and involuntary (Addante et al., 2011;
Fellner et al., 2013; Salari and Rose, 2016; Scholz et al., 2017). In particular, when the role
of prestimulus theta during voluntary and involuntary encoding was specifically assessed
(Schneider and Rose, 2016), a psSME emerged only when encoding was voluntary. However,
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a direct comparison between voluntary and involutary psSME did not reveal any difference.
Finally, TF psSME has been detected in other frequency bands such as alpha (Park et al.,
2014), beta (Noh et al., 2014; Salari and Rose, 2016; Schneider and Rose, 2016; Scholz et al.,
2017), gamma (Noh et al., 2014), and occasionally theta psSME has not been detected (Noh
et al., 2014).
The functional roles of ERP and TF psSMEs are debated. While evidence for theta
psSME as correlate of top-down control is still mixed and its functional role has not yet been
established, theta activity has been linked to attentional resources (Missonnier et al., 2006).
Frontal theta synchronisation has been found to be modulated by experimental manipulations
that modulate attentional resources. For example, frontal theta synchronization has been
shown to increase with task demand (Chander et al., 2016; Mazaheri and Picton, 2005;
Sauseng et al., 2007a), increased fatigue (Wascher et al., 2014), the engagement of sustained
(Clayton et al., 2015) and divided attention (Keller et al., 2017), and following oddball targets
(Jyrki Ahveninen, Samantha Huang, John W. Belliveau, Wei-Tang Chang, 2013; Keller et al.,
2017; Mazaheri and Picton, 2005). It is therefore possible that the preparatory processes
ascribed to prestimulus theta are functionally attentive. On the other hand, evidence for
attentional origins of ERP spSME is still scarce and it relies on the modulation that task
demand has on such an effect (Galli et al., 2013). One question is whether the various ERP
and TF psSMEs have similar functional roles or reflect different mechanisms (Sauseng et al.,
2007b). As this introduction has suggested, one possibility is that effects are related to
attentional processes. Another option is that TF psSME underlies preparatory attentional
processes and ERP psSME underlies the activation of a task set for semantically oriented
processing.
An additional point is the exact replicability of psSMEs. Recently, the question of repli-
cability has received a lot of attention in the whole of cognitive neuroscience (Kappenman
and Keil, 2017). One of the threats to reproducible results is statistical power (Button et al.,
2013; Ioannidis, 2005; Szűcs and Ioannidis, 2017) and the psSME literature is no exception.
Calculating the power for effect sizes (Cohen’s d) traditionally considered small (d = 0.2),
medium (d = 0.5), and large (d = 0.8) (Cohen, 1962; Rossi and Pourtois, 2015; Sedlmeier
and Gigerenzer, 1989) with a significance level of α = 0.05, ERP studies have low statistical
power (median power to detect small, medium and large effect in ERP studies: 0.16, 0.65,
0.96 (table 2.1).Consequently, variability in the parameters of the ERP psSME can not only
be attributed to different design and data analysis parameters but also to low power Szűcs
and Ioannidis (2017).
In summary, while ERP findings seem fairly replicable, the literature has some important
shortcomings. Firstly, the statistical power of many studies is low. Secondly, ERP timings are
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very variable across studies. Thirdly, time-frequency findings are very variable in terms of
frequencies, locations and timings of effects. While some variability can be attributed to task
differences, low power can also lead to highly variable findings. Finally, an important open
question about the interpretation of the psSME is whether it reflects semantic or attentional
processes. Clarifying the involvement of attentional mechanisms in psSMEs is not only
important for theory but it also informs research on memory formation in clinical populations
in which memory is impaired.
Figure 2.1 Prestimulus activity predictive of encoding success as reported in the original paper
of Otten et al. (2006). A) Grand-average of the ERP prestimulus waveform at a representative
electrode corresponding to Fp1 of the 10-20 system. B) Topography of the psSME voltage
distribution over the whole scalp in the -250ms to 0ms time-window. The effect was obtained
by subtracting the voltage of forgotten words to the voltage of remembered words.
2.1.3 Rationale of the study
Here, I aimed at resolving important controversies by replicating ERP findings related to the
psSME in a study with very high statistical power. We attempted to replicate the classical
incidental encoding task (Otten et al., 2006) used to elicit EEG psSMEs with high statistical
power to examine the robustness of the various ERP psSMEs previously reported. The
decision of replicating such specfic study came from the fact that Otten et al. (2006) were the
first to report the psSME. Given that the focus of the present thesis is on WM, it could be
argued that the original task from Otten et al. (2006) is a LTM task. While this is a legitimate
concern, WM has been described as the gateway to LTM (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971) and
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processes happening before the presentation of a stimulus can reasonably be assumed to
overlap.
Furthermore, the present study has been conducted with a conservative approach with
the aim of being as replicable as possible: published data-preprocessing pipelines have
been used for bad channel detection and interpolation and no eye-blinks correction has
been applied on the data. Finally, I attempted to determine whether effects are related to
preparatory engagement of attentional mechanisms or to semantic processes. We achieved
this by comparing prestimulus EEG data in later remembered and later forgotten trials in
the above encoding task and in high-attention and low-attention trials in a purely attentional
task. If psSMEs are elicited by semantic processes, an interaction between task and trial type
should be detected.
As reported in this introduction, the psSME has been observed not only in ERPs but
also in TF studies. While looking at TF data has great potential of giving insights into the
engagement of attentive processes, in the present thesis only ERPs have been analysed.
68 The prestimulus subsequent memory effect and attentional processes
Study N Power Effect Loc. Timing
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Table 2.1 ERP studies ordered by sample size. The asterisk (*) indicates the median value.
Post-hoc statistical power is calculated for Cohen’s d of 0.2 (small), 0.5 (medium), and
0.8 (large) with respect to α = 0.05 assuming two-tailed matched samples t-tests. Effect
sizes (Cohen’s d) have been calculated from the F and t statistics reported in the papers for
significant psSMEs. When disambiguation is needed, the condition in which the spSME was
significant is reported in brackets. ERP psSME refer to remembered being more negative than
forgotten. The plus sign (+) indicates inverse psSMEs (forgotten more negative). Location
acronyms are as follows: frontal (F), parietal (P), central (C), and midline (M).
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2.2 Materials and methods
2.2.1 Participants
60 native English speaking participants were recruited in Cambridge, UK. 39 (21 F, 18 M)
were retained for statistical analysis. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and no history of psychiatric disorders. The following criteria determined the exclusion of a
participant from the analyses: if the participant failed to complete the full testing session;
if behavioural performance was lower than 50% in the encoding task and if they fell in the
lowest 5% of d’ scores in the attention task (see subsection 2.2.3); if there were less than 15
artifact-free trials per condition; if on average across blocks there were no more than 25% of
channels were interpolated. Participants that failed to meet the inclusion criteria in one of the
tasks were excluded from all analyses
Participants were recruited via the University bulletin and paid £20 for their participation.
The study was approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Cambridge.
2.2.2 Tasks and procedure
Stimuli and presentation time were as in Otten et al. (2006) with some modifications. In
the encoding and recognition phases stimuli were words (4-10 letters, 1-30 occurrences per
million) (Kučera, 1967). In the attentional task stimuli were strings of random letters (4-10
letters). We obtained the list of the words used in Otten et al. (2006) with their respective
animacy values as courtesy of Dr L. Otten (see table 2.3 and table 2.4 in the appendix of
this chapter). I considered some animacy judgements to be ambiguous (e.g. ANKLE and
CABBAGE were judged as animate). Therefore, from the same database (Kučera, 1967), I
selected our own pool of stimuli excluding body parts, plants and fruits (see table 2.5 and
table 2.6 in the appendix). The stimuli were displayed on a grey background (RGB [64 64
64]) and white font at the centre of the screen.
The testing session started with the encoding phase as in Otten et al. (2006). 320 words
(one occurrence per word) were presented divided into four blocks of 80 words each. Each
word was preceded by a cue. There were two cue types: "X" and "O". Within a block,
only one cue type was presented. Blocks associated with one cue type were alternate
blocks associated with the other cue type. For example, the first and third blocks used "X"
and the second and fourth blocks used "O". The order of presentation of the cues was be
counterbalanced across participants. Cue types did not have any function in the encoding
phase other than serving as fixation point. However, cue type carried task relevant information
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in the attention task, as it will be explained later in this section when describing the attention
task. The decision of keeping the same cues between the two tasks was made in order to
reduce perceptual differences between them.
The sequence and timing of events within each trial followed that of Otten et al. (2006).
Each trial begun with the presentation of the cue for 2600 ms followed by 100 ms of blank
screen. Then, a word was be displayed for 300 ms. Intertrial interval (ITI) consisted of pound
signs ("######") which stayed on the screen a random time between 2000 ms and 2200 ms
(fig. 2.2 A). As in Otten et al. (2006), participants had to judge whether the word referred
to an animate or inanimate object by pressing a button with their left or right index finger.
The laterality of response buttons was switched after the second block and counterbalanced
across participants. Accuracy and speed were stressed. To reduce artifacts during epochs,
participants were instructed to blink only during the ITI.
After the encoding phase, participants performed the attention task which functioned as a
distractor task as well (fig. 2.2 C). This task is an original task specifically developed for
investigating my research question and was not present in the original paper of Otten et al.
(2006). The stimuli presentation was the same as in the encoding phase with the following
modifications. Each block consisted of the presentation of 80 strings of letters (320 strings in
total, half of them longer than 5 characters) and each block was divided into sequences of
10 and 6 trials. The stimuli within each sequence were preceded by the same cue. The cue
indicated whether the participant had to judge whether the non-word presented is longer than
5 letters (high-attention trials) or whether the participant simply had to press a button when
the stimulus appears (low-attention trials). Sequences of 10 trials were always be assigned to
the low-attention condition and those with 6 will always be assigned to the high-attention
condition (fig. 2.2 D). At the beginning of each block, the participant was informed of
the association between cue type and task type. Such association and the laterality of the
response buttons was counterbalanced within the four blocks. The order of presentation of
the sequences was randomized across blocks (for example, in the first block the sequences
will follow the high-attention-low-attention order). The sequence design has been chosen
over the traditional oddball task to overcome the possible contamination of prestimulus
activity from surprise effects elicited by the cue change.
Finally, a surprise recognition phase followed the attention task (fig. 2.2 B). Succession
of events during trials was the same as in the encoding phase with the difference that the
cue was an exclamation mark, as in (Otten et al., 2006). The 320 words presented in the
encoding phase were presented intermixed with 160 new words (total of 480 words). By
button pressing, participants decided whether they had seen the word during the encoding
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phase and whether they were confident or non-confident about their decision.
Figure 2.2 Succession of events during trials. Trial structure was the same in the encoding
task (A), recognition task (B) and the attention task (C). In the encoding task (A) and attention
task (C), there were two types of cue ("X" and "O"). In the recognition task (B), the cue was
the same in every trial ("!"). D) Example of sequence succession in the attention task. In
this example, a sequence of 10 low-attention (U) trials is followed by a sequence of 6 high-
attention (A) trials. Each block of the experiment will contain 5 sequences of low-attention
alternated to 5 sequences of high-attention trials.
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2.2.3 Behavioural data
In all three tasks, RTs were calculated from the onset of the target word/string. In the attention
task, the d’ was calculated in MATLAB with the following formula (Stanislaw and Todorov,
1999):
d’ = zscore(targets) - zscore(false_alarms)
where targets is the accuracy of correctly identified targets in the high-attention condition.
The accuracy of correctly identified targets was obtained by dividing hits by the total number
of targets (hitstargets/Ntargets). False_alarms was obtained with the following formula:
false_alarms = 100 - non_targets
with non_targets being the accuracy of correctly ignored non-targets in the high-attention
condition. The accuracy of correctly ignored non-targets was obtained by dividing the
number of ignored non-targets by the total number of non-targets (hitsnon−targets/Nnon−targets).
The function zscore() converts each element of the input vector such that the vector values
are centred to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Behavioural data were not analysed for hypothesis testing but used for subjects and trials
rejection.
2.2.4 EEG data acquisition and pre-processing
Electroencephalography (EEG) data was acquired with 129-Channels HydroCell nets (Elec-
trical Geodesics Inc.) (see fig. 2.3 for whole-head channel locations). The recording took
place inside an electrically shielded room at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Electrode impedance
was kept below 50 kΩ.
Bad channel detection was carried out with the PREP pipeline extension (Bigdely-Shamlo
et al., 2015) for the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) which run automated
noise removal, bad channel detection, and robust re-referencing. For each experimental
block, the PREP pipeline was run on continuous EEG using default settings. Frequencies
multiple of 50 Hz up to the Nyquist frequency (50 Hz, 100 Hz, 150 Hz, 200 Hz, 250 Hz)
were removed. Then, the data was re-referenced to the average reference. Finally, a 0.1-20
Hz band-pass filter was applied with the pop_eegfiltnew() function in EEGLAB and
detrended.
Epochs from -500 ms before cue-onset untill word onset were extracted from continuous
EEG. Removed channels were interpolated with spherical interpolation and re-referenced
to Cz. Epochs were then rejected if voltage exceeded ±100µV using pop_eegthresh().
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Epochs were then baseline corrected with the pop_rmbase() function using the 500 ms
pre-cue baseline.
In the encoding task, epochs were backsorted as remembered if in the recognition task
they were given a confident recognition judgement and as forgotten if they were wrongly
judged as new (Otten et al., 2006). Epochs whose corresponding RT was be below 200 ms
were be excluded from the analysis. In the attention task, the first trial of each high-attention
and low-attention sequence was be discarded from the analysis to avoid the influence of
surprise responses elicited by the change in cue type.
Analyses were first run independently for each task. Then, to assess whether psSME are
attentional in nature, the two tasks were compared.
Statistical analysis
ERPs were obtained by averaging epochs from each electrode according to the conditions.
Because the psSME was found in the last 250ms of the prestimulus interval, confirmatory
analysis were run on the averaged ERPs during the last 250ms. Furthermore, to avoid
double-dipping, confirmatory analyses were run only on the the averaged ERPs of electrodes
18 and 22, that are equivalents of Fp1 of the 10-20 system, as used in Otten et al. (2006).
Paired t-tests corrected for false discovery rate (FDR) and paired bayesian t-tests were run
between remembered and forgotten trials to attempt to replicate the psSME found in (Otten
et al., 2006). The contrast between high-attention and low-attention trials assessed whether
the attention task was successful in distinguishing between attend and low-attention items.
Furthermore, the attention effect was compared to the memory effect. Namely, the difference
between high-attention and low-attention was directly compared to the difference between
remembered and forgotten trials. In order to have the same number of trials per condition
in the attention task, 5 trials per condition were extracted from each sequence and kept for
analysis.
Furthermore, to better assess the location of the psSME and of the attention effect in a
novel task, all electrodes in the -250ms to 0ms time-window were tested. This time window
was chosen based on the time window in which Otten et al. (2006) detected the psSME.
To decrease the likelihood of finding bogus effects, and therefore to increase replicability,
a mass univariate approach was adopted (Groppe et al., 2011; Luck and Gaspelin, 2017).
Cluster-based permutation analysis was run using FieldTrip toolbox (Oostenveld et al., 2011).
As test statistics, paired one-tailed t-tests were used in the individual tasks as the direction
of the effect was informed by the results from Otten et al. (2006). At the cluster level,
the null distribution was generated using Monte Carlo methods with 1,000 permutations.
The p-threshold for significant clusters was set to 0.05 one-tailed. Other settings were
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kept as default. In the encoding tasks, t-tests were contrasted remembered and forgotten
trials, while in the attention task t-tests contrasted high-attention and low-attention trials.
To compare the two tasks, cluster-based permutation was run using two-tailed t-tests with
p-threshold for significant clusters set to 0.025 because the direction of the effect was
unknown. We compared the remembered to the high-attention condition and the forgotten to
the low-attention condition
2.2.5 Results
After preprocessing, participants had on average 64 trials in the remembered condition, 47
trials in the forgotten condition, 54 trials in the high-attention condition and 47 trials in the
low-attention condition.
The paired t-tests and bayesian t-test on the average ERP amplitude in the -250ms to 0ms
prestimulus time-window was statistically significant for remembered compared to forgotten
trials (t(38) = -2.00, p ≤ 0.05, BF01 = 0.96) suggesting neither evidence for the alternative nor
for the null hypothesis. The t-test comparing high-attention and low-attention trials was not
significant (t(38) = -0.79, p = 0.43, BF01 = 4.33) and 4.33 times more likely to be observed
under the null hypothesis. The t-test comparing remembered and high-attention trials (t(38)
= -0.31, p = 0.76, BF01 = 5.53) as well as the t-test comparing forgotten and low-attention
trials (t(38) = -0.08, p = 0.94, BF01 = 5.78) was not significant and the data were likely to be
observed under the null hypothesis. The t-test comparing the attention effect to the memory
effect was not significant (t(38) = 0.43, p = 0.67, BF01 = 5.31). Descriptives are reported in
table 2.2.
The topography contrasting remembered and forgotten trials (first row - third column of
fig 2.5) presents a similar phase reversal reported in Otten et al. (2006) (figure 2.1). On the
other hand, the voltage over most of the scalp topography of the attention effect approaches
0 (fig. 2.5).
Testing for an effect in the latency range from 250 to 0 ms pre-stimulus, the cluster-
based permutation test did not reveal any significant difference between the remembered
and the forgotten condition, nor between the high-attention and low-attention conditions,
nor between forgotten and low-attention. This suggests that the data from the contrasted
conditions come from the same probability distribution in the last 250ms prestimulus interval.
Cluster-based permutation test revealed a significant difference between remembered and
high-attention trials (p ≤ 0.05) in the latency range from 250 to 0 ms pre-stimulus over
central-left electrodes (Fig. 2.7).
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Encoding task Attention task
Remembered Forgotten Attended Unattended
-1.62 M -0.66 M -1.33 M -0.60 M
4.82 SD 4.79 SD 6.55 SD 5.12 SD
Table 2.2 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the voltage in µV averaged within the
-250ms to 0ms time-window in the four experimental conditions.
Figure 2.3 Channel locations of the 129-channels HydroCell Geodesic Sensor Net used in
the current experiment. The boxes mark the two electrodes used for detecting the pSME and
the attention effect.
76 The prestimulus subsequent memory effect and attentional processes
Figure 2.4 A) Quantification of the psSME and the attention effect in the -250ms to 0ms
time-window at the frontal-left electrodes analysed. B) Quantification of the contrasts
between tasks in the -250ms to 0ms time-window at the frontal-left electrodes analysed. C)
Quantification of the contrast between the attention effect (high-attention minus low-attention)
and the memory effect (remembered vs forgotten) in the -250ms to 0ms time-window at the
frontal-left electrodes analysed. The asterisk (*) denotes p ≤ 0.05. Vertical bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.5 Topographies of the voltage over the whole scalp in the -250ms to 0ms time-
window. The psSME (third column-first row) has been obtained by subtracting the voltage
of forgotten trials to the voltage of remembered trials. The attention effect (third column-
second row) was obtained by subtracting the voltage of low-attention trials to the voltage of
high-attention trials. The white box marks the electrodes selected for analyses.
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Figure 2.6 Grand-averaged ERP waveforms of the prestimulus interval in the encoding task
(A) and attention task (B) at the averaged electrodes 18 and 22 corresponding to Fp1 of the
10-20 system. Timepoint 0ms denotes the onset of the cue. The box marks the -250ms to
0ms time-window selected for analyses.
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Figure 2.7 Significant cluster permutation results of the contrast between remembered and
high-attention conditions. Results are plotted for the -250ms to 0ms time-window at steps of
50ms. The significant positive cluster is marked in bold.
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2.3 Discussion
The aim of the present study was to replicate the psSME first reported by Otten et al. (2006)
using a conservative approach and with high statistical power. Furthermore, I aimed at
assessing whether such effect reflects semantic encoding or whether it reflects the influence
of attentional processes over memory encoding. The experiment consisted of three tasks
in the following order: an encoding task, an attention task and a surprise recognition task.
In the encoding task, participants had to judge whether words belonged to an animate or
inanimate object. In the attention task participants saw strings of letters and had to either
give a response at each trial or only when the string was longer than five letters. Finally, in
the surprise recognition task participants were presented with the words of the encoding task
mixed with new words and had to judge whether they had seen the word in the encoding
task and how confident were with their judgement. EEG data were collected throughout
the encoding and attention task and ERPs were analysed during the prestimulus phase were
analysed. Epochs from the encoding task were backsorted according to whether words were
later remembered or forgotten in the recognition task. The conditions in the attention task
were established a-priori.
2.3.1 Replication of the psSME
The first aim of the study was to replicate the classical psSME. We observed the amplitude
preceding later remembered words to be more negative than later forgotten trials. The effect
was congruent with that reported in Otten et al. (2006) and was statistically significant.
Furthermore, the topography of the effect (first row - third column of fig 2.5) presents a
similar phase reversal reported in Otten et al. (2006) (figure 2.1). One difference was that
the positivity in our study peaked over central-left electrodes as compared to parietal-left
electrodes in Otten et al. (2006). While these results suggest that I have replicated the
classical psSME (see figure 2.8), conclusion should be drawn with caution. It could be
argued that analyses were run on the same electrode analysed in the original paper and that
the actual effect detected by our system might have shifted topography (fig. 2.5). However,
cluster-based permutation exploratory analysis did not detect any difference between later
remembered and later forgotten words in the last 250ms prestimulus time-window. Further-
more, in the original paper, the 58-channels EasyCap was used while in the present study
the 129-channels HydroCell Geodesic Sensor Net was used for recordings. The different
recording systems might have contributed to small shifts in topography.
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Figure 2.8 Side by side comparison on the psSME obtained by Otten et al. (2006) (A) and
the psSME obtained in the current study (B).
2.3.2 Prestimulus attentional processes
The second aim of the study was to assess whether the psSME reflects attentional mechanisms
rather than semantic processes. The attention task is a novel task that was developed
specifically to engage anticipatory attentional processes with written stimuli while not
engaging semantic processing. If the psSME was determined by attention I expected the
prestimulus ERPs of remembered and high-attention and of forgotten and low-attention
not to differ between the two tasks. Because the attention task is a novel task, in order to
test our hypothesis regarding the psSME I first had to assess whether the prestimulus ERPs
discriminated between high-attention and low-attention trials. This suggests that there was
no difference between the two conditions. Therefore, I cannot claim that the attentional task
has been able to distinguish between high and low attentional states.
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The statistically negative outcome of the attention task could be ascribed to several factors.
First, the attentional effect is small and the variability of the data high and therefore I was not
able to detect the effect. This possibility is suggested by the large confidence intervals (fig.
2.4). Second, the task simply was not able to elicit variations in anticipatory attentional pro-
cesses and therefore the lack of effect is a consequence of inefficient task design. Third, the
effect of variations in attention allocation due to experimental manipulation was small, hence
spontaneous fluctuations in attention throughout the task confounded the effect. Because
the task investigates anticipatory prestimulus effects, the behavioural performance at each
specific trial had little influence on trials inclusion. In other words, the interest was on the
allocation of attentional resources regardless of whether the participant correctly identified a
target. Therefore, the d’ had the function of identifying whether participants performed the
task as requested, taking into account the entirety of the experimental trials. If a participant
showed to have complied with task instructions, it was assumed that anticipatory allocation
of attentional resources was employed regardless of whether the subsequent stimulus was a
target or a non-target and whether the judgement on the length of the stimulus was correct.
This approach was adopted in order to maximize the number of available epochs for anal-
ysis and to obtain a similar number of trials in the two conditions. Indeed, analysing only
correctly identified trials would have greatly reduced the number of available epochs in the
high-attention condition. The drawback of such methodology is that there was little control
over spontaneous fluctuations in sustained attention.
2.3.3 The psSME and attentional processes
In order to assess whether the psSME is influenced by attentional processess, the remembered
condition was compared to the high-attention condition and the forgotten condition was
compared to the low-attention condition. The attention task did not produce evidence for
the modulation of anticipatory attentional processes in the two conditions. Hence, it is
not possible to draw any conclusion on the nature of the psSME as attentive. For a purely
anecdotal discussion of the data, we can observe in figure 2.4 and figure 2.6 that the direction
of the psSME and the attention effect are similar. However, the big variability in the data does
not allow to detect an effect in the behavioural task. Similarly, observing the topographies
in figure 2.5 a negativity seems to appear in a similar location of the psSME. However, as
reported in subsection 2.3.2, the voltage over most of the scalp topography of the attention
effect approaches 0.
If I detected an attention effect and found no difference between the two tasks, I could have
argued that the psSME was modulated by anticipatory attentional processes independently of
2.3 Discussion 83
semantic encoding. Indeed, Otten et al. (2006) suggested that the left-frontal psSME effect
may be compatible with WM control over verbal material, such as phonological rehearsal and
semantic maintenance (Ruchkin et al., 2003). However, the attention task simply required
to judge the number of letters forming strings with no semantic meaning. Therefore, the
recruitment of resources involving phonological or semantic processing was not necessary
to perform the task.Nevertheless, the absence of a significant effect in the attention task
does not allow us to interpret the observation that the data from the contrasts remembered
vs high-attention and forgotten vs low-attention are drawn from the same distributions as
evidence of similar processes modulating the psSME and the attention effect. Hence, the
interpretation of the psSME as prefrontal negativity as reflecting the recruitment of a set
of cognitive resources for semantically oriented encoding cannot be discarded (Otten et al.,
2006; Pashler et al., 2001; Ruchkin et al., 2003).
Finally, cluster-permutation based analysis revealed a significant difference between
remembered and high-attention trials over central-left electrodes. Because I did not a-priori
expect a difference between these two conditions and because cluster-permutation analysis
was run as exploratory, interpretation of these results are at the moment speculative. As
I have just discussed, the encoding task required processing meaningful words while the
attention task did not require any verbal processing. Hence, the difference between the two
conditions may be determined by modulation of components that have been linked to the
processing of semantic features for verbal material (Evans and Federmeier, 2007; Neville
et al., 1986; Olichney et al., 2002a,b; Ruchkin et al., 2003).
2.3.4 Limitations and directions for future research
Carrying out the present study adopting a conservative approach has proved to be challenging.
The major difficulty has been retaining participants and trials for statistical analysis. While
60 participants were tested, only 39 (two thirds of the sample) could be retained drastically
reducing statistical power. Furthermore, as reported in subsection 2.2.5, only a handful of
trials could be kept for analysis in each condition. That is problematic especially if dealing
with potentially small effect sizes that can easily be overshadowed by variability within
the data and that require high statistical power. We can identify two main features of the
experiment that are responsible for this outcome. First, is the intrinsic feature of the encoding
task for which trials are backsorted into conditions according to behavioural performance.
Second, epochs were extremely long (3,200ms) and participants struggled in refraining
themselves from blinking, causing a large number of trials to be rejected. The length of the
epochs was the same as in Otten et al. (2006) for the sake of replication. However, in the
original paper eye-blinks were corrected with regression-based methods. Other methods
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for eye-blinks correction such as ICA, PCA and toolboxes for automatised detection of
artifactual components are available. However, I took the methodological decision of not
manipulating the data beyond that strictly necessary for EEG preprocessing. In the future,
the data could be reprocessed using an algorithm for eye-blink correction.
Another limitation of the study is a lack of control over spontaneous fluctuations of
sustained attention. The attention task could be re-designed so that sustained attention can
be monitored with behavioural data. For example, instead of asking participants to give a
response only on target stimuli, the task could be designed so that a judgement on the current
stimulus is required at every trial belonging to the high-attention condition.
Finally, future work should integrate TF analysis of the data.
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2.4 Conclusions
In summary, the aim of the experiment was to replicate the psSME first reported by Otten
et al. (2006) and to assess if such effect reflects allocation of attentional resources during
memory encoding. While frequentist analysis replicated the psSME, the evidence obtained
by bayesian analysis suggest that the present results are not conclusive. Furthermore, I could
not find an attentional effect in the attention task and therefore no conclusion can be drawn
from a comparison between the two tasks. It is possible that the attentional effect has been
overshadowed by the variability within the data as a result of methodological constraints and
the choice of a rigorous approach.
2.5 Declaration
The experiment reported in the present chapter constitutes original work. Giulia Cristoforetti
contributed to data collection and Dr Lincoln Colling informed on analyses.
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2.6 Appendix
ABDOMEN animate CAGE inanimate DOCK inanimate GRAVE inanimate
ABORIGINE animate CAKE inanimate DOCUMENT inanimate GRAVY inanimate
ACROBAT animate CALF animate DOLL inanimate GREASE inanimate
ACTRESS animate CALORIE inanimate DOLPHIN animate GRENADE inanimate
AERIAL inanimate CAMEL animate DOME inanimate GUITAR inanimate
AEROSOL inanimate CAMERA inanimate DONKEY animate GUTTER inanimate
AGENDA inanimate CANCER animate DOVE animate GYPSY animate
AGNOSTIC animate CANDLE inanimate DRILL inanimate HADDOCK animate
ALARM inanimate CANNON inanimate DRUM inanimate HAMMER inanimate
ALCOHOL inanimate CANVAS inanimate DUCK animate HARDWARE inanimate
AMULET inanimate CANYON inanimate DUNE inanimate HATCH inanimate
ANCHOR inanimate CAPE inanimate DUNGEON inanimate HAWK animate
ANKLE animate CAPILLARY animate DWARF animate HAZELNUT animate
ANTIQUE inanimate CARDINAL animate EAGLE animate HEART animate
ANVIL inanimate CARGO inanimate EARL animate HEDGE animate
APPLE inanimate CARPET inanimate EASEL inanimate HELMET inanimate
APRON inanimate CARROT animate ELEPHANT animate HERD inanimate
ARENA inanimate CARTON inanimate ELLIPSE inanimate HERON animate
ARTERY animate CASINO inanimate EMBASSY inanimate HINGE inanimate
ARTIFACT inanimate CASTLE inanimate EMBRYO animate HOLLOW inanimate
ASHTRAY inanimate CAVE inanimate EMERALD inanimate HOOF animate
ASSASSIN animate CAVERN inanimate EMPEROR animate HOOP inanimate
ASTERISK inanimate CELLAR inanimate ENCLAVE inanimate HORMONE animate
ATHLETE animate CEMENT inanimate ENVELOPE inanimate HOSPICE inanimate
ATLAS inanimate CHALK inanimate ENVOY animate HOSTAGE animate
ATTIC inanimate CHAPEL inanimate ENZYME animate HUNTER animate
AUNT animate CHARITY inanimate EQUATOR inanimate IGNITION inanimate
AVIATOR animate CHEF animate ERASER inanimate INSULIN animate
AXLE inanimate CHERRY animate ESSAY inanimate INTESTINE animate
BACTERIA animate CHICK animate EXPORT inanimate INTRUDER animate
BADGE inanimate CHILL inanimate EYEBALL animate IVORY animate
BALE inanimate CHIMNEY inanimate FALCON animate JAIL inanimate
BALLOON inanimate CHISEL inanimate FEAST inanimate JANITOR animate
BANANA inanimate CIRCUIT inanimate FERRY inanimate JAWBONE animate
BANDAGE inanimate CLAM animate FIGURINE inanimate JEEP inanimate
BANGLE inanimate CLARINET inanimate FILTER inanimate JEWEL inanimate
BANJO inanimate COBBLER animate FIREMAN animate JUGULAR animate
BARRIER inanimate COCKTAIL inanimate FISH animate JUNGLE animate
BASKET inanimate COIL inanimate FLASK inanimate JUROR animate
BAUBLE inanimate COIN inanimate FLEA animate KENNEL inanimate
BEAD inanimate COLLAR inanimate FLESH animate KETTLE inanimate
BEAKER inanimate COLT animate FLOOD inanimate KEYBOARD inanimate
BEAR animate COMPUTER inanimate FLUTE inanimate KIDNEY animate
BEDROOM inanimate COMRADE animate FOAL animate KIPPER animate
BEETLE animate CONCRETE inanimate FOLDER inanimate KITTEN animate
BENCH inanimate CONSTABLE animate FOREARM animate KNEE animate
BICEPS animate CONVICT animate FORK inanimate KNIGHT animate
BIKINI inanimate COPPER inanimate FREEZER inanimate KNUCKLE animate
BISCUIT inanimate CORD inanimate FROST inanimate LACE inanimate
BISHOP animate CORK animate FUNGUS animate LADLE inanimate
BLADDER animate CORN animate FURNACE inanimate LAGOON inanimate
BLADE inanimate COSMETIC inanimate GALLON inanimate LAMB animate
BLAZER inanimate COSTUME inanimate GARAGE inanimate LANCE inanimate
BLISTER animate COUPON inanimate GARMENT inanimate LANTERN inanimate
BLIZZARD inanimate COVE inanimate GAZELLE animate LARDER inanimate
BOLT inanimate COWBOY animate GEAR inanimate LARYNX animate
BOOTH inanimate COYOTE animate GENE animate LATCH inanimate
BRAKE inanimate CRAB animate GERM animate LATTICE inanimate
BRICK inanimate CRADLE inanimate GEYSER inanimate LEAF animate
BROCHURE inanimate CRATE inanimate GILLS animate LEAFLET inanimate
BRONZE inanimate CRIMINAL animate GIRAFFE animate LEASE inanimate
BROTHEL inanimate CROW animate GLACIER inanimate LEDGER inanimate
BUBBLE inanimate CUBE inanimate GLAND animate LEMON animate
BUCKET inanimate CUCUMBER animate GLIDER inanimate LEOPARD animate
BULL animate CYST animate GLOBE inanimate LIGAMENT animate
BULLET inanimate DAFFODIL animate GLOVE inanimate LIMB animate
BUOY inanimate DAISY animate GLUE inanimate LINEN inanimate
BURGLAR animate DEER animate GOAT animate LION animate
BUSH animate DENTIST animate GOOSE animate LIZARD animate
BUTTON inanimate DENTURE inanimate GOWN inanimate LOBSTER animate
CABBAGE animate DETERGENT inanimate GRANDSON animate LOCK inanimate
CABIN inanimate DIAGRAM inanimate GRANITE inanimate LOOP inanimate
CABINET inanimate DIGITAL inanimate GRANULE inanimate LUGGAGE inanimate
CABLE inanimate DINGO animate GRAPE animate LUNAR inanimate
CAFE inanimate DITCH inanimate GRAPH inanimate LYNX animate
Table 2.3 Words from A to L used in the original experiment (Otten et al., 2006) with the
respective animacy judgement. Courtesy of Dr L.J. Otten.
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MACKEREL animate PECTORAL animate RUBBER inanimate SWORD inanimate
MAGGOT animate PELICAN animate RUST inanimate SYRINGE inanimate
MAGICIAN animate PELVIS animate SACK inanimate TABLET inanimate
MAGNET inanimate PENGUIN animate SAILOR animate TATTOO inanimate
MAMMAL animate PETAL animate SALMON animate TAVERN inanimate
MANGO inanimate PHEASANT animate SAPLING animate TELEGRAM inanimate
MANSION inanimate PIANO inanimate SARDINE animate TENDON animate
MARBLE inanimate PICKLE animate SATCHEL inanimate TERRIER animate
MARE animate PIER inanimate SATIN inanimate THIGH animate
MASK inanimate PIGEON animate SAUCER inanimate THIMBLE inanimate
MAST inanimate PILLAR inanimate SCALLOP animate THROAT animate
MATRON animate PIPE inanimate SCALP animate THRONE inanimate
MAZE inanimate PISTON inanimate SCARF inanimate TIGER animate
MELON animate PIXIE inanimate SEDIMENT inanimate TOAD animate
METEOR inanimate PLANK inanimate SEED animate TOMATO animate
MINERAL inanimate PLAQUE inanimate SENSOR inanimate TOMB inanimate
MINK animate PLIERS inanimate SHARK animate TONGUE animate
MIST inanimate PLUG inanimate SHAWL inanimate TONSIL animate
MOLE animate PLUM animate SHED inanimate TORSO animate
MOLECULE inanimate PLUMBER animate SHEEP animate TOURIST animate
MONK animate PODIUM inanimate SHERIFF animate TOWEL inanimate
MONKEY animate POKER inanimate SHRAPNEL inanimate TOWER inanimate
MOOSE animate POLLEN animate SHRIMP animate TRICEPS animate
MOSQUE inanimate PONY animate SILICON inanimate TROTTER animate
MOSQUITO animate POODLE animate SILK animate TROUT animate
MOTH animate POPE animate SINEW animate TULIP animate
MOUSE animate POPPY animate SINUS animate TUMOUR animate
MOUSTACHE animate PORK animate SKEWER inanimate TUNA animate
MULE animate POSTER inanimate SKULL animate TUNIC inanimate
MUSHROOM animate POTATO animate SKUNK animate TURBINE inanimate
NANNY animate POULTRY animate SKYLARK animate TURNIP animate
NATIVE animate PRAM inanimate SLEDGE inanimate TURTLE animate
NECK animate PRAWN animate SLEEVE inanimate TUSK animate
NEEDLE inanimate PREACHER animate SLIPPER inanimate UDDER animate
NEURON animate PRIMATE animate SLUG animate ULCER animate
NITROGEN inanimate PRINCE animate SMOG inanimate UTERUS animate
NOSTRIL animate PULLEY inanimate SNAIL animate VEIN animate
NUCLEUS animate PUMPKIN animate SNORKEL inanimate VERMIN animate
NURSE animate PUPPY animate SNOUT animate VICAR animate
NYLON inanimate PURSE inanimate SOAP inanimate VINE animate
OLIVE animate PUZZLE inanimate SOCKET inanimate VIOLIN inanimate
ONION animate PYTHON animate SOLICITOR animate VIRUS animate
ORCHID animate RABBI animate SPACE inanimate VODKA inanimate
OSTRICH animate RABBIT animate SPADE animate VULTURE animate
OTTER animate RACKET inanimate SPANIEL animate WAITER animate
OXEN animate RADISH animate SPATULA inanimate WALNUT animate
OYSTER animate RAFT inanimate SPEAR animate WALRUS animate
OZONE inanimate RASPBERRY animate SPICE animate WART animate
PACKET inanimate RAVEN animate SPIDER animate WASP animate
PAINT inanimate RAZOR inanimate SPINACH animate WEASEL animate
PAMPHLET inanimate REACTOR inanimate SPINDLE inanimate WEDGE inanimate
PANDA animate RECEIPT inanimate SPRAY inanimate WHALE animate
PANSY animate RECIPE inanimate SPROUT animate WHIP inanimate
PANTHER animate RECTANGLE inanimate STAIRWAY inanimate WICKET inanimate
PARADE inanimate REPTILE animate STALLION animate WIDOW animate
PARASITE animate RETINA animate STAPLE inanimate WOLF animate
PARCEL inanimate RHUBARB animate STATUE inanimate WOMB animate
PARROT animate ROBE inanimate STEEPLE inanimate WORM animate
PASSPORT inanimate ROBIN animate STEROID animate WRIST animate
PATIO inanimate ROBOT inanimate STOOL inanimate ZEBRA animate
PEACH animate RODENT animate STORK animate ZINC inanimate
PEACOCK animate ROOSTER animate SUITCASE inanimate
PEAR animate ROOT animate SURGEON animate
PEARL animate ROSE animate SWAN animate
Table 2.4 Words from M to Z used in the original experiment (Otten et al., 2006) with the
respective animacy judgement. Courtesy of Dr L.J. Otten.
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ADOLESCENT animate CANDLE inanimate DAMP inanimate FOGG inanimate
ADULT animate CANDY inanimate DANCER animate FOLKS animate
AIRPORT inanimate CAKE inanimate DAUGHTERS animate FORK inanimate
ALARM inanimate CANVAS inanimate DAWN inanimate FRINGE inanimate
ALIEN animate CARBON inanimate DAYTIME inanimate FLUTE inanimate
ALUMINUM inanimate CARD inanimate DEALER animate FLASK inanimate
AMBASSADOR animate CATS animate DEER animate FUEL inanimate
ANACONDA animate CELLAR inanimate DEMOCRAT animate GALLERY inanimate
ANCHOR inanimate CARPET inanimate DENTIST animate GLOVE inanimate
ANGELS animate CHAIRMEN animate DESERT inanimate GATES inanimate
ARCH inanimate CHAMPIONS animate DESIGNER animate GEAR inanimate
ARCHITECTS animate CHANCELLOR animate DETERGENT inanimate GOOSE animate
ARROW inanimate CHANNEL inanimate DEVIL animate GENTLEMAN animate
AUNT animate CHEETAH animate DICTATOR animate GRANDSON animate
AUTHORS animate CHEF animate DIMENSION inanimate GYPSY animate
BABIES animate CHRISTIANS animate DISK animate GIFT inanimate
BEETLES animate CIGARETTE inanimate DOCTORS animate GOAT animate
BANKERS animate CIRCUIT inanimate DOCUMENT inanimate GOVERNORS animate
BARBECUE inanimate CITIZEN animate DOLPHINS animate GOWN inanimate
BARBER animate CIVILIAN animate DOME inanimate GRADUATES animate
BASS inanimate CLASSMATE animate DOORWAY inanimate GRAIN inanimate
BATHROOM inanimate CLEANER animate DOSE inanimate GRAMDMA animate
BUTTON inanimate CLERK animate DRAGONS animate GRAMS inanimate
BEARS animate CLIENT animate DRIVEWAY inanimate GRAVE inanimate
BEAVER animate CLOSET inanimate DUKE animate GUARANTEE inanimate
BEER inanimate CLOTHING inanimate DUNES inanimate GAZELLE animate
BEES animate CLOUD inanimate ECHO inanimate GUARDS animate
BELL inanimate CLUE inanimate EMERALD inanimate GUITAR inanimate
BELT inanimate COCKPIT inanimate ELECTRON inanimate GULF inanimate
BIRD animate CRADLE inanimate ELEPHANT animate GYMNASTS animate
BLAZER inanimate COIL inanimate EMPEROR animate HATS inanimate
BLANKET inanimate COLLAGE inanimate EMPLOYER animate HEROES animate
BOOTS inanimate COLLEAGUE animate ENEMIES animate HISTORIAN animate
BOSS inanimate COMB inanimate ENGINEERS animate HONEY inanimate
BOTTLES inanimate COMMANDER animate ERASER inanimate HOSTESS animate
BOWL inanimate COMMUTER animate ENVELOPE inanimate HUMANS animate
BOXES inanimate COMPANION animate EROSION inanimate HUNTER animate
BRANCH inanimate COMPOSER animate FABRIC inanimate HUSBANDS animate
BRASS inanimate CONSUMERS animate FALCON animate INFANT animate
BREEZE inanimate CONTROLLER animate FARMER animate INSECT animate
BRIDE animate CHALK inanimate FILTER inanimate INSPECTOR animate
BUBBLES inanimate COUSINS animate FATHERS animate INSTRUCTOR animate
BUFFALO animate COWBOY animate FEATHER inanimate INTERVAL inanimate
BUFFER inanimate CREATURE animate FEES inanimate INVENTOR animate
BUGS animate CROWN inanimate FELLOWS animate ISLANDS inanimate
BUILDER animate CUPS inanimate FENCE inanimate IVORY inanimate
BULL animate CURE inanimate FESTIVAL inanimate JAGUAR animate
BUTCHER animate CURRICULUM inanimate FIGHTERS animate JEANS inanimate
BUTLER animate CURTAIN inanimate FILES inanimate JEEP inanimate
BUTTER inanimate CUSTOMER animate FISH animate JUICE inanimate
CAFE inanimate CYCLIST animate FLAME inanimate JUNIORS animate
CALENDAR inanimate DAME animate FLIGHTS inanimate JUNK inanimate
Table 2.5 Words from A to J with the respective animacy judgement used in the present
experiment.
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KEYBOARD inanimate NITROGEN inanimate PRISONERS animate SPRAY inanimate
KEYS inanimate NOVELIST animate PRIZE inanimate STATUE inanimate
KETTLE inanimate NUNS animate PRODUCER animate STORM inanimate
KIDS animate NURSE animate PROPHET animate STOVE inanimate
KILLER animate NUTRIENTS inanimate PUPILS animate STRAW inanimate
KNIGHT animate OBSERVERS animate PUPPY animate STRING inanimate
KNOT inanimate OBSTACLE inanimate PYTHON animate SUBMARINE inanimate
LABEL inanimate OILS inanimate QUANTUM inanimate SOLICITOR animate
LADIES animate ODORS inanimate QUEENS animate SUGAR inanimate
LAGOON inanimate OVAL inanimate RABBI animate SULTAN animate
LAMB animate OMELET inanimate RABBIT animate SUSPECT animate
LAMP inanimate OVERCOAT inanimate RAILWAY inanimate TAPE inanimate
LANDLORD animate OUTFIT inanimate RANCHER animate TAXI inanimate
LANE inanimate OWNER animate REBELS animate TAXPAYER animate
LAWYERS animate PACK inanimate RECTOR animate TEARS inanimate
LAYER inanimate PAGES inanimate RELATIVES animate TESTAMENT inanimate
LEAFLET inanimate PAINTER animate REPORTER animate THERAPIST animate
LEVER inanimate PARROT animate RESIDENCE inanimate THIEF animate
LECTURER animate PARENT animate ROOSTER animate TICKET inanimate
LIEUTENANT animate PARLOR inanimate RIDER animate TIGER animate
LOTION inanimate PLUMBER animate ROOKIE animate TATOO inanimate
LION animate PASSENGER animate RAZOR inanimate TOAST inanimate
LISTENERS animate PASTOR animate ROPE inanimate THRONE inanimate
LIZARDS animate PATRIOT animate ROWS inanimate TOWEL inanimate
LUNCH inanimate PAYROLL inanimate RUBBER inanimate TOOLS inanimate
LOAF inanimate PEACOCK animate SAILORS animate TOURIST animate
MADAME animate PRIMATE animate SAINT animate TRACT inanimate
MAID animate PENCIL inanimate SALESMAN animate TRAINS inanimate
MOTEL inanimate PERFORMERS animate SCENERY inanimate TRAVELER animate
MARTYR animate PETITIONER animate SCHEME inanimate TUBE inanimate
MOTH animate PHARMACY inanimate SCHOLAR animate TURKEY animate
MEADOW inanimate PHYSICIAN animate SCIENTIST animate TURTLE animate
MEAL inanimate PIANIST animate SEATS inanimate TROUT animate
MEDICINE inanimate PIGEON animate SERGEANT animate VECTOR inanimate
MERCHANT animate PILL inanimate SERVANTS animate VESSEL inanimate
MILLS inanimate PIONEER animate SHADE inanimate VETERAN animate
MINERAL inanimate PIRATES animate SHAPES inanimate VICAR animate
MINISTERS animate PLANES inanimate SHEEP animate VICTIMS animate
MIRROR inanimate PLASTER inanimate SHEETS inanimate VICTOR animate
MIST inanimate PLASTIC inanimate SHERIFF animate VISITOR animate
MAGICIAN animate PLAYERS animate SHIRT inanimate VOLUNTEER animate
MONK animate POETS animate SHOWER inanimate VOTER animate
MOTHERS animate POLE inanimate SILVER inanimate WHIP inanimate
MOUNTAIN inanimate POLICEMEN animate SINGERS animate WARRIORS animate
MOUSE animate PONY animate SKETCH inanimate WASTE inanimate
MURDERER animate PORK animate SLAB inanimate WHISKEY inanimate
MUSE animate PORTER animate SLEEVE inanimate WIDOW animate
MUSEUM inanimate PARCEL inanimate SNAKES animate WAITER animate
MUSICIAN animate POUND inanimate SOAP inanimate WEDGE inanimate
MUSTARD inanimate POWDER inanimate SONS animate WORKER animate
NYLON inanimate PREACHER animate SOUP inanimate YOUNGSTERS animate
NARRATOR animate PREY animate SNAIL animate ZENITH inanimate
NEEDLE inanimate PRINCE animate SPHERE inanimate ZONE inanimate
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Chapter 3
A resource model account of the effects of
anxiety on visuospatial working memory
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The effects of anxiety on WM
Anxiety is an aversive emotional and motivational state that occurs in situations of anticipated
threat. It is often associated with adverse effects on the performance of cognitive tasks
(Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck and Calvo, 1992). Anxiety can impact WM which is con-
sidered to be a limited capacity system that temporarily retains and manipulate information
necessary for many complex cognitive activities (Baddeley, 1992; Miller and A., 1956). The
detrimental effects of anxiety on processing efficiency have been explained within Baddeley’s
working memory model (Baddeley, 1992). According to this model, WM is a limited capacity
system formed of several components: a modality-free central executive (CE) involved in
the processing of information and having self-regulatory functions; a phonological loop that
holds verbal and acoustic information using a temporary store and an articulatory rehearsal
system; a visuospatial sketchpad for the processing and transient storage of visual and spatial
information; an episodic buffer that serves as temporary storage system which is capable of
integrating information from a variety of sources. The main effects of anxiety were typically
thought to be on the CE (Eysenck et al., 2007) as a result of attentional biases occurring
in anxiogenic situations, such as attentional shift on self evaluative focus on physiological
arousal, enhanced recognition of threat and attention narrowing on the sources of threat
(Barlow, 2000).
Some studies have suggested that the detrimental effects of anxiety on verbal WM and
VSWM are smaller than those on the CE or non-existent (Eysenck et al., 2007, 2005). On
100 A resource model account of the effects of anxiety on visuospatial working memory
the other hand, studies using a spatial n-back task have shown that VSWM is impaired
during experimentally induced anxiety (Clarke and Johnstone, 2013; Lavric et al., 2003; Li
et al., 2006; Shackman et al., 2006). Impairments in VSWM tasks have also been observed
in participants with anxiety disorders, although findings are not consistent. For example,
obsessive compulsive disorder patients performed poorly in a spatial n-back task (Van Der
Wee et al., 2003). However, in a change detection task (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004) where
participants had to decide whether a set of coloured squares was the same of the previous set,
high trait anxiety participants did not under-perform as compared to controls (Qi et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, electroencephalography data suggested that high trait anxiety participants have
reduced VSWM capacity (Qi et al., 2014).
A crucial aspect for the understanding of the effect of anxiety on VSWM, is the functional
overlap between mechanisms of VSWM and spatial selective attention (Awh and Jonides,
2001). Firstly, top-down attentional control determines which stimuli will be stored in
memory. Secondly, if more than one item is represented in WM, covert shifts of spatial
attention could underlie the maintenance of information in VSWM as a rehearsal mechanism
(Awh et al., 2006; Smyth and Scholey, 1994). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have
shown a neuroanatomical overlap between spatial attention and WM networks. Indeed
prefrontal and parietal brain regions have been found to aid both spatial attention and WM
(Lepsien et al., 2005; Mayer et al., 2007). It has been suggested that the mechanism through
which anxiety impairs VSWM is via the elective depletion of limited resources. Research
has indeed indicated that neuronal networks instantiating anxious arousal and the neuronal
networks activated in various form of VSWM and spatial attention partially overlap in the
right prefrontal cortex and in the right posterior parietal cortex (Adhikari et al., 2010; Dalton
et al., 2005; Manoach et al., 2004). It is, therefore, possible that anxious arousal competes
with ongoing cognitive operations as they share common neuronal networks.
It could be argued that the relationship between anxiety and WM may follow the opposite
direction. It may be that the loading of WM reduces the resources available for emotion
regulation. It has been proposed that cognitive ability contributes to the control of emotional
responding (Schmeichel et al., 2008) such as the ability of modulating complex behavioural
responses and the reappraisal of emotional stimuli (Ochsner and Gross, 2008). In the
context of MA, some evidence points towards a causal effect of cognitive resources over
anxious responding, while other authors suggest a reciprocal influence (Carey et al., 2016).
However, in these cases emotion regulation is defined as complex behaviours and cognitive
coping strategies. On the other hand, the present research question is framed in terms of
basic properties of WM. In this context, the ACT provides a theoretical framework for the
explanation of the relationship between WM and anxiety. Keeping in mind that it might
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provide a partial description of the phenomenon, such framework has been adopted as starting
point for the work carried out in this chapter.
3.1.2 Models of VSWM
Typically, research on VSWM has used binary tasks, namely tasks whose answer is given
on a binary fashion (e.g., correct vs incorrect ). Those tasks are suitable for investigating
VSWM as conceptualized by slot models. According to these models, WM is considered to
be a limited capacity system able to store only a small number of items (Cowan, 2010; Miller
and A., 1956). Specifically, VSWM is composed of a small number of slots and each slot can
retain one item only, whose features are incorporated and bound all together. Those objects
that have gained access into a memory slot will be remembered accurately, while competing
objects that did not get into a memory slot will not be remembered at all (for a full review
see Ma et al., 2014). Visual attention is the means through which competing objects gain or
do not gain access to a slot (Cowan, 2010).
Recently, the slot model has been challenged by studies that used the delayed-estimation
technique (Wilken and Ma, 2004). In such technique, participants have to recall features of
a target stimulus. The features of the target stimulus and the possible responses vary on a
continuous scale and it is therefore possible to assess how much the value of the recalled
feature deviates from the value of the target. These studies have observed behavioural effects
that are incompatible with the slot model, according to which items are early encoded in
a binary fashion and with their features integrated and bound together. For example, the
accuracy of recall has been shown to decline as the number of stimuli increases and errors in
recalling have been shown to be distributed in the space of possible responses (Bays et al.,
2009, 2011a; Bays and Husain, 2008; Zhang and Luck, 2008a). In another study, Bays
et al. (2011b) showed that each visual feature of a target item presents its own Gaussian
distribution of errors centred on the target value. Furthermore, in large arrays a subset of
responses were clustered around feature values belonging to non-target objects present in
the array. Bays et al. (2011a) also found that cued items had a recall advantage and such
effect was observed even when the item had already been encoded. These effects have been
explained by resource models of VSWM. According to resource models, limited resources
are flexibly allocated across the set of the objects to be remembered.
The exact distribution of the statistical model that best explains VSWM precision of recall
data is still debated. According to equal-resource models (Bays and Husain, 2008; Wilken
and Ma, 2004) error variability increases with the number of items to be remembered because
attentional resources are equally allocated across items. In this model, error distribution
follows a Von Mises distribution with mean zero and the variability parameter κ reflecting
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error variability. According to the discrete-representation model (Zhang and Luck, 2008a),
WM is instead composed of discrete memory slots. This model can be included under the
umbrella of the resource models. That is because it states that discrete slots are shared
between items. For small set-sizes, the resources available for each slot combine. Resulting
in high-resolution memory representations for the items. On the other hand, for big set-sizes,
each slot supervises the representation of one single item and items that do not fall within
any slot will be forgotten. Similarly to equal-resource models, errors follow a von Mises
distribution with variability expressed by the parameter κ . However, the distribution also
includes a uniform parameter u for items that have not been stored in any slot. Hence, error
recollection for items that have not been stored in any slot stems from purely random guesses.
Bays et al. (2009) however, proposed that errors in recollecting the features of a target item
might also be influenced by the interference of other non-target items present in the memory
array. According to the probabilistic mixture model, the response distribution is formed by
three components: the distribution of responses with mean zero and with variability κt , the
uniform (u) distribution of random guesses, and the distribution of responses centred at the
value of one of the non-target items with variability κnt .
3.1.3 Anxiety in the framework of resource models of VSWM
The distribution of errors in the recollection of a stimulus is determined by noise. Such noise
can affect the recalling process at different stages, namely early sensory processing, retention,
and retrieval (Ma et al., 2014). So far, sources of noise have been identified as physical
stimulus factors (Ma et al., 2014), set size (Bays and Husain, 2008), and time available for
encoding or decoding (Bays et al., 2011a; Pertzov et al., 2013). Interest in such sources of
noise has been driven by the assumption that the allocation of limited resources depends
on two factors: the interference generated by competing items and goal directed attentional
mechanisms. However, no investigation has yet been carried out looking at the effects of
external and item-independent noise. Task-irrelevant anxiety may indeed act as an external
source of noise. The attentional shift and biases (Barlow, 2000) may interfere with top-down
mechanisms involved in the encoding and decoding of visuospatial properties of the items to
be remembered. For example, anxiety induced by the administration of electric shocks has
been shown to disrupt the activity associated with the evaluation of task-relevant information,
biasing attention and resource allocation (Rossi and Pourtois, 2015; Shackman et al., 2011).
VSWM has been found to be affected by anxious states (Lavric et al., 2003; Li et al.,
2006; Shackman et al., 2006). One possible explanation is that anxiety has a detrimental
effect on performance of VSWM tasks because it interferes with resource allocation and
biases attention away from task relevant information (Rossi and Pourtois, 2015; Shackman
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et al., 2011). Importantly, flexibility in resource allocation in combination with noise is
thought to explain the error distribution in resource models of WM (Ma et al., 2014).
3.1.4 Rationale of the study
In this study I aimed at investigating the effects of anxiety on VSWM in the framework of
the resource models of VSWM. Indeed, anxiety is characterized by attention biases towards
threat-relevant stimuli (e.g., Pflugshaupt et al., 2005) and by shifts towards self evaluative
focus (Barlow, 2000), which may decrease the attentional resources available for performing
tasks. I assessed VSWM by means of accuracy on a continuous scale rather than in a binary
fashion. To this aim, I used a modified version of the task developed by Bays et al. (2011b).
The delayed-estimation task was adopted to assess whether anxiety impacted on the ability of
dealing with the noise intrinsic to memory representations. I manipulated the level of negative
arousal varying the probability of receiving a shock at the end of each trial. This methodology
was informed by the NPU-threat test protocol (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). Behavioural
responses were analysed by comparing the estimates of the discrete-representation model
(Zhang and Luck, 2008a) for both colour and angle features. The two features were measured
to assess the precision of recall of both visual and spatial information in VSWM. Because
Bays et al. (2011b) report that misreporting occur independently for features of an item,
we believed that assessing both would not result in trade-offs between the two features that
would affect the data.
A no-memory task in which there was no retention interval was also administered.
Anxiety is thought to drive attention away from task relevant stimuli. Hence, a decrease in
performance might have been modulated by the effect of anxiety over aspects of performance
not directly related to memory. For example, participants might have been less accurate
simply because they wanted to quickly respond to the trials and get over the experimental
block. If that was the case, also performance to a task that does not require the retention of
items in WM would be affected. The no-memory task allowed to test whether the decrease
in performance was disengaged from WM. If a decrease in performance due to anxiety was
present in data from the orientation task and not in data from the no-memory task, I could
conclude that VSWM processes are indeed affected by anxiety.
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3.2 Materials and methods
3.2.1 Participants
Seventeen participants (9 females, 8 males) took part to the study after giving informed
consent. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no colour blindness, no
history of psychiatric conditions, and no cardiac pacemaker. Participants were paid £50 for
their participation upon completion of both sessions of the experiment.
The study was approved by the University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics
Committee.
3.2.2 Task and stimuli
Orientation task
Each trial began with a 1000ms presentation of a cue that predicted the probability of
receiving an electric shock at the end of the trial. The cue was followed by 300ms blank
interval. Next, a memory array of three coloured oriented arrows was presented for 2000ms
followed by a pattern mask for 100ms and then a blank retention interval (900ms). The
pattern mask was included to ensure iconic memory did not contribute to performance. A
single vertical test arrow (white) was then presented at one randomly chosen location from
the preceding memory array. Subjects were instructed to adjust the angle and colour of the
test arrow to match the features of the probed arrow of the memory array (Fig. 3.1A).
The arrows of the memory set were randomly distributed at eccentricities with x and y
coordinates in the range -423 to 422 pixels, the centre of the screen being (0,0). Angle and
colour were independently chosen at random from two circular parameter spaces. The angle
parameter space corresponded to the range of angles –180°to +180°(i.e. the full range of
possible arrow orientations). For colour, we used the guidelines in Zhang and Luck (2008b).
The parameter space was defined 180 colour values distributed in a L*a*b* colour space.
The parameters of the colour space were defined as L*≈ 54, a*≈22.5+55 × cos(θ ), and
b*≈ 11+46× sin(θ ), where θ ranged from 2°to 360°in 2°steps. This circle was centred in
the colour space at (L = 70, a = 20, b = 38) with a radius of 60. Its centre was chosen to
maximize its radius and therefore the discriminability of the colours. All colours had equal
luminance and varied mainly in hue and slightly in saturation.
The features were adjusted using two input dials (X-box Wireless Controller, Microsoft,
USA. Fig. 3.1C). The right one was controlled with the right hand and the left one with the
left hand. Turning one dial caused the probe to rotate through the range of possible angles;
turning the other dial caused the probe’s colour to cycle through the space of possible values.
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Subjects could adjust the two dials in any order or simultaneously, and indicated adjustment
was complete by pressing the green “A” button.
There were four experimental blocks of 75 trials each. On 12 randomly chosen trials per
block, the mask onset was timed with the onset of a 102dB, 50ms long white noise presented
binaurally via headphones. Immediately after the white noise offset, a 100ms electric shock
was or was not administered according to the experimental condition. The rationale for
presenting the white noise before the administration of the shock was to elicit the startle
reflex while anxiety was induced by the anticipation of threat. In other words, eliciting
the startle reflex during such anticipation would have provided a measure of physiological
arousal. Each block was assigned to one condition only. The four experimental conditions
(0%, 30%, 70% and 100%) were determined by the probability of receiving an electric shock
after the white noise offset. Every condition was indicated by a coloured geometrical shape
presented as cue and was different for each condition. A green circled cued the 0% condition,
a blue triangle cued the 30% condition, a yellow triangle cued the 70% condition and a red
square cued the 100% condition. In the 0% condition no shock was administered, in the
30% condition the shock was administered in 30% of the trials, in the 70% condition the
shock was administered in the 70% of the trials, while in the 100% condition the shock was
administered in each trial. During the 30%, 70% and 100% conditions a shock was also
administered at a random point during the presentation of the test arrow in 5% of the trials.
The choice of intermediate probabilities was informed by (Hefner and Curtin, 2012). Their
study constitutes the only study that so far has employed probabilities rather than time-related
predictability in threat-of-shock paradigms. Compared to such studies, probabilities have
been modified to 30% and 70% (rather than 20% and 60% in the original paper) so that 30%
and 70% would have equal distance from 0% and 100%. respectively
No-memory task
Each trial began with the presentation of a cue (1000ms) that predicted the probability of
receiving an electric shock at the end of the trial. The cue was followed by a 300ms blank
interval. Consequently, a target arrow appeared in the upper half of the screen while a white
test arrow pointing upwards was presented in the lower half of the screen. Participants were
instructed to adjust the angle and colour of the test arrow in order to match them with those
of the target arrow (Fig. 3.1B). Accuracy was stressed and each trial ended once a response
was given.
Colour and angle of the target arrow were independently chosen at random from the
same two circular parameter spaces as in the orientation task and the same response device
was used. After the subject completed the adjustment, a 100ms long mask was displayed on
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Figure 3.1 A) Example of trial in the orientation task. B) Example of trial in the no-memory
task. C) Response device
the screen and was followed by 900ms of blank interval. On 12 randomly chosen trials per
block, the mask onset was timed with the onset of a 102dB, 50ms long white noise presented
binaurally via headphones. Immediately after the white noise offset, a 100ms electric shock
was or was not administered according to the same four experimental conditions of the
orientation task.
3.2.3 Setup, data acquisition and data analysis
All stimuli were displayed against black background on a 17-in. LCD monitor at a viewing
distance of about 60-65 cm.
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EMG startle reflex preprocessing
During the experiment, the EMG startle reflex was recorded using the Biopac MP150
amplifier (Biopac Systems Inc., USA). The EMG signal was continuously recorded with
4mm Ag-AgCl electrodes. Two shielded electrodes were placed on the left lower eyelid to
record the activity of the orbicularis oculi and a third unshielded electrode was placed on the
forehead. The EMG signal was sampled at 1000Hz and then smoothed with 40-500Hz FIR
band-pass filter using AcqKnowledge 4.4 software (Biopac Systems Inc., USA). The signal
was rectified, baseline corrected (baseline -100ms to 0ms) and averaged. For each condition,
maximum peak amplitudes were identified and averaged with 2 datapoints before and after
the peak. Then, values were converted first into z-scores and then in T-scores (t-score=
(z*10)+50) within participants to reduce individual variability (Grillon et al., 1999). The
trials where the 5% inter-stimulus shock occurred were excluded from EMG processing and
analyses.
Shock administration
Electric shocks were administered on the right forearm with Biopac STM100 and STM200
stimulators. A four step workup procedure (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012) was used in order to
obtain the optimal shock intensity. The participant received four test shocks starting from a
minimum voltage of 10V. The participant was instructed to rate the intensity of the shock
from 1 (very mild) to 5 (very unpleasant) and it was stressed that the shock should not be
painful. The shock intensity was increased in steps of 5V until rate 4 was reached. If the
rating of 4 was not reached after four shocks, the maximum intensity of 30V was used.
Behavioural data preprocessing
Data were analysed separately for angle and colour features. For each trial, recall errors
were acquired by calculating the angular deviation between the feature value reported by
the participant and the feature value of the target item (Bays et al., 2011b). The deviations
were then corrected for circular responses. Maximum angle error was 180°deviation from
the target value, while maximum colour error was 90°deviation from the target value.
Statistical analyses
Startle data To assess whether the probability of receiving a shock modulated the ampli-
tude of the startle reflex, repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out with shock probability
as factor. If sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values are reported.
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Next, paired-t tests Bonferroni corrected were run in case of significant ANOVAs.
Behavioural data For orientation task data, there is yet no consensus on the model that
best fits this type of data. Hence, I run maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with a Von
Mises distribution, the mixed distribution proposed by the discrete-representations model
(Zhang and Luck, 2008a), and the mixed distribution proposed by the probabilistic-mixture
model (Bays et al., 2009).
Statistical models were defined in MATLAB as following:
Mises = @(x ,k) exp(k * cos(x))./(2*pi*besseli(0,k));
Mixture = @(x, k, g) g*(1/(2*pi))+(1-g)*exp(k * cos(x))./(2*pi*besseli(0,k));
Where:
• x is the data matrix in either the angle or colour feature
• mean is assumed 0
• k is the κ parameter of the Von Mises distribution
• g is the parameter of the uniform distribution
• besseli is the function to compute the modified Bessel function of order 0
MLE was then computed as following:
MLE(DataAngle, model, StartingValueForFit, lowerbound, upperbound);
Where:
lowerbound = [0 0];
upperbound = [Inf Inf];
The full MATLAB function MLE() is available in figure 3.5 in the appendix of this
chapter. The estimates of the probabilistic-mixture model proposed by Bays et al. (2009)
were calculated with the function CO16_fit() which calls the function CO16_function().
For the MATLAB code, see figures 3.6 and 3.7 in the appendix of this chapter.
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was calculated separately for each participant
and suggested that the discrete-representations model fitted the data best for both the angle
and colour features in the orientation task (table 3.1 in the appendix). Repeated-measure
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ANOVAs and BANOVAs were run with shock probability as factor and the parameters of the
best fitting model as dependent variable. BANOVAs were run on R using the BayesFactor
package (version 0.9.12-2). In the discrete-representations model, the parameter κt represents
the variability of the behavioural response around the correct value of the target stimulus,
while the parameter u represents the uniform distribution of random guesses. For no-memory
data, the Von Mises distribution was fitted with the same MLE() function used for the data
from the orientation task. In the no-memory task the stimuli consisted of a single target and
no memory recall was necessary to perform the task. Given the absence of non-targets and
of a memory delay period, the κnt and the u parameters of the mixture model would have
increased model complexity without the theoretical justification.
The trials where the 5% inter-stimulus shock occurred were excluded from behavioural
analyses.
3.2.4 Procedure
The experiment was run over two sessions of about 2.5h each carried out on two different
days. Each day they completed both orientation and no-memory tasks. The order of the tasks
was counterbalanced across participants. Furthermore, within participants, the task order in
the two sessions was inverted. During each session, the participant completed 4 blocks of 75
trials of the orientation task and 4 blocks of 50 trials of the no-memory task.
During the first session, participants gave informed consent and then were prepared for
physiological recording and shock administration following the guidelines suggested by
Blumenthal et al. (2005) and Schmitz and Grillon (2012). Participants were first instructed
on the first task and completed a 20 trials practice block during which there was no shock
administration. Prior starting the testing, the four-steps workup procedure was carried out
and the participant was habituated to the startling noise. The habituation procedure consisted
presentation of 9 bursts of white noise. This procedure was employed to ensure that the
strong startle habituation did not influence the results (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). After the
completion of the first task, the second task was explained, followed by a 20 trials practice
block with no shock administration. The same procedure was followed during the second
session.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Orientation task
Figure 3.2 shows that EMG startle amplitude was amplified by threat of shock (F(3,48) =
14.55, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.13, ε = 0.38, p-value Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted). Bonferroni
adjusted pairwise comparisons showed that the 30% condition (t(16) = -4.48, p < 0.01; M
= 51.68, SD = 6.25), the 70% condition (t(16) = -4.35, p < 0.01; M = 53.79, SD = 6.57),
and the 100% condition (t(16) = -3.05, p < 0.05; M = 51.73, SD = 7.13) elicited bigger
amplitudes than the 0% condition (M = 56.75, SD = 7.58). Furthermore, the amplitudes
in the 70% condition was bigger compared to both the 30% (t(16) = -3.90, p < 0.01) and
the 100% conditions (t(16) = 4.61, p < 0.01). On the other hand, no statistically significant
difference was found between the 30% and the 100% conditions.
The ANOVAs showed that precision of recall was not affected by threat of shock neither
for angle nor colour in any of the parameters. For the parameter κt , the BF01 = 9.95 for angle
and the BF01 = 7.02 for colour suggest that the current data are 9.95 and 7.02 times more
likely to be observed under the null hypothesis (see table 1.1 for BF interpretation). For the
parameter u, the BF01 = 5.66 for angle and the BF01 = 10.88 for colour suggest that the data
are 5.66 and 10.88 times more likely to be observed under the null hypothesis.
Figure 3.2 EMG startle reflex responses in the no-memory and orientation task with 95%
confidence intervals. Significant contrasts are marked with asterisks (* p < 0.05, ** p <
0.01, *** p < =0.001).
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Figure 3.3 A) Fitted curves of the behavioural data in the orientation task. B) Fitted curves
of the behavioural data in the no-memory task.
3.3.2 No-memory task
EMG startle amplitude was amplified by threat of shock (F(3,48) = 27.24, p < 0.001,
η2G = 0.08, ε = 0.43, p-value Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted). Bonferroni adjuste pairwise
comparisons showed that the 30% condition (t(16) = -7.48, p < 0.001; M = 51.80, SD =
7.57), the 70% condition (t(16) = -6.88, p < 0.001, M = 53.42, SD = 6.79), and the 100%
condition (t(16) = -3.36, p < 0.05; M = 50.96, SD = 6.13) elicited bigger amplitude than the
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Figure 3.4 Orientation task: (A) κt estimates for angle data, (B) κt estimates for colour data,
(C) u estimates for angle data, (D) u estimates for colour data. No-memory task: (E) κt
estimates for angle data, (F) κt estimates for colour data. No contrast is significant. Vertical
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
0% condition (M = 47.53, SD = 8.59). Furthermore, the amplitude in the 70% condition was
bigger compared to both the 30% (t(16) = -4.90, p < 0.001) and the 100% (t(16) = 6.84, p <
0.001). On the other hand, no statistically significant difference was found between the 30%
and the 100% conditions (Figure 3.2).
Precision of recall was not affected by threat neither for angle nor colour. The BF01 =
10.02 for colour suggests that the current data are 10.02 times more likely to be observed
under the null hypothesis. On the other hand, the BF01 = 2.34 for angle suggests that the
support for the null hypothesis is anecdotal.
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3.4 Discussion
Recently, slots models of VSWM have been challenged by resource models. According
to resource models, limited resources are flexibly allocated across the set of objects to be
remembered. Moreover, the different object features (e.g., colour, angle) compete for the
same limited resources and the errors in recalling object features present a Gaussian-like
distribution centred at the feature value (Bays et al., 2011b; Marshall and Bays, 2013; Zhang
and Luck, 2008a). Precision of recall has been thought to be influenced by two factors. First,
by noisy object representations caused by random fluctuations (van den Berg et al., 2012).
Second, by the number of objects sharing the available attentional resources (Bays et al.,
2009, 2011a; Bays and Husain, 2008). In the present study, I assessed whether anxiety may
act as an external interfering factor, increasing the noise intrinsic to objects representations.
To this aim, I combined the orientation task originally developed by Bays et al. (2011b) with
anxiety experimentally induced by means of the NPU-threat of shock protocol (Schmitz and
Grillon, 2012). Participants had to recall the angle and colour of a target arrow previously
presented in a set of three arrows, while anxiety was modulated by varying the probability
of receiving an electric shock. Anxiety levels were measured using the EMG ocular startle
reflex, whose amplitude increases when the presence of a cue has been paired with an aversive
unconditioned stimulus (Davis, 2006). Furthermore, a no-memory task that did not require
memory retention, was used to assess that the effect of anxiety specifically affects memory
processes. I hypothesized that the distribution of recalling errors in the orientation task
would reflect anxiety interference, with larger κt and u parameters associated with larger
interference.
3.4.1 Effect of anxiety on and physiological arousal
Anxiety measured by startle reflex amplitude was successfully modulated in both orientation
and no-memory tasks. The conditions in which electric shocks were administered elicited
bigger startle reflex than the control condition in which no shock was administered. Further-
more, the conditions in which the electric shock was likely to be administered elicited bigger
startle reflex responses than the condition in which shock administration was certain. These
results are in agreement with previous research in which uncertainty of shock administration
elicited higher levels of anxiety (Grillon et al., 2004, 2008). Indeed, anxiety has been defined
as a future-oriented emotional state that triggers a cascade of cognitive and physiological
modifications that prepare the body to respond to threat. Uncertainty reduces individuals’
predictive power over threatening events and it contributes to enhanced tension, worry, feeling
of insecurity and increased physiological arousal (Barlow, 2000; Grupe and Nitschke, 2013).
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Typically, uncertainty has been experimentally modulated by making the timing of shock
administration unpredictable, as reported in the NPU-threat test protocol of Schmitz and
Grillon (2012). However, in the present study we adopted a modified approach, modulating
uncertainty in terms of probability of shock (Hefner and Curtin, 2012). Such approach was
chosen because varying the timing of the shock (rather than the probability) would have
meant to apply a shock at each single trial. Given the necessity of a large number of trials
for statistical analysis of behavioural data, variations in probability was chosen to reduce
discomfort for the participants.
As it may be noted, the standard deviations vary a lot with probability of shock. In partic-
ular, the standard deviation is considerably bigger for the 0% condition. I could hypothesize
that in such condition the variability across participants may reflect big individual variabil-
ity in the response to a testing situation. On the other hand, during shock administration,
participants might activate a physiological fight-or-flight fear response that is evolutionary
advantageous and therefore more stereotyped.
3.4.2 Effect of anxiety on behavioural data
In the present study, three statistical models were fitted to the data in both orientation and
no-memory tasks. In the orientation task, the discrete-representation model had the best
fit of the behavioural data (both for colour and angle data) against the competing models:
the simple Von Mises distribution and the probabilistic-mixture model proposed by Bays
et al. (2009) (Table 3.1). I therefore looked at whether anxiety affected the error distribution
parameters. Unsurprisingly, anxiety did not modulate error distribution in the no-memory
task and precision of response was very high (Fig. 3.3). Such effect was expected as the
no-memory task did not have a retention period in which representations could have been
subject to interference. On the other hand, I expected the effect of anxiety in the behavioural
data of the orientation task. However, anxiety had an effect on response precision in neither
colour nor angle features. If anxiety affected the κt parameter, I could argue that anxiety
might have depleted the available attentional resources and decreased precision of recall.
One explanation might have stemmed from the framework of the Attentional Control Theory
(Eysenck et al., 2007, 2005) according to which anxiety reduces resistance to distractors
by redirecting attention towards threatening stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007). Hence, threat
of shock would have reduced the available limited attentional resources needed to discern
between competing internal representations. An alternative explanation would have been that
anxiety acted as a source of noise. The reduction in recall precision would have not been a
result of depletion of resources, but rather the result of the increased instability of internal
representations. Fougnie et al. (2012) have suggested that memory representations are subject
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to a stochastic process of degradation stemming from physiological cortical noise. It is known
that networks supervising anxious arousal overlap with networks associated with spatial
attention and WM, such as the prefrontal cortex (Adhikari et al., 2010; Dalton et al., 2005;
Manoach et al., 2004). It has been shown that during anxious states changes in connectivity
between prefrontal and limbic areas reduces emotional control of memory and attentional
processes (Gilboa et al., 2004; Gold et al., 2015; Prater et al., 2013). If the recruitment of
larger neural population improved the precision of WM representations through decreased
signal drift, a reduction in the emotional control over prefrontal areas might have increased
cortical noise and therefore reduced representation acuity. This explanation is however
hypothetical and would need extensive testing. Finally, if anxiety affected the u parameter,
we could have argued that anxiety increased random guesses rate. Reducing the number
of items encoded. This explanation would have been in agreement with the evidence that
suggests that both state and trait anxiety reduces WM capacity (Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001;
Eysenck and Calvo, 1992; Sorg and Whitney, 1992). It seems unlikely that worry would have
reduced VSWM capacity in the present task because anxiety was induced by means of threat
of shock. On the other hand, we could have argued that the probability of shock activated
stimulus-driven attentional processes at the expense of task-driven allocation of resources.
Here, I elaborated on how anxiety could have impacted VSWM taking into account
the framework of the model that best fitted the data. However, the empirical results of
the present study pointed towards the absence of an anxiety effect on precision data (Fig.
3.4). According to the results obtained by frequentist statistics, I could not reject the null
hypothesis. Therefore, no conclusion could be drawn. However, the BANOVAS suggested
that the data are most likely to be observed under the null hypothesis. In the orientation task,
the evidence for the absence of an effect of anxiety was substantial for the parameter κt for
angle and colour data, and for the parameter u for angle data. Furthermore, evidence for the
null hypothesis was strong for the u parameter in colour data of the orientation task and for
the κt parameter of colour data in the no-memory task. On the other hand, the evidence for
the null hypothesis in the no-memory angle data was only anecdotal.
Drawing conclusions on the resilience of VSWM to anxiety is at this stage premature.
However, it is possible to make preliminary hypotheses on why the anxiety manipulation did
not have any impact on response precision. One possibility is that the detrimental effect of
anxiety were overcome by compensatory mechanisms, resulting in no behavioural differences
between conditions. Several studies have shown the benefits of compensatory strategies on
behavioural performance. For example, in a backward digits span task children with high
and low state anxiety did not differ in performance. However, the high anxiety group took
longer to perform the task and reported increased mental effort (Hadwin et al., 2005). In
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another study, high and low maths anxious participants did not differ in the performance to a
maths task. However, the high anxious group showed enhanced ERP components associated
with increased engagement of cognitive resources (Suárez-Pellicioni et al., 2013). Therefore,
it is plausible that in the present task the detrimental effect of anxiety was compensated by
the increased allocation of cognitive resources. A second factor might have been the means
by which anxiety has been manipulated. It is known that sources of anxiety can be diverse.
Indeed, anxiety can be elicited in healthy patients by task-irrelevant manipulations, such as
threat of shock (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012) and CO2-enriched air inhalation (Bailey et al.,
2005; Poma et al., 2005; Woods et al., 1988). The threat of shock paradigm used in the
present study has the advantage of being a well established technique that reliably produces
anxious physiological arousal. Furthermore, by modifying the probability of shock, such
technique can be used in block designs allowing within-participants investigations. However,
a drawback might be that the threatening stimulus is completely task-irrelevant and may not
suited to investigate the cognitive interference of anxiety. According to the ACT (Eysenck
et al., 2007) anxiety disrupts the WM inhibition function by external task-irrelevant stimuli
but also by internal task-irrelevant stimuli such as worry. It is possible that in the present
paradigm the nature of the threatening stimuli did not initiate worry and self preoccupation
as, for example, fear of failure could do in a maths test situation. Hence, anxiety might
not have taken a toll on cognitive control despite inducing increased physiological arousal.
Furthermore, the placement of the shock delivery within the trial might not have been ideal.
The choice of delivering the shock before target presentation was made so that anxiety was
high during the retention period. While participants were not informed on when they would
receive a shock within the trial, the timing of shock delivery was kept constant. Hence,
participants might have implicitly understood that if a shock was not delivered after a certain
time, then they would be safe. For the same reason, we did not make the choice of delivering
the shock after a response was given. This would have created a safe space during the
retention interval, with the risk of minimizing the effects of the induced anxiety. A third
factor influencing the outcome of the present study might be the set size of the trials. Because
of constraints dictated by time (the participants completed two sessions of 2.5 hours each)
we only employed a set size of three items. One of the primary findings in the literature is
that variability of recall increases with set size (Ma et al., 2014). Because the relationship
between precision of recall and set size seems to follow a simple power law (Bays et al.,
2009; Bays and Husain, 2008) set size 3 has been chosen arbitrarily. It is possible that the
cumulative noise of the items composing the experimental trials was not sufficient for anxiety
to have a behavioural observable effect on recall precision.
3.5 Conclusions 117
3.4.3 Directions for future research
The results reported in this study leave us with more open questions than answers. Before
ruling out any effect of anxiety on parameters describing resource models of VSWM, it
should be investigated whether other factors have influenced the outcome. First, the same
experiment could be run on increased set sizes. However, adding set sizes in the repeated
measure design with four condition would be not feasible because it would require too
much testing time. One option would be dropping the 30% and 100% probability of shock
conditions as they provide redundant information. Because the 70% condition was the most
successful in eliciting anxiety, reducing the conditions to 0% and 70% would allow to include
set size as a second factor in the design. Second, timing of shock could be varied in order to
ensure that anxiety is high during the retention period. Third, it might have been that threat of
shock did not elicit sufficient anxiety to produce a detectable behavioural effect. To overcome
this issue it may be interesting to see if highly anxious individuals do show any behavioural
effect of anxiety on precision of recollection. Finally, electroencephalography could be
used to assess whether compensatory strategies have come into play. For example, the
same task could be run while measuring ERPs. Analysing components that reflect cognitive
effort and the recruitment of processing resources such as the P300 and the Late Positive
Component (Polich, 2007) could offer an insight into compensatory activity. Differences in
such components in conjunction to no behavioural effects would be an indication that anxiety
depletes attentional resources and requires increased cognitive effort in order to produce the
same behavioural performance.
3.5 Conclusions
In summary, the aim of the present study was to assess whether anxiety impacts precision of
recall. To this aim we manipulated anxiety using threat of shock in healthy participants and
asked them to replicate the angle and colour of a target arrow previously displayed. We then
compared across conditions the parameters of a mixed distribution (Zhang and Luck, 2008a).
The results in both the angle and colour feature of the stimuli point towards an absence of the
effect of anxiety on behavioural data. Both the distribution parameter expressing response
precision and random guessing were not affected by the experimental manipulation.
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Figure 3.5 The MATLAB code reports the function used to estimate the parameters of the
model with maximum likelihood estimation.
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Figure 3.6 The MATLAB code reports the CO16_fit() function used to fit the probabilistic-
mixture model. The function calls the CO16_function() function (see Fig. 3.7). The
function is downloadable from www.paulbays.com
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0% shock 30% shock 70% shock 100% shock






-377.0 -412.0 -410.0 -336.0 -384.0 -382.0 -388.0 -401.0 -399.0 -354.0 -408.0 -406.0
-63.9 -165.0 -163.0 -81.5 -140.0 -138.0 -107.0 -196.0 -194.0 -157.0 -286.0 -284.0
-87.5 -157.0 -155.0 -90.0 -168.0 -166.0 -136.0 -179.0 -177.0 -82.3 -99.7 -97.7
-222.0 -324.0 -322.0 -171.0 -273.0 -271.0 -259.0 -357.0 -355.0 -170.0 -232.0 -230.0
-26.3 -165.0 -163.0 30.1 -85.0 -83.0 0.429 -90.8 -88.8 -38.6 -194.0 -192.0
-311.0 -372.0 -370.0 -200.0 -293.0 -291.0 -249.0 -302.0 -300.0 -284.0 -348.0 -346.0
-76.9 -180.0 -178.0 -53.8 -201.0 -199.0 -77.0 -212.0 -210.0 -1.61 -129.0 -127.0
-186.0 -339.0 -337.0 -24.0 -221.0 -219.0 80.8 -104.0 -102.0 -132.0 -279.0 -277.0
-211.0 -327.0 -325.0 -193.0 -283.0 -281.0 -231.0 -283.0 -281.0 -322.0 -393.0 -391.0
-78.9 -186.0 -184.0 -51.8 -193.0 -191.0 -76.3 -190.0 -188.0 -4.16 -132.0 -130.0
-97.8 -249.0 -247.0 -128.0 -240.0 -238.0 -118.0 -235.0 -233.0 -17.6 -134.0 -132.0
-3.9 -47.2 -45.2 -2.36 -114.0 -112.0 -44.1 -120.0 -118.0 -30.7 -143.0 -141.0
-2.2 -114.0 -112.0 38.6 -63.3 -61.3 -6.63 -83.7 -81.7 -17.5 -106.0 -104.0
-25.4 -124.0 -122.0 -37.2 -132.0 -130.0 -3.77 -126.0 -124.0 -64.6 -134.0 -132.0
-183.0 -245.0 -243.0 -198.0 -262.0 -260.0 -243.0 -335.0 -333.0 -199.0 -281.0 -279.0
-45.9 -156.0 -154.0 5.75 -85.1 -83.1 -46.2 -127.0 -125.0 -79.8 -154.0 -152.0
-127.0 -203.0 -201.0 -147.0 -275.0 -273.0 -131.0 -249.0 -247.0 -128.0 -224.0 -222.0
0% shock 30% shock 70% shock 100% shock







-179.0 -299.0 -297.0 -95.8 -173.0 -171.0 -106.0 -211.0 -209.0 -152.0 -249.0 -247.0
110.0 -80.0 -78.0 65.9 -161.0 -159.0 87.7 -113.0 -111.0 -26.7 -235.0 -233.0
40.5 -104.0 -102.0 -3.61 -224.0 -222.0 50.1 -58.9 -56.9 -15.5 -176.0 -174.0
-167.0 -265.0 -263.0 -150.0 -285.0 -283.0 -165.0 -233.0 -231.0 -116.0 -225.0 -223.0
17.1 -191.0 -189.0 5.27 -176.0 -174.0 24.9 -117.0 -115.0 5.97 -95.9 -93.9
-281.0 -327.0 -325.0 -304.0 -356.0 -354.0 -304.0 -340.0 -338.0 -314.0 -353.0 -351.0
-98.7 -208.0 -206.0 27.7 -86.0 -84.0 -6.01 -211.0 -209.0 -17.5 -175.0 -173.0
-197.0 -278.0 -276.0 -18.8 -139.0 -137.0 33.2 -60.9 -58.9 -133.0 -217.0 -215.0
-27.2 -164.0 -162.0 -20.8 -180.0 -178.0 -26.9 -171.0 -169.0 -48.9 -221.0 -219.0
-39.2 -156.0 -154.0 24.4 -103.0 -101.0 -63.7 -253.0 -251.0 -18.0 -201.0 -199.0
-34.4 -152.0 -150.0 -94.0 -211.0 -209.0 -103.0 -204.0 -202.0 -84.6 -210.0 -208.0
101.0 -38.9 -36.9 53.2 -143.0 -141.0 43.6 -135.0 -133.0 10.5 -77.0 -75.0
54.2 -234.0 -232.0 31.7 -215.0 -213.0 74.2 -207.0 -205.0 38.9 -195.0 -193.0
53.6 -173.0 -171.0 109.0 -37.5 -35.5 91.1 -170.0 -168.0 87.1 -144.0 -142.0
-162.0 -308.0 -306.0 -168.0 -258.0 -256.0 -133.0 -250.0 -248.0 -148.0 -251.0 -249.0
32.7 -135.0 -133.0 58.9 -115.0 -113.0 28.7 -226.0 -224.0 -5.5 -232.0 -230.0
-51.4 -218.0 -216.0 -129.0 -241.0 -239.0 -108.0 -232.0 -230.0 -49.9 -174.0 -172.0
Table 3.1 Akaike Information Criterion values calculated for single participants on orientation task data. The Von Mises model, the
descrete-representations model (DRM) and the probabilistic-mixed model (PMM) were fitted to the data. The Akaike Information
Criterion informed on which model fitted the data best. Lower values indicate better fit.
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Chapter 4
Implicit and explicit measures of maths
anxiety
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 MA as a complex construct
MA is a complex construct in which cognition, metacognition, physiology and performance
are tightly interconnected and their individual role is still under scientific investigation. The
complexity of such construct becomes apparent when investigating the relationship between
MA and performance to maths tasks. It is indeed still debated whether difficulties in maths
are the primary cause of MA or whether is MA playing a role in poor maths performance
(Carey et al., 2016). Studies investigating poor maths skills in children have suggested
that children with early maths learning disabilities or other cognitive deficits, such as poor
self-regulation skills, report higher levels of MA (Jain and Dowson, 2009; Kramarski et al.,
2010; Passolunghi, 2011; Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010). Furthermore, longitudinal studies
on schooling populations have found a correlation between maths achievement and MA
scores the following year (Ma and Xu, 2004). While these studies seem to suggest that
cognitive deficits and poor maths performance are the cause of MA, Devine et al. (2013)
reported that only a small percentage of the population is diagnosed with specific learning
disabilities (1-6% in the case of dyscalculia). Given that the prevalence of MA has been
reported to be between 6% to 68%, depending on population and inclusion criteria (Dowker
et al., 2016), it is unlikely that the entirety of the prevalence is explained by cognitive
disabilities. Furthermore, Devine et al. (2017) found that 77% of their sample had high MA
but typical maths performance. Suggesting that emotional maths difficulties and cognitive
maths difficulties dissociate.
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Others suggest an opposite relationship, with MA impairing maths performance. It
has been hypothesized that the mechanism through which MA impacts performance is by
depleting cognitive resources, as explained by the ACT (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992). Like
in the case of other types of anxiety, MA individuals during a maths task may experience
worry. Worry consists of self-directed and task-irrelevant thoughts that may reduce WM
resources. The role that the different WM components (Baddeley, 1992) have in arithmetic
processing has been object of wide investigation (for reviews, see DeStefano and LeFevre,
2004; Raghubar et al., 2010). It is therefore not surprising that researchers have hypothesized
that the effects of MA on maths performance may be mediated by the effects on WM
resources. For example, HMA participants have been found to have reduced WM spans
compared to LMA participants (Ashcraft and Kirk, 2001; Ashcraft and Krause, 2007) and
differences in WM have been found to be a significant factor accounting for the variance in
maths performance in HMAs (Miller and Bichsel, 2004). Furthermore, Mattarella-Micke
et al. (2011) found that the impact that MA had on maths performance was mediated by
WM capacity. On the other hand, Klados et al. (2015) have reported differences between
HMAs and LMAs in the cortical activation of areas associated with WM independently of
performance. Finally, studies have observed that modulating MA either by increasing social
pressure (Gerstenberg et al., 2012; Marx et al., 2013; Seitchik et al., 2014; Spencer et al.,
1999a) or by modifying task properties, such as the time available to perform the task (Faust
et al., 1996), had an effect on performance.
4.1.2 The importance of implicit measures of MA
There is not yet consensus on the directionality of the relationship between MA and perfor-
mance and the mechanisms through which such relationship is regulated. MA is a complex
construct that is influenced by phenomena that span from social pressure to basic cogni-
tive processes. Hence, measuring MA is a challenging task. MA is typically measured by
self-report questionnaires in which individuals rate their agreement or disagreement on a
series of sentences referring to everyday situations involving maths. These questionnaires
have satisfactory psychometric properties (Alexander and Martray, 1989; Carey et al., 2017;
Hopko et al., 2003a; Plake and Parker, 1982; Richardson and Suinn, 1972). However, they
are subject to general limitations linked to the fact that they are explicit measures of anxiety.
First, questionnaires assume that individuals are honest in their answers. This might be
problematic especially in studies investigating gender differences. For example, the stereo-
type that boys are better at maths than girls (Spencer et al., 1999b) might result in girls
being more willing to report difficulties in maths related tasks than boys. Unfortunately, the
tools available do not provide any scale enabling questionnaire invalidation where biased
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answers are detected. Second, self-report measures require a certain level of metacognition
that might differ between ages, genders and abilities. Third, scores are not easily comparable
between culturally and linguistically different samples. Furthermore, as reported in the
previous section, MA also impact basic cognitive processes such as WM that are engaged
in an automatized fashion and are only partially, if at all, under the control of conscious
top-down processes. There is therefore a qualitative discrepancy between explicit measures
and the processes impacted by MA. Explicit measures quantify MA through a verbal output
that is the result of a process of self-evaluation. On the other hand, the cognitive processes
impacted by MA are automatized in nature. Hence, interest has grown for implicit measures.
Implicit measures seek to quantify automatised cognitive processes and physiological indices
that are modulated by MA.
4.1.3 The affective priming task as a behavioural implicit measure of
MA
Behavioural measures have been employed to investigate automatised processes (Hopko et al.,
1998, 2002; Rubinsten et al., 2015; Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010; Suárez-Pellicioni et al.,
2015). One task that has been implemented to study the emotional value that the subjects
attribute to stimuli is the affective priming task. The idea behind the affective priming task is
that participants respond quicker to stimuli that are emotionally congruent with the preceding
prime (Fazio et al., 1986; Houwer et al., 2002). There are two mechanisms that have been
suggested to underlie such effect. According to the spreading of activation account (Collins
and Loftus, 1975), concepts are organized as nodes in semantic networks. Nodes that share
similar valence are linked to each other. If a node is activated (for example by a priming
word with a certain valence) the activation spreads to the neighbouring nodes. If response
selection depends on node activation, the nodes that have been activated because linked to
the prime will elicit a faster response compared to nodes that do not share strong links with
the prime (Fazio, 2001). On the other hand the response activation account explains affective
priming effects in terms of response selection, rather than target evaluation. According to
this account, the prime stimuli activate responses on the basis of their valence (positive or
negative). For example, if subjects are asked to judge if a target word is positive or negative
(e.g. beautiful), response selection will be faster if the preceding prime had positive valence
as well (e.g. a smiley face). Because the prime will have activated a positive response, the
subject will be facilitated to select a response that is congruent with the valence of the prime
(De Houwer et al., 2009).
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Rubinsten and Tannock (2010) used an affective priming task paired with an arithmetic
verification task to study MA in children with developmental dyscalculia (DD). Specifically,
they looked at how priming words influence the processing of mental arithmetic in DD
children. They used prime words that could either be positive, negative, neutral or related to
maths (such as quantity). Words were followed by an arithmetic operation that the subject
had to judge whether it was correct or incorrect. They found that DD children responded
faster when the operation was preceded by negative prime words. On the other hand, controls
responded faster when the operations were preceded by positive prime words. No difference
was found between responses to trials with maths-related and neutral primes. Because
affective prime words facilitate responses to targets that are emotionally congruent, the
authors concluded that DD children attributed negative valence to maths. The same task was
used in Rubinsten et al. (2012) to assess whether gender differences in the ability to solve
arithmetic facts depend on differences in MA. An affective priming effect was found in both
groups but with different directionality. Males had responded faster when the operations
were preceded by positive prime words. On the other hand, females were faster when the
operations were preceded by negative prime words. Hence, the authors concluded that males
attribute positive valence to maths while females attributed negative valence. The authors
suggested that the priming effect may be due to differences in MA. Therefore the affective
priming task may be an implicit measure of MA.
4.1.4 The startle reflex and HRV as physiological implicit measures of
MA
Because of the automatised nature of physiological reactions to stress, several studies have
attempted to investigate MA by means of physiological indices with varying success (as
reported in the general introduction). The measure that seems to be the most effective
in measuring MA is salivary cortisol (Mattarella-Micke et al., 2011; Pletzer et al., 2010;
Sarkar et al., 2014). However, the fact that changes in cortisol levels reflect an hormonal
response makes it difficult to pair it with computerised tasks that are usually employed to
investigate cognitive processes. First, the time lag between psychological responses and
endocrine responses (Hellhammer et al., 2009; Schlotz et al., 2008; Smyth et al., 1998) makes
cortisol measurements suitable for paradigms that require a small number of measurements
spaced in time (e.g. before and after a maths exam). However, it is less suitable to be
used in conjunction with tasks that require fast online measurements. This is the case for
computerised tasks with fast presentation of stimuli and within-participants design. Second,
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salivary cortisol spontaneously varies throughout the day, making it difficult to compare
levels across participants (Gröschl et al., 2003).
Physiological measures that have faster reactivity to stressors are the ocular startle reflex
and HR measures. As mentioned in the general introduction, the ocular startle reflex has
widely been used to assess the physiological arousal during anxious states (Davis, 2006;
Grillon et al., 1991; Grillon and Davis, 1997). However, to the best of my knowledge it has
never been employed to assess MA. Regarding HR measures, the literature investigating the
sensitivity of HR (measured as beats-per-minute) to MA levels has produced inconsistent
results (Dew et al., 1984; Hopko et al., 2005, 2003b). Whether heart rate increases or
decreases in anticipation of threatening stimuli is still debated (Alm, 2004). Inconsistency
in HR results might be due to the fact that during anxious responding the sympathetic and
the parasympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous system coactivate exerting opposite
effects on the heart rate. Therefore, measures of HRV may be more suitable for the assessment
of anxiety (Chalmers et al., 2014; Shaffer et al., 2014). Similarly to the startle reflex, to the
best of my knowledge HRV has not been used to assess MA.
4.1.5 Rationale of the study
The aim of the present study was to investigate implicit measures of MA. I adopted the same
affective priming task paired with a verification task developed by Rubinsten and Tannock
(2010) and replicated by Rubinsten et al. (2012), recording the startle reflex and HRV data.
The priming task consisted in the presentation of emotionally charged words followed by
an arithmetic verification task. The purpose of the task was to test the behavioural and
physiological response to the association between the emotional valence of the prime words
and the emotional valence attributed to performing maths. Furthermore, a two-back task
with geometrical figures was administered. Participants had to judge whether the current
stimulus was the same as the one presented two trials earlier. The aim of the two-back task
was to assess how variations in HRV measures could be attributed to WM load regradless of
emotional valence. Regarding HRV measures, the mean of the IBIs was selected as simple
time-domain measure, the SDNN and the RMSSD as complex time-domain measures and
the ratio LF/HF as frequency domain measure.
From the present experiment, I first expected to replicate the affective priming effects:
participants with higher levels of MA were expected to respond faster to negative compared
to positive prime trials. On the other hand, I did not expect prime effects on neutral and maths
trials as in Rubinsten and Tannock (2010) and Rubinsten et al. (2012). Second, I expected
to observe larger startle reflexes and reduced HRV in HMAs. Third, I aimed at assessing
whether the effects of MA on the affective priming task showed a corresponding activation
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in physiological measures. I expected that HMAs showed larger startle reflex and smaller
HRV in trials preceded by negative words than in trials preceded by positive words. I did not
have strong hypotheses regarding trials preceded by negative and maths primes. Finally, I
wanted to assess whether implicit measures of MA predicted self-report ratings.
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4.2 Materials and methods
4.2.1 Participants
60 participants were tested. 40 participants (11 M, 29 F, mean age 24.44, mean education
was Master’s degree) were retained for the analysis (see sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.5 for details
on inclusion criteria). Participants were over 18 years of age, English native speakers, did not
have a history of psychiatric disorders or learning disabilities and had normal or corrected-to
normal vision and hearing.
Participants were recruited via the University bulletin and paid £20 for their participation.
The study was approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Cambridge.
4.2.2 Tests and self-report measures
Numeracy skills were tested with an arithmetic difficulties questionnaire (Openhaim-Bitton,
2003). In this test participants had 2 minutes to solve as many operations as possible (see
fig. 4.6 in the appendix of this chapter). Operations had to be solved in order without being
skipped. One participant scored 3 SD below the mean and was excluded from the analysis.
Reading skills were assessed with the WIAT-II Reading Task (starting from section C) in
which participants were asked to read aloud a list of words whose pronunciation increased in
difficulty. No participant scored more than 1 SD below the mean in the total raw score. The
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-state and STAI-trait) and Test Anxiety Inventory (TAI)
questionnaires were also administered (Spielberger, 1977; Spielberger et al., 1983). MA was
assessed using the Abbreviated Maths Anxiety Scale (AMAS Alexander and Martray, 1989).
4.2.3 Tasks and stimuli
Verification task with emotional priming
The participants performed a verification task combined with affective priming. The stimuli
appeared in white against a black background and were displayed at the centre of a 17-inch
Apple LCD monitor placed about 50 cm in front of the participants.
Priming was induced by means of written words. A total of 40 word primes were chosen
as belonging to four different types (table 4.1): 10 with negative emotional value, 10 with
positive emotional value, 10 with neutral emotional value and 10 maths related. Of these,
33 were selected from the Affective Norms for English Words database (ANEW; Bradley
and Lang, 1999). In the database, words are rated in their valence (ranging from pleasant to
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unpleasant), arousal (ranging from calm to excited) and dominance (ranging from in control
to dominated). In the current study, all words selected had low arousal (scores from 1 to
3 in the arousal dimension) and medium dominance (scores from 4 to 6 in the dominance
dimension). In the valence dimension, negative primes were rated 1 to 3, neutral primes were
rated 4 to 6, and positive primes were rated 7 to 9. Because the ANEW did not have enough
maths word, 7 maths words were selected outside of the database. All four word types had
an average length of 4.6 letters per word.










door 5.16 312 4
bird 7.27 31 4 chair 5.08 66 5
gentle 7.31 27 6 chin 5.29 27 4
peace 7.72 198 5 elbow 5.12 10 5
relax 7.00 14 5 arm 5.34 94 3
safe 7.07 58 4 lamp 5.41 18 4
cosy 7.39 1 4 statue 5.17 17 6
sleep 7.20 65 5 street 5.22 244 6
warmth 7.41 28 6 table 5.22 198 5










circle 5.30 60 6
dreary 3.05 6 6 sphere 5.33 22 6
sad 1.61 35 3 square 4.74 143 6
gloom 1.88 14 5 pi na na 2
dirt 4.17 43 4 arc na na 3
mess 3.15 3 4 angle na na 5
grime 3.37 1 5 maths na na 5
pity 3.37 14 4 sine na na 4
rusty 3.86 8 5 count na na 5
weary 3.79 17 5 area na na 4
Table 4.1 Words used as primes in the affective priming task paired with an arithmetic
verification task. Words could either have positive, negative or neutral valence, or be maths-
related. Positive, negative and neutral words were selected from the ANEW (Bradley and
Lang, 1999) while 7 maths-related words were selected outside of the database. Valence
ratings and frequency of use are reported.
The stimuli in the verification task were arithmetic operations in the form a+b=c (table
4.2) belonging to all four operation types (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division). For
each operation type, 8 simple and 8 complex operations were created. Simple operations
consisted of single digit operands with the exception of two subtractions. Complex additions
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and subtractions consisted of double digit operands. For multiplications and divisions, half
of them had both operands being double digits, while in half of them the first operand was a
double digit and the second operand was a single digit. Each operand combination was paired
with one correct and one incorrect solution. Incorrect solutions deviated ±2 or ±4 from
the correct solution (Avancini et al., 2014). The following criteria were used for operands
selection (Avancini et al., 2014): ties (e.g. 3+3) were excluded, 0 was not used as operand.
Furthermore, every solution to the equations was a positive integer. Each operation was
repeated twice in the experiment, for a total of 256 trials.
The trial (fig. 4.1A) started with the presentation of a fixation eye for 500ms followed
by 500ms of blank screen. Then, the prime word was displayed for 250ms followed by
the presentation of the operation. The operation was displayed until the subject made a
response or for a maximum of 6 seconds. The intertrial interval was a 1,800ms blank screen.
Participants were instructed to judge whether the operation was correct or incorrect and made
a response by pressing keys on a keyboard with the right and left index fingers. Participants
were encouraged to be as fast and as accurate as possible. The laterality of response buttons
was counterbalanced across participants.
The experiment was composed of four blocks, each block belonging to one experimental
condition determined by the emotional value of the prime. Therefore, in every block the
prime words had the same emotional value. Each block consisted of the presentation of
64 trials. The words within each block and the operations across blocks were randomised.
Furthermore, the block order was randomized across participants.
In order to elicit the startle reflex, 50ms bursts of white noise were presented binaurally
at 102dB. In each block, the bursts were played at 12 randomly chosen intertrial intervals.
Only correct trails were retained for the statistical analysis. In addition, trials that received
a response faster than 200ms were removed.
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Figure 4.1 A) Example of trial in the affective priming task paired with an arithmetic
verification task. Participants were presented with a priming word followed by an arithmetic
operation. Participants were instructed to judge whether the operation was correct or incorrect.
In 12 trials per block a 50ms burst of white noise was played to elicit the startle reflex. B)
Example of trial in the two-back task. Participants were presented with coloured geometric
shapes. The task required participants to give a response if the current stimulus was the
same as the stimulus displayed two trials earlier. In 12 trials a 50ms burst of white noise was
played. However, the startle reflex was not analysed for the two-back task as the purpose
was to control for the influence of cognitive load on HRV in a task not involving emotion
regulation.
Two-back task
In the two-back task stimuli appeared on black background and were displayed on a 17-inch
Apple LCD monitor placed about 50 cm in front of the participants. Stimuli were coloured
geometrical shapes centred at the centre of the screen. The trial (fig. 4.1B) started with a
500ms fixation "#". The fixation "#" was chosen over the eye because it was more easily
distinguishable from the target stimuli. The fixation was followed by a stimulus displayed for
500ms and then by 2,000ms of blank screen. Participants were instructed to press a key when
the stimulus displayed was the same of the stimulus displayed two trials earlier. Similarly to
the verification task, 50ms bursts of white noise were presented binaurally at 102dB. In each
block, the bursts were played at 12 randomly chosen blank intervals.
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6+7=13 16-7=9 4×9=36 6/2=3
9+7=16 14-9=5 7×6=42 4/2=2
5+9=14 9-6=3 3×4=12 8/2=4
3+6=9 9-4=5 9×7=63 9/3=3
5+4=9 8-5=3 6×3=18 6/3=2
3+5=8 7-3=4 4×7=28 8/4=2
4+3=7 11-3=8 8×6=48 7/1=7






6+7=9 16-7=11 4×9=38 6/2=5
9+7=18 14-9=7 7×6=44 4/2=4
5+9=16 9-6=1 3×4=10 8/2=2
3+6=7 9-4=3 9×7=61 9/3=1
5+4=7 8-5=7 6×3=22 6/3=6
3+5=12 7-3=8 4×7=32 8/4=6
4+3=11 11-3=4 8×6=44 7/1=3






22+13=35 35-13=22 19×3=57 78/6=13
11+17=28 28-17=11 6×14=84 84/6=14
34+23=57 57-23=34 16×7=112 96/8=12
16+43=59 59-43=16 4×17=68 68/4=17
17+39=56 56-39=17 14×19=266 72/18=4
47+26=73 73-26=47 15×13=195 78/13=6
29+52=81 81-52=29 12×16=192 56/14=4






22+13=37 35-13=24 19×3=59 78/6=15
11+17=26 28-17=9 6×14=82 84/6=12
34+23=61 57-23=38 16×7=116 96/8=16
16+43=55 59-43=12 4×17=64 68/4=13
17+39=58 56-39=19 14×19=268 72/18=6
47+26=71 73-26=45 15×13=193 78/13=4
29+52=85 81-52=33 12×16=196 56/14=8
64+19=79 83-19=60 18×17=302 96/16=2
Table 4.2 Stimuli used in the affective priming task paired with a verification task. Operations
were either additions, subtractions, multiplications or divisions. Half of the operations were
simple and half complex. Simple operations had single digit operands or only one double
digit operand in the case of subtractions. Complex operations had double digit operands or at
least one double digit operand in the case of multiplication and divisions. In half of the trials
the operations were correct and in half operations were incorrect.
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4.2.4 Procedure
During recruitment participants were asked not to make use of tobacco or caffeinated drinks
on the day of the testing. The reason was to reduce the effects of caffeine and nicotine on the
physiological response to stress. On the day of the experiment, participants were asked to
sign a consent form and fill in the personal details form prior starting the experiment. Half
of the participants performed the verification task first, while half performed the two-back
task first. The TAI (fig 4.8 in the appendix) and the STAI-trait (fig 4.10 in the appendix)
questionnaires were administered online. Half of the participants were asked to complete
them before coming to the testing session while half completed them after the testing session.
The STAI-state (fig 4.9 in the appendix) was administered during the testing session. Half of
the participants filled it before the computerized tasks and half after. In order to avoid that
participants understood that the experiment was specifically about MA, the AMAS (fig 4.7 in
the appendix) and the arithmetic difficulty questionnaire (fig 4.6 in the appendix) were always
administered after the computerized task. The Reading Task (fig. 4.11 in the appendix) was
administered at the end of the testing session.
After all electrodes were applied and before starting the recording, the participant was
habituated to the startling noise with the presentation of 9 bursts of white noise. This
procedure was employed to ensure that the strong startle habituation did not influence the
results (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). Then, the participant was asked to relax with the eyes
closed for 5 minutes. This was to ensure that the HR was at resting state before the experiment
begun. For the same reason, a 2 minutes rest in which the participant had to relax with the
eyes closed was given in between experimental blocks.
4.2.5 Physiological data acquisition and processing
The ocular EMG signal and the ECG signal were recorded using the EOG100C and ECG100C
BIOPAC system modules and the software AcqKnowledge (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Santa
Barbara, CA). The ocular EMG signal was acquired using three 4mm Ag/AgCl electrodes.
The two active electrodes were placed below the lower eyelid 2cm apart and the ground
electrode was placed on the forehead. The signal was sampled at 2000Hz with on-line 0.05Hz
high-pass filter. The signal was then 40-500Hz band-pass filtered off-line in AcqKnowledge.
The signal was segmented at -100ms to 2000ms relative to noise onset, rectified, baseline
corrected (baseline -100ms to 0ms relative to noise onset) and averaged. For each condition,
maximum peak amplitudes were identified. Statistical analyses were carried out on values
obtained by the averaging the peak value and ±2 datapoints around the peak. EMG segments
in which the voltage did not peak over 0.01mV within the segment were removed. If for a
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participant 80% of the EMG segments could not be retained for all conditions, the participant
was removed from the analysis. Furthermore, because of the high interindividual variability
in startle response, startle data were converted into T-scores within participants. This allowed
to establish a common metric across participants. T-scores were calculated by transforming
z-scores: multiplying each z-score by 10 and then adding 50 (Levenston et al., 2000).
The ECG signal was acquired using three 11mm Ag/AgCl disposable electrodes. The
Lead II configuration was chosen because it outputs large positive R peaks. In the Lead II
configuration the positive lead is placed over the ribcage below the left breast, the negative
lead is placed below the right clavicle and the ground lead is placed below the left clavicle.
The signal was sampled at 2000Hz with on-line 0.05Hz high-pass filter. A 1Hz high-pass
filter was applied off-line. The data was then visually inspected: noisy segments of the data
were removed and the remaining good segments were concatenated. Peaks were identified
as the R peaks of the QRS complex. IBIs were calculated as the time difference between
consecutive R peaks. In order to exclude IBIs produced by ectopic beats, IBIs that were
longer than 1,800ms and shorter than the 25% of the preceding IBI were removed. Because
there is no consensus on the most appropriate way to edit ectopic beats (Lippman et al.,
1994; Peltola, 2012), no interpolation was carried out. In the time domain, the HRV indices
extracted were the mean of the IBIs from which ectopic beats have been removed, the SDNN
and the RMSSD. In the frequency domain, the ratio of low frequencies to high frequencies
(LF/HF) was calculated. In order to calculate the LF/HF, the spectral power was obtained
with the Fast Fourier Transformation. The LF/HF was then obtained by computing the
ratio between the integral of low-frequencies (LF boundaries: 0.04Hz-0.15Hz) and high-
frequencies (HF boundaries: 0.15Hz-0.4Hz). Participants in which the signal was too noisy
to detect R-R peaks, were removed from the analysis.
4.2.6 Statistical analyses
Participants were retained for statistical analysis only if they did not meet any exclusion
criteria (see sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.5). The data of the mean of the IBIs and the SDNN were
log-transformed to meet normality.
Hierarchical regressions were run to assess whether implicit measures predicted self-
report scores at the AMAS. Regressions were run separately for each implicit measure.
First, the regression coefficient of a regression with Prime Type as independent variable
and Implicit Measure as dependent variable was calculated separately for each participant.
Because the effect of prime on behavioural implicit measures was found to be inconsistent
across studies and between genders (Rubinsten et al., 2012; Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010),
the order of Prime Type as independent variable in the regression model was informed by
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the descriptive statistics of behavioural data (table 4.4). The prime order was the following:
positive prime, negative prime, neutral prime, maths prime. The same order was kept for
physiological data. Following individual regressions, a regression model with AMAS scores
as predictor and individual regression coefficients (β ) as response variable was run to assess
whether implicit measures predictes AMAS scores.
The participants were sorted into LMA, MMA and HMA using the AMAS (Alexander
and Martray, 1989). Participants falling within the first quartile were included in the LMA
group, participants falling within the second and third quartiles were included in the MMA
group and participants falling within the top quartile were included in the HMA group (Table
4.3). We obtained 12 LMAs, 16 MMAs and 12 HMAs. ANOVAs and BANOVAs with Group
as between-subjects factor and Prime Type as within-subjects factor were run on all implicit
measures. In the case of significant interaction in the overall ANOVA and support for the
alternative hypothesis in the overall BANOVA, one-way repeated measure ANOVAs and
BANOVAs were run to investigate the interaction. Pairwise t-tests Bonferroni corrected and
pairwise bayesian t-tests were run to investigate contrasts between conditions.
Furthermore, because HRV is also sensitive to attentional processes (Börger et al., 1999;
Luque-Casado et al., 2016; Richards and Casey, 1991), differences in HRV measures were
investigated by means of pairwise t-tests Bonferroni corrected and bayesian t-tests between
priming task, two-back task and resting state. Because the ANOVAs and BANOVAs on HRV
data did not show any difference between conditions in the priming task (see section 4.3),
the HRV data in the priming task were averaged across conditions to reduce the number of
contrasts.
Anxiety level AMAS TAI STAI-state STAI-trait
LMA 11.33 M 34.33 M 29.67 M 36.41 M
1.56 SD 12.91 SD 8.81 SD 8.96 SD
MMA 15.63 M 38.00 M 31.37 M 36.56 M
1.15 SD 13.44 SD 7.59 SD 9.68 SD
HMA 22.75 M 40.66 M 34.58 M 47.33 M
5.50 SD 13.09 SD 8.35 SD 8.79 SD
Table 4.3 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of at the AMAS, TAI, STAI-state and
STAI-trait questionnaires for the LMA, MMA and HMA groups.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Complexity and operation type
As sanity check, we run a one-way ANOVA with Operation Type as factor and paired t-tests
were run to check for the effect of Complexity on both reaction times (RTs) and accuracies.
For accuracies, the ANOVA run with Operation Type as factor was significant (F(3,117)
= 43.45, p ≤ 0.001, η2p = 0.27), result that was confirmed by the BF01 = 1.10e−28. Pairwise
t-tests Bonferroni corrected and bayesian pairwise t-tests showed that participants were
more accurate on additions than subtractions (t(39) = 4.22, p ≤ 0.001, BF01 = 0.006),
multiplications (t(30) = 9.91, p ≤ 0.001, BF01 = 3.75e−10), and divisions (t(39) = 7.27,
p ≤ 0.001, BF01 = 7.23e−7). Furthermore, they were more accurate on subtractions than
multiplications (t(39) = 7.24, p ≤ 0.001, BF01 = 7.78e−7) and divisions (t(39) = 5.04, p
≤ 0.001, BF01 = 0.0005). For RTs, the ANOVA run with Operation Type as factor was
significant (F(3,117) = 12.28, p ≤ 0.001, η2p = 0.10), result that was confirmed by the BF01
= 4.19e−8 . Pairwise t-tests Bonferroni corrected and bayesian pairwise t-tests showed that
participants were faster on additions than subtractions (t(39) = -8.78, p ≤ 0.001, BF01 =
8.88e−9) and multiplications (t(39) = -4.22, p ≤ 0.001, BF01 = 0.006). Participants responded
faster on trials with divisions than on trials with subtractions (t(39) = 3.60, p ≤ 0.01, BF01 =
0.03) and than on trials with multiplications (t(39) = 3.23, p ≤ 0.05). Regarding the contrast
between subtractions and multiplications, however, a BF01 = 4.41 suggests that the data are
likely to be observed under the null hypothesis. Descriptives are reported in table 4.5.
For Complexity, the pairwise t-tests and the bayesian pairwise t-tests showed that partici-
pants were more accurate (t(39) = 13.93, p ≤ 0.001, BF01 = 2.37e−34) and faster (t(39) =
-17.75, p ≤ 0.001, BF01 = 1.61e−64) on simple compared to complex operations. Descriptives
are reported in table 4.6.
4.3.2 Effect of anxiety
The ANOVA Anxiety Group × Prime Type was not significant neither for accuracy (F(6,111)
= 1.27, p = 0.27) nor RTs (F(6,111) = 1.04, p = 0.41). A BF01 = 227.21 for accuracy and a
BF01 = 56.37 showed that the data were respectively 227.21 and 56.37 times more likely to
be observed under the null hypothesis. Finally, the main effect of Group was not significant
neither for accuracy (F(2,37) = 1.15, p = 0.32, BF01 = 2.06) nor for RTs (F(2,37) = 0.08, p =
0.92, BF01 = 3.97).
The ANOVAs Anxiety Group × Prime Type (Fig. 4.3) were not significant and the
BANOVAs suggested that the data were likely to be observed under the null hypothesis for
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startle data (F(6,111) = 1.39, p = 0.23, BF01 = 60.70), for the mean of the IBIs (F(6,111)
= 1.06, p = 0.39, BF01 = 163.88), for the SDNN (F(6,111) = 1.90, p = 0.09, BF01 = 20.09)
and LF/HF ratio (F(6,111) = 1.41, p = 0.22, BF01 = 14.94). For the RMSSD, the ANOVA
Anxiety Group × Prime Type showed a significant main effect of Prime Type (F(3,111) =
3.57, p ≤ 0.05, η2p = 0.09, BF01 = 0.67) and a significant interaction between the two factors
(F(6,111) = 2.72, p ≤ 0.05, η2p = 0.13, BF01 = 0.34). Pairwise t-tests Bonferroni corrected
and bayesian t-tests showed that the difference between positive and negative primes was
significant (t(39) = -2.75, p ≤ 0.05, BF01 = 0.22) with the RMSSD being higher for negative
(µ = 63.44, σ = 44.53) than positive (µ = 57.97, σ = 39.40) primes. In order to study the
interaction, three one-way ANOVAs and BANOVAs were run for each anxiety group with
Prime Type as factor. The ANOVA and BANOVA run on MMA participants had an effect
of Prime type (F(3,45) = 4.29, p ≤ 0.01, η2p = 0.22, BF01 = 0.20). However, no pairwise
comparisons Bonferroni corrected were significant. Finally, no effect of Prime Type emerged
from the one-way ANOVAs and BANOVAs on LMA (F(3,33) = 0.12, p = 0.95, BF01 = 8.12)
and on HMA (F(3,33) = 1.33, p = 0.28, BF01 = 2.74).
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Figure 4.2 Boxplots of accuracy and RTs divided by complexity (top row) and operation type
(bottom row). Significant contrasts are marked with asterisks: * p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, ***
p≤0.001.
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Positive Negative Neutral Maths
Acc (%)
86.40 M 86.40 M 87.70 M 88.71 M
12.14 SD 11.94 SD 9.76 SD 10.28 SD
RTs (seconds)
2.18 M 2.19 M 2.31 M 2.40 M
0.83 SD 0.87 SD 0.87 SD 0.85 SD
Table 4.4 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of accuracy and RTs for trials in the four
affective priming conditions. Descriptives are calculated for all subjects grouped together.
Additions Subtractions Multiplication Divisions
Acc %
92.77 M 89.81 M 81.41 M 83.95 M
6.30 SD 7.79 SD 9.35 SD 8.78 SD
RTs (seconds)
2.07 M 2.33 M 2.29 M 2.13 M
0.45 SD 0.46 SD 0.45 SD 0.42 SD
Table 4.5 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of accuracy and RTs for the four operation
types. Descriptives are calculated for all subjects grouped together.
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Acc
93.52 M 80.58 M
RTs (seconds)
1.61 M 2.90 M
6.43 SD 8.46 SD 0.34 SD 0.59 SD
Table 4.6 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of accuracy and RTs for simple and
complex operations. Descriptives are calculated for all subjects grouped together.
4.3.3 Hierarchical regression
Following hierarchical regression on behavioural data, neither accuracy (F(1,38) = 0.01, p
= 0.90, R2 = 0.0004) nor RTs (F(1,38) = 0.56, p = 0.45, R2 = 0.01) predicted scores at the
AMAS (Fig. 4.4).
None of the physiological measures predicted AMAS scores (Fig. 4.4): neither startle
amplitude (F(1,38) = 0.21, p = 0.65, R2 = 0.005), nor the mean of IBIs (F(1,38) = 0.0001, p =
0.99, R2 = 2.718e−6), nor the SDNN (F(1,38) = 3.41, p = 0.07, R2 = 0.08), nor the RMSSD
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(F(1,38) = 0.17, p = 0.89, R2 = 0.0004), nor the LF/HF ratio (F(1,38) = 0.05, p = 0.83, R2 =
0.001).
4.3.4 Effect of WM load on physiological measures
Pairwise comparisons Bonferroni corrected and bayesian pairwise t-tests were run to assess
the effect of task on HRV measures (Fig. 4.5). The mean of the IBIs was larger in the priming
task than in the two-back task (t(39) = 2.68, p ≤ 0.05, BF01 = 0.26) and than during the
resting state (t(39) = 3.07, p ≤ 0.01, BF01 = 0.11). The SDNN was larger in the priming task
than in the two-back task (t(39) = 3.69, p ≤ 0.01, BF01 = 0.02). The RMSSD was larger in
the priming task than during the resting state (t(39) = 3.13, p ≤ 0.01, BF01 = 0.09). Finally,
the LF/HF ratio was smaller in the priming task then in the two-back task (t(39) = -3.86, p ≤
0.01, BF01 = 0.26). Descriptives are reported in table 4.7.
Priming Two-back Resting State
means IBIs
6.72 M 6.70 M 6.70 M
0.14 SD 0.14 SD 0.16 SD
SDNN
4.19 M 4.08 M 4.11 M
0.45 SD 0.49 SD 0.53 SD
RMSSD
59.85 M 55.04 M 53.04 M
39.68 SD 38.18 SD 38.53 SD
LF/HF
2.91 M 3.22 M 3.09 M
0.50 SD 0.57 SD 0.77 SD
Table 4.7 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of HRV measures in the priming task,
two-back task and resting state. Because no difference between conditions was found in the
priming task, data were grouped together.
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Figure 4.3 Plots of all implicit measures in the different affective priming conditions: accuracy,
reaction times (RTs), mean of the interbeat intervals (IBIs), standard deviation of the NN
intervals (SDNN), root mean square of the successive differences (RMSSD), ratio between
low and high frequencies (LF/HF ratio) and the startle reflex. The coloured lines represent
the three MA groups. Vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. No interaction between
Group and Prime Type was found to be significant in any of the implicit measures.
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Figure 4.4 Fit of the regression models for the group data for each implicit measure: accuracy,
reaction times (RTs), mean of the interbeat intervals (IBIs), standard deviation of the NN
intervals (SDNN), root mean square of the successive differences (RMSSD), ratio between
low and high frequencies (LF/HF ratio) and the startle reflex (EMG). On the x axis are
AMAS scores as predictor. On the y axis are the β coefficients obtained at the individual
level. The individual β coefficients were calculated for each participant by regressing the
physiological measure values on the Operation Type variable. Levels of the Operation Type
variable were ordered according to the behavioural descriptives.
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Contrasts between tasks for HRV measures: mean of the interbeat intervals (IBIs), standard
deviation of the NN intervals (SDNN), root mean square of the successive differences
(RMSSD), ratio between low and high frequencies (LF/HF ratio). Because no difference
between conditions was found in the affective priming task, data from the affective priming
task were grouped together. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Significant




The relationship between MA and maths performance is a question that is still under investi-
gation. While some hypothesize that cognitive difficulties are the cause of MA, others suggest
that MA interferes with executive functions such as WM and attentional processes, leading
to poor maths performance (Carey et al., 2016). The difficulty in unravelling such complex
relationship also depends on the complexity of MA in itself. MA is a complex construct
that touches aspects of cognition, metacognition and physiology, making it challenging to
measure and assess. The most common measure of MA is done through self report measures.
However, self reports present two major limitations. First, their validity partially relies on
honesty and metacognitive skills. Second, because of their narrative fashion they do not
provide information on automatised processes affected by MA. Hence, the last two decades
have seen an increased interest in implicit measures of MA.
In the present study, an affective priming task paired with an arithmetic verification task
while measuring startle reflex and HRV was used to investigate implicit measures of MA.
In the priming task, primes were words that could either have positive, negative or neutral
valence, or be maths-related. Each prime word was followed by an arithmetic operation
that the subject had to judge correct or incorrect. During the task, startle reflex and heart
rate (to obtain HRV indices) were measured. Behavioural data and physiological data were
analysed as implicit measures of MA. Differences in the affective priming effect between MA
groups was assessed for both behavioural and physiological data. Furthermore, I looked at
whether the AMAS predicted implicit measures values. Finally, to look at the influence that
WM might have played on HR data, HRV measures during a two-back task and 5 minutes
resting state were compared to experimental data from the affective priming task. Overall,
the results obtained from this experiment did not allow me to reject the null hypothesis.
Specifically, the emotional manipulation did not produce any effect on the implicit measures
that could discriminate between different levels of MA. Similarly, implicit measures did not
predict ratings to the AMAS scale. The comparison of physiological measures between the
priming task and the two-back task suggests that there might have been a generic effect of
emotional priming elicited by words carrying semantic meaning compared to simple WM
load. However, such effect did not vary across anxiety group nor prime type.
4.4.1 MA and the affective priming effect on behavioural data
The effect of operation type and complexity on both accuracy and RTs confirms effects
widely reported in mental arithmetic literature (Campbell and Alberts, 2009; Dagenbach and
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McCloskey, 1992; De Smedt et al., 2010; Núñez-Peña et al., 2006; Roussel et al., 2002). A
perhaps surprising effect is that divisions were solved faster than subtractions. However,
the fact that responses to divisions were less accurate, suggests a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
Although the main effect of Operation Type and Complexity did not contribute towards
resolving the research question, it allows me to conclude that participants did understand the
task and were performing it according to the task instructions. This is important especially in
light of negative results obtained on factors interactions.
The results of the present experiment replicated neither the study of Rubinsten and
Tannock (2010) nor Rubinsten et al. (2012). First, the BF01 of the Group × Prime Type
interaction suggested decisive evidence for H0 for accuracy and very strong evidence for H0
for RTs (see section 4.3.2 and table 1.1 for BF interpretation). According to the previous
work of Rubinsten and colleagues (2010, 2012), I expected HMAs to respond faster to
operations when preceded by negative word primes compared to when preceded by positive
word primes. That would have suggested that for HMAs the emotional valence of negative
priming word acts as affectively related prime. Corroborating the suggestion that a priming
task paired with an arithmetic verification task may be a tool to obtain implicit measures of
MA. However, this was not the case in the present study. The main effect of MA group was
not significant either and, while for accuracy there was only anecdotal evidence for H0, there
was substantial evidence for H0 for RTs. Finally, the AMAS predicted neither accuracy nor
RTs.
The present data suggest that MA did not affect performance on the verification task,
regardless of Prime Type, that MA did not modulate priming effects and that AMAS scores
do not predict behavioural data on the priming task. Taken together the results suggest that
the affective priming task might not be an effective tool to measure MA.
4.4.2 Physiological data
The data suggested that the priming task did not have any effect on any of the physiological
measures. Specifically, the evidence for H0 was strong for the SDNN and for the LF/HF
ratio, very strong for the startle reflex and decisive for the mean of the IBIs (see table 1.1
for BF interpretation). The RMSSD was the only HRV measure that showed an effect of
Prime Type and a significant interaction. However, the evidence is not strong enough to allow
me to interpret such a finding. First of all, decomposing the interaction did not reveal any
significant pairwise comparison. Second, the BF01 of the main effect of Prime Type and of
the interaction suggest that the evidence is only anecdotal. Finally, regarding the main effect
of Prime Type, the BF01 for the pairwise comparison between positive and negative prime
word types provides evidence neither for H0 nor for H1. Hence, no interpretation should be
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done on the RMSSD. Furthermore, AMAS scores did not predict any of the physiological
measures.
HRV is not only sensitive to emotion regulation but also to attentional processes and
cognitive workload (Börger et al., 1999; Luque-Casado et al., 2016; Richards and Casey,
1991). While all four priming conditions had comparable WM load as a result of stimulus
randomization, the need of engaging attentional resources in itself might have overshadowed
the effect of emotional priming. Therefore, I compared the HRV measures obtained during
the priming task to a challenging WM task with no emotional manipulation and to a passive
resting state. Regarding time measure of HRV, participants showed more variability in the
priming task compared to the two-back task (in mean of the NN intervals and SDNN) and to
the resting state (in the RMSSD). While no difference was found between priming conditions
and while no difference was found between groups, higher HRV in the priming task compared
to when no emotional regulation is required, might suggest that the affective priming task
did induce emotion regulation in participants and that the variability was emotion-specific
and not influenced by attentional processes. However, the data seem to suggest that the
sensitivity of HRV measure to emotion regulation is not sensitive enough to discriminate
between emotional valence or between MA group. Alternatively, the task did not induce any
priming effect that could be detected by physiological measures. That would be supported by
the lack of priming effect in the behavioural data.
Also frequency-domain measures distinguished the priming task from the two-back task.
However, the directionality of the effect is unexpected. According to the classical interpreta-
tion of the LF/HF ratio, lower ratios are thought to reflect parasympathetic activation which
is dominant when we engage in tend-and-befriend behaviours (Shaffer and Ginsberg, 2017).
In the context of the present research, it seems unlikely that parasympathetic activation is the
branch of the autonomic system mostly activated during a task involving maths. Especially
in a sample in which HMAs were included, albeit the comparison between tasks was run
on the whole sample. As reported in the introduction, HRV has been measured through a
wide number of different indexes. In the present thesis and for sake of comprehensiveness
both time-domain and frequency domain measures were included. However, it is known
(as also reported in the introduction) that the interpretation of frequencies as measures of
sympathovagal balance has been challenged (Billman, 2013; Shaffer and Ginsberg, 2017;
Shaffer et al., 2014).
4.4.3 Limitations and directions for future research
The present study does not provide strong conclusions on implicit measures of MA. The
failed replication of Rubinsten and Tannock (2010) and Rubinsten et al. (2012) on the level of
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behavioural data suggests that the lack of effect on physiological measures of MA might stem
from the ineffectiveness of the task in itself. It could be argued that the frequentist ANOVAs
with three groups were run on low power. Nevertheless, group sizes were comparable to
those in Rubinsten and Tannock (2010) and Rubinsten et al. (2012). Furthermore, bayesian
analyses strongly supported evidence for the null hypothesis. In addition, the regressions
run on the whole group had poor fit and were not significant. It is possible that the ordering
of the variable Prime Type in the individual regressions was not optimal. However, I chose
such order informed by the descriptive statistics. No other order was used to comply with
scientific rigour and prevent p-hacking.
One potential limitation concerns the level of anxiety of the sample. While the sample
has been divided into three anxiety levels based on the distribution of AMAS scores within
the sample, it may be that overall participants were not math anxious enough to display
any physiological or behavioural effect at the emotional priming task. Indeed, Hopko et al.
(2003a) report that in a sample of undergraduate students with mean age 19 the mean AMAS
score was 21.1 (SD = 7.0) with reported gender differences (in females M = 21.9, SD = 6.9,
in males M = 19.5, SD = 6.9). The majority of the sample in the current study is pooled
from the population of university students at Cambridge. Given the high academic standard
required to access such institution is notoriously high, it is possible that the sample was not
adequately representative of the general population. With relatively low scores at the AMAS
(table 4.2.2) the characteristics of the sample might have contributed at the lack of positive
results.
Investigating the theoretical grounds of affective priming effects goes beyond the purpose
of this study. Nevertheless, it may be hypothesized that the affective priming task influences
behaviour by cognitively associating psychological events that hold similar emotional value.
However, such effect may not be strong enough to elicit a full emotional response both
behaviourally and physiologically. In the present study I adopted the task developed by
Rubinsten and Tannock (2010) as it is one of the very few studies investigating behavioural
implicit measures of MA and allowed me to build up evidence from the already limited
literature available.
The fact that the manipulation did not elicit the expected results highlights the need of
independent replication of the behavioural results. However, there are several aspects that
may have contributed to a failed replication. The first factor may be the choice of priming
words. The exact words used for the original study could not be used in this context as the
original sample was formed of Hebrew speaking individuals while the present study was
carried in an English speaking country. While the present selection of words attempted at
keeping the same criterion (similar words length on average and similar valence score and
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same part of speech), other characteristics of the words might have played a role in the failed
replication. For example, words were not matched for frequency. In particular, the database
used for the selection of the English words (ANEW), did not contain enough maths words.
As a result, the maths words used in this study were likely to be less common than those
used by Rubinsten et al. (2012). Furthermore, other than language, cultural differences and
differenced in educational practices should also be taken into consideration as possible covert
variables influencing the failed replication.
Another difference concerns the group factor. In the current study, level of anxiety was
the between-group factor. On the other hand, in Rubinsten et al. (2012) it was gender. The
present study was designed on the assumption that the emotional priming effect could be
regarded as valid and reliable measure of MA if it effectively distinguished between groups
that are considered to differ in MA, regardless of the factor in itself. However, that is probably
not the case in this scenario. One possibility is that the priming effect may be effective in
assessing differences in MA between genders but not between anxiety levels. Considering
that in Rubinsten et al. (2012) males and females presented somehow contrasting behavioural
responses, grouping both genders together might have caused such effects to cancel out.
Finally, the present study suggests that it is yet too early to combine the assessment
of behavioural and physiological implicit measures within one study. Given the need of
replication and the methodological complexity of psychophysiological research, at this stage
it is advisable to re-think how implicit measures of MA should be investigated. First, the
number of psychophysiological indexes that may be employed in such research is quite
big. A striking example is the number of measures of HRV, both in the time and in the
frequency domain. While an abundant pool of measures may create an appealing ground for
experimentation and testing, that comes with challenges. Indeed, a big number of measures
may mean bigger variability in the results, especially at a stage in which literature on
physiological measures of MA is scarce. That is particularly true in the context of physiology
where there may be substantial individual variability and where the signal to noise ratio is
admittedly an issue in the field. Hence, I believe that at this stage there should be an effort in
employing a limited set of measures, aiming at narrowing down the pool to those that may
be the most sensitive to assessing MA. In particular, it should not be overlooked that MA is a
type of anxiety that affects real people in real life scenarios. Research should keep in mind
the future goal of assessing MA in ecologically valid settings. Hence, not all measures may
be suitable, for instance, during classroom testing. An example might be the startle reflex,
which requires the presentation of white noise to be elicited. Hence, measuring the startle
reflex might not be ideal for online testing during real-life scenarios. Another way in which
research should be re-thought is by assessing implicit measures with the aid of experimental
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manipulations that have reliably elicited strong effects in MA individuals. Alternatively, by
selecting a sample in which LMAs and HMAs present extreme scores to self-report measures.
Indeed, a limitation of this study is that the priming effect might not have been efficient
enough in eliciting an anxious response in MA individuals.
4.5 Conclusions
In summary, the aim of the present study was to investigate implicit measures of MA. The
research question was driven by the existing gap between the available measures of MA
mostly relying on self-report and the automatised nature of the processess affected by MA
and of anxious responding. To this aim we used an affective priming task paired with an
arithmetic verification task, as well as physiological recordings of the startle reflex and HRV.
Despite the lack of sensitivity of the measures chosen in the present study to MA levels, the
scientific interest on implicit measures of MA should not be abandoned but rather re-thought.
First, replication of the available literature is paramount. Second, at this stage it is advisable
to assess behavioural and physiological measures separately. Employing tasks that allow for a
solid understanding of these measures before attempting to combine them in a comprehensive
single paradigm should be the first step.
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General Discussion and Conclusions
5.1 Theoretical framework
The present research project adopted physiological measures to investigate the relationship
between anxiety and working memory (WM). I decided to employ physiological measures
because they are sensitive to both anxious responses and executive processes. Given the
importance of WM for maths processing, physiological measures are appealing for advancing
our understanding of maths anxiety (MA).
WM is a limited capacity system where information is temporarily maintained and
manipulated in order to perform a task (Baddeley, 2010). The understanding of WM has
drawn substantial interest in the area of cognitive psychology and neuroscience since the
first conceptualization of a short term storage (STS) by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1971). Since
then, several models of WM have been developed. The model of Baddeley (Baddeley, 1992)
has had great influence on how we understand WM to this date. The main contribution of
Baddeley is the identification of distinct WM susbsystems that carry out specialized functions.
Of particular interest for the theoretical framework of this thesis is the central executive.
The central executive, as intended by Baddeley, is a modality-free subsystem that exerts
attentional control over encoded memory representations.
There are several reasons why the concept of central executive has influenced the current
work. First, executive functions are tightly related and partially overlap with attention.
Furthermore, attention plays a central role in both encoding and maintenance of information
in WM. Second, attentional and executive control are thought to be processes affected by
anxiety and to explain poor performance to cognitive tasks in anxious individuals. Third, I
believe that the intertwined relationship between attentional control, anxiety and performance
is key to understanding MA.
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5.2 Experimental work
The overarching question of the present thesis was whether anxiety affects the accuracy
of the representations in WM and whether that explains the detrimental effects of MA on
performance. WM is a process that is thought to be central to performing maths tasks and
hence it may have a key function in explaining the relationship between maths performance
and MA. Furthermore, this work approached the construct of anxiety from two angles. First,
in terms of source of noise causing a decrease in performance to tasks relying on WM.
Second, as evolutionary determined physiological reaction to stressors. The former conceptu-
alization of anxiety informed the parts of this thesis investigating the effects of anxiety over
WM. The latter provided the starting point to investigate how physiological measures may
provide insights on the relationship between WM processes and maths performance. Thus,
overcoming the limitations of self-report measures by taking advantage of the automaticity
of physiological responses. The work was carried out through three experiments that will be
now discussed.
The first experiment that was carried out (chapter 2) looked at attentional processes
engaged prior to memory encoding. While no anxiety was directly investigated, the idea
behind the experiment was to capitalize on the prestimulus subsequent memory effect
(psSME) originally reported by Otten et al. (2006). The aim was to assess whether the psSME
could be a phenomenon that may later be analysed to provide a insight on how anxiety effects
WM even before a stimulus is presented. Indeed, a central cognitive characteristic of anxiety
is the anticipation of threat. In more detail, selective attention as well as vigilance are thought
to be mechanisms through which items gain access to WM (Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). The
psSME was first observed by Otten et al. (2006) and refers to the phenomenon for which
prestimulus ERPs predict whether an item will or will not be encoded in memory. While
Otten et al. (2006) suggested that the psSME reflects semantic encoding, I argued that it
may instead reflect attentional processes. The interest in disambiguating the nature of the
psSME is to be linked to the influence of anxiety on WM. Indeed, anticipation of threat is a
key feature of anxiety (Grillon, 2008). If the psSME reflected attention allocation before the
presentation of a stimulus, it would provide a useful tool to investigate how anxiety might
affect the efficiency of WM memory encoding even before a stimulus is presented. Hence,
the rationale behind the choice of investigating the psSME in the context of anxiety was
driven by the common anticipatory aspect of both attention and anxious responding.
To test whether the ERP psSME reflects attentional processes, I first wanted to replicate
Otten et al. (2006)’s work. Indeed, how reviewed in chapter 2 introduction, the topography
and timing of the psSMEs reported in literature vary substantially. To this aim, I recruited 60
participants (Otten et al. (2006) only tested 24 participants and run analysis on 21) to achieve
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better statistical power. As part of the experiment, participants had to perform the same
encoding and recalling tasks as in the original paper. Then, to test if the psSME reported by
Otten et al. (2006) is determined by attention mechanisms, the same sample of participants
was asked to perform an attention task. The attention task was a novel paradigm that I
developed specifically to make prestimulus ERPs comparable between tasks. The stimuli
in the attention task were strings of letters so no semantic process could be used to perform
the task. Second, the trials belonged to two conditions (high-attention and low-attention)
that depended on whether the preparatory engagement of attentional resources was key
in order to perform the task. The rationale was that the high-attention and low-attention
conditions corresponded to the remembered and forgotten conditions of the encoding task, if
the processes involved were the same.
As reported in the results section of chapter 2, we replicated Otten’s psSME in the
encoding task. However, I decided to analyse the data of the present thesis with both
frequentist and bayesian statistics. While the effect was reported as significant by frequentist
analysis, the BF obtained suggested that the evidence was inconclusive. Furthermore, no
evidence for an attentional effect was found in the attention task. Although from a first look at
the data it seemed that the direction of the ERP polarity were consistent with the hypotheses,
the effect did not reach significance. A lack of effect in the attention task invalidated any
conclusion I could draw from the difference, or lack thereof, between the two tasks.
During data preprocessing, I encountered challenges in correcting for eye-blinks due to
the length of the analysed epochs. Several algorithms are available for eye-blinks correction,
however I wanted to approach the present research project with rigour and I wanted to
give preference to conservative methodologies. As a result, the data suffered a consistent
reduction. At the level of subject number (39 out of 60 were retained for analyses) and at
the level of trials per condition. Therefore, a combination of reduced power, high signal
variability and the psSME effect size made the present data only partially informative on
psSMEs.
Criticism may also be directed to the choice of tasks. First, one might argue that the
paradigm proposed by (Otten et al., 2006) tests encoding in long term memory (LTM).
However, I believe that this does not invalidate the choice of the encoding task. As reviewed
in the introduction, it is believed that retention of information in WM is a precursor of
encoding in LTM. As already early models suggested (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1971), executive
processes in WM have, amongst others, the function of preventing the decay of memory
representations. Maintained representations are then thought to be fed into LTM. Hence, I do
believe that the choice of task is still relevant in relation to the overall scope of this thesis.
Second, one might argue that the choice of the attentional task was suboptimal given that
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it was not a well established task. On one hand I would agree with such concern. On the
other, no other attention task in literature were suited to assess the psSME when considering
comparing the data with prestimulus ERPs from the encoding task. Moreover, the novelty of
the task wanted to be a contribution to original research despite risks of negative findings.
The results from the first experiment suggested that the psSME may indeed reflect
semantic processes rather than the recruitment of attentional resources. However, the results
are not unequivocally conclusive because of the methodological issues that contributed to
a signal to noise ratio that was below being ideal. If the psSME was indeed determined by
attentive processes, how induced anxiety affected such recruitment and how that affected
encoding in WM would have been the logical further questions to be asked. That would have
then led to the assessment of how anxiety affects memory representations during maintenance,
as done in the second experiment (chapter 3). It could be argued that the task adopted to
assess the psSME actually investigated LTM processes on verbal material while the following
aim was to look at the effect of anxiety on VSWM, which is the function thought to be central
to maths processing. The choice of task was made because the effects that were originally
reported were assessed using words. My prediction was indeed that such effects were not a
result of the recruitment of semantic processes but rather of attentional resources irrespective
of any semantic information carried by the stimulus. The experiment aimed at providing
a disambiguation between these processes, predicting that attentional processes explained
the psSME, which would have provided a starting point for addressing how anxiety affects
encoding in memory. That would have been particularly relevant in light of the overlapping
concepts of attention an WM in resource models, upon which the data of chapter 3 were
modelled. Nevertheless, the results to the first experiment did not justify further investigation
of the psSME in the context of the influence of anxiety over WM processes.
A mentioned, attention was central to the work carried out in chapter 3. In particular,
attentional processes are intended as functional to the maintenance of representations in WM,
specifically in visuospatial WM. As reviewed in this thesis’ introduction, resource models of
WM theorizes that WM is a limited resource system (Bays et al., 2009). These resources are
indeed attentive and are flexibly allocated. As a result, they can be redistributed across the
entire pool of items or can redirected, even retrospectively, towards task-relevant items at cost
of other items’ representations. Furthermore, representations in WM carry a certain degree
of noise. As a result, precision of recall may vary as function of several factors such as set
size or the salience of specific items for task performance (Bays et al., 2009). The chapter
aimed at directly answering the question of whether anxiety affects the maintenance of items
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in VSWM. I hypothesized that anxiety might impact the ability of attentional resources to
deal with noise, resulting in decreased precision of recall.
To test the hypothesis I combined a delayed-recall task with the NPU-threat of shock
protocol. This protocol is a well established technique to experimentally induce anxiety
(Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). It has been developed on the assumption that anxiety is elicited
by the anticipation of unpredictable threatening stimuli. Anxiety was measured using the
startle reflex. The experimental manipulation successfully elicited anxiety as shown by startle
data. However, there was no difference in precision of recall between the conditions. As
thoroughly elaborated in chapter 3 discussion, the lack of anxiety effect on precision of recall
might be due to several factors. One possibility is that anxiety does not decrease the ability
of executive functions to deal with noise. A second possibility is that set size was too small
for anxiety to have an impact on attentional resources detectable in behavioural data. Third,
the choice of shock delivery time within the trial might not have been ideal.
In the context of the overarching question of the present thesis, the chapter was aiming at
providing an insight on whether the detrimental effects of anxiety on maths performance was
due to increased noise in VSWM that would result in reduced discrimination between memory
representations. This would have suggested a mechanism through which MA affected maths
performance. The lack of effect may be due to the resilience of VSWM to noise or specific
methodological choices such as set size and type of threat. If the resilience of VSWM
explained the outcome of the study, then the processes affected by MA may be ascribed to
the verbal rather than visuospatial subsystem if WM. Alternatively, it may simply be resilient
up to a certain level of memory load that was not reached in the present experiment. On the
other hand, if the choice of threat is what has driven the results, that highlights the necessity
of adopting paradigms that are ecologically valid. That would be particularly true in the
context of MA in which the anxious response and its resulting physiological arousal are
elicited by a very specific kind of threat such as maths.
Despite the null results, chapter 3 still provides some advancements in the field. On
the technical level, it suggested how threat of shock and delayed-estimation paradigms
could be used to investigate how anxiety effects memory. Second, it suggests (although it
should be replicated) that with small set sizes attentional resources are sufficiently resistant
to anxiety and able to deal with noise. Because of the null results, several adjustments
could have been done to the study. For example, the same study could have been run with
a higher number of trials in order to rule out that the results where due to the resilience of
VSWM to anxiety at a relatively low memory load. It could be argued that dropping such
choice constitutes a missed opportunity. While agreeing, I would also argument that the thesis
proposed investigate the effect of anxiety in the framework of MA. Unfortunately, the specific
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question on the impairment of WM under the influence anxiety could not be conclusively
addressed and further investigation would have deviated the focus of the thesis towards a
narrow investigation on WM. While that would have been interesting and justifiable in it’s
own rights, the original idea was to assess the effect of anxiety on basic cognitive processes
in order to shed light on the mechanisms impacted by MA. Because such link could not
be established, we made the methodological choice to look at anxiety from the perspective
of a physiological reaction to threat. This may have allowed us to take advantage of the
automaticity of physiological arousal to study MA, overcoming limitations of subjective
reporting. Hence, the choice was made to focus on MA in terms of an automatic physiological
response induced by a the cognitive association between maths and threat.
The experimental work carried out in chapter 4 looked at physiological measures of
MA. The link between maths processing and WM is widely accepted and it was reviewed
in the introduction of this thesis. In particular, studies consistently found evidence for the
involvement of the central executive in performing maths while the involvement of the
slave systems seems less clear (DeStefano and LeFevre, 2004). MA is usually measured by
means of self report questionnaires (Devine et al., 2012). The use of self-reports, although
widespread and easy to implement, has its limitations. Questionnaires assume honesty in the
responses, good metacognition and a certain degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity.
All factors that make questionnaires easily affected by biases. Most importantly for the
present thesis, physiological change is a core aspect of anxious responding. Moreover, WM
has been found to mediate the relationship between MA and physiological measures in several
instances (Al’Absi et al., 2002; Shaffer and Ginsberg, 2017; Vedhara et al., 2000). Taken
these factors together, investigating physiological arousal is necessary to reach comprehensive
understanding of MA.
The aim of chapter 4 was to assess physiological measures in MA while replicating
Rubinsten et al. (2012)’s results. In Rubinsten et al. (2012), the task is an affective priming
task paired with an arithmetic verification task. Such task was developed by to assess implicit
behavioural responding in MA participants. Affective priming words were presented before
an arithmetic operation that participants had to judge correct or incorrect. Startle reflex and
HRV indices were analysed as physiological measures. Furthermore, participants performed
an 2-back task to assess the influence of WM on HRV indices as opposed to HRV emotional
regulation. Data were analysed for three MA groups and implicit measures were compared
to AMAS scores.
I was not able to replicate the original findings on behavioural measures. I could not detect
differences related to levels of MA neither in behavioural measures nor in physiological
measures. Given that I could not detect a group difference, it is not surprising that no
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difference was detected in the physiological indices as well. Regarding WM, HRV indices
seemed to suggest that HRV reflected some emotional regulation happening during the
affective priming task. However, given that no group effect was found, little can be drawn in
terms of anxious responding in the context of MA.
The study wanted to combine the replication of previous literature that provided a first
attempt at using implicit measures of MA (Rubinsten and Tannock, 2010) with the assessment
of physiological indexes as potential implicit measures. Language differences between the
original study (conducted in Hebrew) and the present study (conducted in English) constituted
the main methodological challenge. That is because the priming words had to be drawn from
different databases. On one hand, it may be argued that cognitive and physiological effects
should be robust enough to overcome language differences. That is true especially if looking
at the bigger picture, where research in cognitive and educational contexts should be able to
provide knowledge that is applicable to real life scenarios, in which the complexity of the
reality requires methodologies to be robust to the influence of covert variables. On the other
hand, research should start from basic questions and provide incremental knowledge from
the available literature. Combining ecologically valid research and a suitable experimental
paradigm has been proved to be a challenging task.
5.3 A note on failed replication
The present work did not output the results that every researcher would hope for the sake
of academic publications and, why not, personal satisfaction. Did this project fall into the
quicksand of the replication crisis? The studies in this thesis present some limitations that
have been reported in the experimental chapters. However, I believe discussing issues related
to failed replication is relevant for integrating the results of the present thesis within the
bigger picture of scientific research.
In a multi-year study, Johnson et al. (2017) attempted to replicate 100 psychological
experiments. 97% of the original studies reported significant results but only 36% of the
replicated ones did. The authors suggest that more than 90% of tests performed in psychology
tested negligible effects. Furthermore, Szűcs and Ioannidis (2017) analysed published effect
sizes and statistical power in influential psychology and cognitive neuroscience journals.
Shockingly, journal impact factor negatively correlated with statistical power. The authors
concluded that false report probability may exceed 50% for the literature in the field.
There are several factors that can undermine reproducibility. Low power, analyses
flexibility, selective reporting, unclear methodology are all factors that increase the probability
of Type I error as well as inflating true effect sizes (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2008).
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It has been reported that it is not uncommon practice to repeatedly check for statistical
significancy while gradually adding participants and to post-hoc regroup participants by
unplanned grouping variables (Szűcs, 2016). Moreover, researchers often treat p-values
as a trichotomous index for strong evidence, weak evidence and no evidence while in fact
p-values is a continuous variable (Gelman, 2013). Finally, in neuroscience procedures of
double-dipping are widespread (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009). All together, improper practices
and misconception of frequentist statistics contribute to low replicability in the field. By
raising the issue of reproducibility I am not necessarily pointing the finger against the specific
work upon which this thesis has been developed. However, I do think that it is important to
be aware that methodological pitfalls are common and at times accepted in our field.
The experiment reported in chapter 2 attempted a direct the replication of the psSMEs
reported in the study of Otten et al. (2006). To do so the same experimental procedure was
used, keeping stimuli and presentation the same. There were two main differences between
the two studies. As mentioned in the chapter, the list of words were matched for word length
and for occurrences per million although not all words were the same between the two studies.
That is because I thought that some words included in the original paper were ambiguous
when it came to animacy judgement (as it was the case for words of fruits and vegetables).
Having substitute those with non-ambiguous words, should have not impacted the results. A
second difference concerns the recording equipment and some data preprocessing choices.
While Otten et al. (2006)’s data were recorded with 58 scalp electrodes, the data in the present
thesis were recorded with 129 electrodes. Furthermore, some preprocessing choices differed.
For example, in the original paper eye-blinks were corrected with regression methods while
in this thesis epochs with eye-blinks were rejected. In both studies data were analysed on a
minimum of 15 good trials per condition. Other details on the preprocessing, for example
the maximum number of interpolated channels accepted for analysis were not reported by
Otten et al. (2006). Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to expect that all studies are run with
the same equipment and preprocessing choices are also made on the basis of the quality
of the collected data, which is liked to the quality of the recording system and setup. It is
possible that the fact that producing a weak and non-conclusive replication of the psSME
while having better statistical power (n=39 in the present research while n=21 in the original
paper) was influenced by the quality of the data and by preprocessing choices. That is the
reason why published preprocessing pipelines like the PREP-pipeline (Bigdely-Shamlo et al.,
2015) used in chapter 2 should be encouraged.
Regarding chapter 3, the results do not necessarily constitute a failed replication. That is
because the independent variable was different from the ones of the original papers (Bays
et al., 2011; Pertzov et al., 2013). In the original studies stimulus features such as number of
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items or type of presentation were the independent variables manipulated. However, in the
experiment reported in chapter 3, the experimental manipulation was probability of shock
which was unrelated to the stimuli. Because the manipulation of the independent variable
was of different in nature between the two studies, null results reflect a genuine absence of
effect rather than a failed replication.
There are three points that should be discussed regarding the null results of chapter 4. The
first is that some of the dependent variables chosen were different from the original studies
upon which the experiment was designed (Rubinsten et al., 2012; Rubinsten and Tannock,
2010). Not only, while heart rate had already been used to assess MA (Hopko et al., 2005,
2003), the experiment in chapter 3 was the first attempt at analysing indexes of heart rate
variability (HRV). Hence, the results on behavioural implicit measures found in (Rubinsten
et al., 2012) could not be replicated, or rather, could not be generalised to other implicit
measures.
The second aspect concerns the fact that the effect over behavioural data was not repli-
cated. Such failed replication may be due to a missed generalisation of the effect to a sample
that has been grouped according to different criteria. While in the original study the group
factor was gender, in the present research the group factor depended on anxiety levels. The
assumption made when designing the experiment was that, if the effective priming task was
a valid measure of MA, then the effect found between genders should also be found between
levels of anxiety given comparable demographics between the studies. In the discussion of
chapter 4, a point was raised about how the differences in AMAS scores between groups
were small probably due to the high achieving university population. However, my argument
is that replication becomes difficult when effects are not robust enough to be generalised to
different groups under the same assumption. In this specific case, that the groups differ in the
subjective response to maths-related stimuli. Publication of both positive and null results,
as well as all effect sizes would greatly help in interpreting results and in informing better
experimental designs.
Finally, the third aspect concerns the difficulties in replicating results across different
languages when the task requires verbal stimuli or a verbal response. The issue with
replicating Rubinsten et al. (2012)’s results might be linked to the impossibility of drawing
the priming stimuli from comparable databases. Choosing appropriate and comparable
stimuli was made even harder by a lack of description on words attributes (such as valence
ratings) in the original study. To overcome this issues it is important to draw stimuli from
published datasets when possible. Moreover, there should be a scientific effort into validating
datasets across cultures and languages as it is been done for the ANEW (Montefinese et al.,
2014; Redondo et al., 2007; Soares et al., 2012).
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By no means I claim that the present research is perfect and would not benefit from
methodological improvements. Methodological shortcomings have indeed been discussed in
each experimental chapter. However, I think that factors that introduce variability in the data
such as small effect sizes, different methodological choices and inherent cultural differences,
make results difficult to replicate and might have partially contributed to the null results
reported in this thesis.
To the best of my abilities, I attempted at approaching the work conducted in this
thesis project with rigour and intellectual honesty. Explorative analyses were interpreted
as such and bayesian factors provided additional information and validation of frequentist
statistics. Hypothesis testing is after all an exercise of planned guessing on the basis of
a-priori information and theoretical beliefs. There would be no need of hypothesis testing
if research was not naturally intertwined with uncertainty. In simple terms, I believe that
guessing it wrong is not less valuable that guessing it right, as long as the hypothesis are
grounded in a solid theoretical framework. Nevertheless, I do believe that publication bias
and low reproducibility in the field of psychophysiology and cognitive neuroscience may
have contributed to the null results reported in this thesis.
5.4 Suggestions for further research
Directions for future research for the specific improvement of each experiment were dis-
cussed in each experimental chapter. Methods for eye-blink correction may help in reducing
the variability in the data of chapter 2 and time-frequency analysis may provide additional in-
formation on whether the psSME is of attentional nature. Multivariate pattern analyses could
be used to decode the cognitive process involved in the psSME. Furthermore, optimizing the
attention task as suggested in the discussion of chapter 2 would indeed allow us to properly
test the original hypotheses.
Although weak, the results of chapter 2 seemed to point towards semantic processes being
responsible for the psSME. However, processing maths is thought to rely on visuospatial
skills. Therefore, it would be interesting whether psSMEs can be detected with visuospatial
stimuli. For example, arrays of objects that vary in colour or position could be presented and
participants would have to later recollect what array was previously presented amongst some
new ones. If the psSME can be detected with visuospatial material, then high maths-anxious
(HMAs) and low maths-anxious (LMAs) could be compared to assess whether they differ in
VSWM encoding. If that was the case, it would provide an insight into cognitive differences
between groups, regardless of anxious arousal. However, it is possible that the two groups
would not differ in a context where anxiety is not elicited. Hence, it would be interesting
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to integrate the NPU-threat test with such paradigm to assess difference in susceptibility to
stress during VSWM encoding. Because combining EEG with shock administration would
probably not fall short of methodological challenges, shocks could be replaced with other
threatening stimuli not involving electricity (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012). Finally, paradigm
assessing the psSME with vusuospatial material could be combined with maths tasks to
assess the effect of anxious responding when maths is explicitly required to perform a task.
Regarding the research questions addressed in chapter 3, increasing set size in the
experiment or employing several set sizes would be the first step to take in order to assess
the effect of anxiety over the allocation of flexible resources. If again there was no effect of
anxiety on precision of recall it could be suggested that anxiety does not impact how attentive
resources deal with noise during visuospatial WM maintenance. It may be that visuospatial
WM is less disrupted by anxiety compared to other subsystems. Alternatively, it may be that
the attentional resources engaged in WM maintenance are dissociable from the executive
functions impacted by anxiety as theorized by the available models (for instance the ACT).
Different maths-anxious groups could be compared. It would be possible to test whether
HMAs have decreased precision of recall compared to LMAs or whether thei precision of
recall is more disrupted by increasing set sizes. This would give an insight into whether
HMAs are more susceptible to noise generated by internal representations. Similarly, a
delayed-estimation task could be combined with a maths task. This would allow to assess
whether maths task increases anxious arousal in HMAs and whether that has a detrimental
effect over maintenance in VSWM.
Regarding chapter 4, the affective priming task paired with the arithmetic verification task
needs replication or at the very least conclusive evidence for the unsuitability of such task.
Optimising the choice of priming words as well as selecting participants with extreme values
at the AMAS would be the first step to specifically improve the work already conducted in
this thesis. On a more general level, the importance of physiological measures of MA should
still be kept under the focus of attention of psychophysiology. What is needed at this stage
is determining reliable measures of anxiety that could be then employed to assess anxiety
in specific scenarios. Measures of HRV need to be investigated further as HR data have the
advantage of being easy to collect in real life situations. For example, the growing use of
sport watches with integrated HR monitor make HR a very appealing measure for testing
during real maths exams in school. HR is an easily acquirable measure of MA that is suited
for ecologically valid testing.
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5.5 Conclusions
In summary, the present thesis adopted physiological measures to investigate the relationship
between anxiety and WM. Furthermore, the importance of WM for maths processing and
the sensitivity of physiological measures to both anxious responses and executive processes
make these measures appealing for advancing our understanding of MA.
The experimental work did not output the expected results. First, the prestimulus memory
effect was replicated although the replication cannot be interpreted as conclusive. In addition,
I was not able to convincingly resolve the debate over the nature of such effect. Second, it
has emerged that there is no effect of anxiety of the flexible allocation of resources in WM,
at least with small set sizes. Third, the affective task paired with the verification task did not
replicate the original behavioural findings. Hence, not surprisingly little was found in the
physiological measures as well. While methodological shortcomings have been discussed in
the thesis, low reproducibility in the field of physiology and cognitive neuroscience might
have played a role in the final outcome of the preset research project.
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